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Secretary of the Navy .John I). Long's authorization of the General
Hoard in March of 1900 marked a significant shift in naval administra-
tive practice as it applied to war planning. The Board, composed of
some of the Navy's most capable officers, advised the Secretary with
respect to America's probable enemies, the manner in which future
conflicts should be fought, and the best way to prepare for them from
a naval point of view. Until that time, the civilian chiefs of the Navy
did not have a formal system of counsel on the overall needs of the
service in the area of war plans and war preparations.
This dissertation is a study of the General Hoard from the 1900
to 1914 period. It analyzes the Board's origins and describes its
organization, operation, and relationship with other Navy Department
components. Also examined are the Board's estimates as to the
"threats" to U. S. security, and its proposals relative to naval bases,
ship strength, and the strategical disposition of the fleet.
The primary source materials used consisted of the rather exten-
sive official files of the General Board maintained at the Office of
Naval History in Washington, I). C. and the archives of the Naval War
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College deposited at Newport, R. I. and Mechanicsburg, Pa. They
were supplemented by the substantial number of personal papers of
naval officers who were cither directly or indirectly connected with
the General Board.
The Board grew out of a movement which began at the Naval War
College in the late 1880's and early 1890 's and which was led by
lluar, Atimiral Henry C. Taylor, The objective was to make war
planning a full time activity so as to better prepare the Navy for war.
The formation of the General Board, while a progressive step, fell
short of Taylor's goals because of Secretary Long's fear that exces-
sive power in the hands of the war planners would lessen his control
and dissatisfy the firmly entrenched bureau chiefs. Long's decision
to establish the Board was based in large part on the need to assign
Admiral George Dewey to a position of prestige. He became President
of the new organization and remained its principal officer for seventeen
years.
Although Dewey was the nominal head, Hear Admiral Taylor
dominated the Board's early years. Despite continual resistance
from the bureau chiefs, he proved the Board's usefulness and markedly
increased the effectiveness of the Navy's war planning. However,
Taylor failed in his efforts to develop the Board into a more authorita-
tive organ with powers akin to those of the bureaus. So strong was the
opposition within the bureaus and Congress to the new approach to war

planning, that Taylor found it impossible to oven achieve legislative
recognition of the Board as a permanent part of tiic Navy's adminis-
trative structure.
The problem of defining the Board's role in the Navy Department
continued after Taylor's death in 1904, but took on a new perspective
when line officer extremists, discouraged by Dewey's disinterest in
their cause, abandoned Taylor's evolutionary approach, advocated
the disestablishment of tire General Board, and the creation of a fui'l-
fledged general staff with authoritative direction over the bureaus.
Some of them suggested the desirability of doing away with the
Secretary of the Navy and indicated that they would not be satisfied
until they had a system which would automatically prepare the United
States for war. The evidence indicates that these radicals had little
if any appreciation for the problems of military planning in a demo-
cratic environment. Their entire philosophy suggested that they
would not be content with anything short of a militarist government.
Throughout most of the period under examination, the Board found
that its programs suffered because of poor secretarial stability. The
position of Secretary of the Navy was too often used as a way station
for other positions in government, or as a reward for distinguished
service elsewhere. Too few of the Secretaries remained in their posts
long enough to understand the complexities of war planning, or to be
able to restrain the independent bureau chiefs. A notable exception

was George von L. Meyer, who remained in office from 1901) to 1013
and established a system which ensured that npproved recommendations
of the Board would be implemented by the bureaus.
Board war plans were predicated on the estimate that American
security could be challenged by Germany in the Atlantic or Japan in
the Pacific, but not by both power's at the same time. Germany was
identified as a probable enemy by most naval officers even before the
Board was organized, and it continued in that status throughout the
time frame of this study. The prospect of war with Japan was not
seriously considered by the planners until after the schools* "crisis"
with Japan arose in 1906.
»
German ambitions were thought to lie principally in the Caribbean
.area, and it was here that the Board felt the decisive sea battles would
take place. Japan's major objective was to wrest the Philippines from
I . S. control. Board members were not sanguine about the outcome
of either conflict, but had more confidence in the American Navy's
ability to counter any German moves in the Caribbean. On the other
hand United States' weakness in the Pacific prompted the Board to con-
clude that the best reaction to Japanese aggression would be to abandon
fie Philippines, withdraw to Hawaii, and await reinforcements from
the Atlantic before engaging the Japanese fleet.
The Board's naval base policy was restrained, reasonable, and
consistent with the expanded territorial responsibilities brought about
<]
as a result of the Spanish- American War. However, it failed to find
favor in Congress and went largely unimplemcnted, because it re-
quired the expenditure of large sums in areas which did not directly
benefit home constituencies.
The Board's shipbuilding programs were also unsuccessful. They
Were based on the objective of achieving, in a specific period of time,
the construction of 48 battleships and a proportionate number of otaer
vessels. White this approach ensured numerical consistency, it a-
correcily assumed that the factors bearing on ultimate fleet strength,
such as German and Japanese building policies, would also remain
constant. In addition, it ignored the impracticability of achieving
governmental approval of specific long range programs in the light of
the congressional practice of appropriating funds on an annual basis.
The Board's shipbuilding programs failed in other aspects as well.
Its annual proposals were generally halved by Congress and perhaps
more significantly, altered to the extent that the desired balance
between battleship. s and other class vessels was never achieved.
While the Board was never satisfied with the growth of the
American fleet, it was able to transform the ships which the Navy
possessed from isolated and untrained units of power into fleets
capable of conducting complex multi-ship operations. The result was
a more responsive and professional iV'avy, far better equipped than
ever before to deal with prospective enemies.
(
The debate which took place within the Board and elsewhere over
i.nc proper disposition of American naval forces revealed that a wide
gap separated naval responsibilities and capabilities in the 1900 to
1914 period. The Navy was simply not prepared, from the standpoint
of bases and ships, to discharge all of the duties which the General
Board anticipated for it within the context of a two-ocean threat and
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In 196& then.' arc thousands of American naval officers in the
United States and elsewhere throughout the world whose primary
function is to plan for future wars. Every large naval staf'.* has a war
plans section which addresses itself to a vast range of possible con-
lingencics and tries to ensure that naval forces will be ready to
respond to them. In short, war planning is a fully institutionalized
endeavor in the United States Navy and the other military services.
This practice of treating war planning as a highly specialized
function is a fairly recent development. The Navy had been in
existence for well over a century before it had an organization whose
primary purpose was to advise the Secretary of the Navy with respect
to America's probable enemies, the manner in which future conflicts
should be fought, and the best way to prepare for them from a naval
point of view. The turning point carnc in March of 1900 when
Secretary of the Navy John D. Long established the General Board as
the Navy's first war planning agency.
The purpose of this study is to shed some light on the origins,
evolution, and inner workings of the General Board from its inception

in 1900 until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914. In addition, it
seeks to describe and analyze the Board's opinions as to the challenges
winch faced American security, and how it thought the Navy should be
prepared to respond to them.
The official files of the General Board, maintained in excellent
condition in the Navy's Operational Archives in Washington, D. C.
,
provide the bulk of the primary source material. I am indebted to
Hear Admiral Ernest M. Idler, Director of iNaVtfl History, for per-
mitting free access to these hies. 1 am also deeply appreciative of
the guidance and administrative support liberally offered by
Dr. Dean C. All.ird, Head of the Navy's Operational Archives and
custodian of the General Board records. Without the willing coopera-
tion of Dr. Allard and his capable staff this study would have been
much less pleasurable and far more difficult. In particular, I would
like to thank Miss Barbara Gilmore, Mrs. Mildred D. Mayeux,
Mr. Bernard Cavalcante, and Miss Sandra J. Brown, all assigned to
the Archives Branch of the Office of Naval History.
Because of the close ties which existed between the General Board
and the Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island, the archives of
the College were consulted and found to be extremely valuable. A
speedy course was steered through these records because of the knowl-
edgeable assistance of Mr. John DiNapoli, Director of Libraries at
the War College, and his assistant, Mrs. Lucille Rotchfort. A
substantial amount of War College material was located at the Federal
WWWW1W ' ,*-^y«-*o^,», -v»- ^_-___________

Records Center in Mcchanicsburg, Pennsylvania, and I am apprecia-
tive of the aid given me there by Mr. R. J. Williard, Chief Reference
Service Branch, and Mr. Fdward (luarna, his able assistant.
Most of the official government documents and secondary source
material used in this study were made available on long term loan
through the kindness of Mr. Walter B. Greenwood of the Navy Depart-
ment Library. He and his highly qualified staff manage one of the
richest collections of books and documents pertaining to naval subjects,
Portions of this study have been read by Dr. Dean Allard,
Dr. Mary Klachko, Miss Mary Loughlin, Mr. Bernard Cavalcante,
and Mr. James Stewart, and 1 am grateful for their constructive
comments. Dr. Klachko, now in the process of writing a definitive
biography of the.Navy's first Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
William S. Benson, has demonstrated that a clear understanding of
naval matters can be achieved by members of a sex who do not ordi-
narily go down to sea in ships.
Finally, and with disproportionate brevity, I would like to thank
Professor Rulil J. Bartlett of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplo-
macy. His wise counsel benefited me greatly, not only in this effort
out during the two years 1 studied under him at the Fletcher School.
While 1 owe much to the many who have helped me in this
endeavor, 1 accept full responsibility for its accuracy and contents.




On March 13, 1900, Secretary of the Navy John Davis Long signed
General Order number 544 creating the General Goard. The simple
act of affixing his signature to this paper was derivative of a new-
outlook on the problem of preparing for naval warfare and marked a
milestone in a long campaign by a few naval officers to organize the
Navj»to plan for war during times of peace. The Fedora 1. Navy,
created in 1798, had seen five wars and several crises and yet never
had, as part of its regular administrative machinery, an agency
devoted to the function of war planning. The old system assumed
there would be adequate time to prepare, and to lay the plans after a
war had begun. Why then in 1900, less than two years after an
apparently glorious and successful trial under fire in the Spanish War
did Long see fit to depart from the practice of the past 100 years?
The answer is a complex one, involving technological growth of naval
armaments, the determination of a few naval officers to recast the
Navy, acquire for it a larger role in the national life, and improve its
performance in war and under the threat of war.

The conflicts of the nineteenth century which most involved the
Navy were the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the
Spanish-American War. In 1812 all of the direction of the Navy was
concentrated in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. There was no
plan for war and few instruments with which to execute a plan if one
had been available. * When war with Great Britain became imminent.
Secretary Paul Hamilton sought professional advice as to the best
means of employing the small navy then available. The response was*
dissonant: Commodore John Rodgers favored concentration of naval
strength to force England to keep her ships together and thus minimize
commerce raiding operations; Commodore Stephen Decatur advocated
dispersion. There was no scheme for the consistent conduct of the
war, and it is doubtful whether one could have been developed by the
Secretary, encumbered as he was by the divergent views of such
distinguished naval officers. 2 There was no fleet organization; ship
captains operated directly under the orders of the Secretary of the
Navy. The experience of the war demonstrated the danger of impro-
visation and the merit of advance preparation. 3
1. Charles O. Paullin, Naval Administration Under Secretaries
of the Navy Smith, Hamilton, and Jones, 1801-1814, " United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 32 (December, 1906),
p. 1317.
2. Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry to Rear Admiral Henry C.
Taylor, February 24, 1904, Naval War College Archives,
Newport, R.I. ; Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of
American Naval Power, 1776-1918
,
(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1939), p. 77.
3. Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, p. 83.
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As a result, the system of naval administration was changed in
1815 to provide for professional counsel to the Secretary in the form
of the Board of Naval Commissioners. The Commissioners were to
be charged, among other things, with the employment of ships.
But this important duty was almost immediately removed from its
cognizance by Secretary of the Navy Benjamin W. Crowninshield, and
its respdnsibilities became almost exclusively civil in character. 5
How the Navy Commissioners would have responded to the adminis-
trative challenge of v/ar is uncertain, for the Navy remained untested
during the entire period of their existence. The Commissioners con-
tinued in power until 1842 when the growing complexity of a navy
making the transition from sail to steam, and the inability of the
Commissioners or the Office of the Secretary to manage the burgeoning
detail associated with naval administration, prompted Secretary Abel
Upshur to recommend to Congress the overhaul of the Navy's organi-
zation and the establishment of several functional bureaus to admin-
ister naval affairs. Significantly, none assumed cognizance over the
employment of ships and preparation for war, and the Secretary
remained the only coordinator of the individual bureaus. 6 The Bureau
4. Charles O. Paullin, Naval Administration Under the Navy
Commissioners, 1815-1842," United States Naval Institute
Proceeding s, Vol. 33 (June, 1907), p. 610.
5. Ibid.
, pp. 610-611.
6. Charles O. Paullin, "Naval Administration, 1842-1861."
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 33 (December,
1907), p. 1440.

System was oriented to manage the business of the construction of
ships, supplies, health, ordnance, and shipyards but not the business
of war. Additionally, the law establishing the bureaus contained no
provision for their cooperation. The effective control of these inde-
pendent entities demanded a dominant and knowledgeable Secretary.
"It was supposed, " Secretary of the Navy William C. Whitney re-
marked, "thfit the bureau chiefs would be able to sit in consultation
with the Secretary and that the department would not lack intelligent
guidance. ' However, Whitney found that the bureau chiefs were so
busy conducting the routine of their offices that they were not able to
counsel the Secretary on matters affecting the Navy as a whole. »
Others like Alfred Thayer Mahan were not so charitable. He
called the bureau heads "advocates" of their specialties but not
"advisers" to the Secretary. " He criticized the bureaus for not
representing the thinking of the line officers of the Navy and, instead,
adopting the parochial view of the staff corps. 10 Another line officer,
Richard Wainwright, reported to a colleague that "war is the last thing
that worries the mind of a bureau chief" and that "each bureau is its
7. U. S. , Department of the Navy, Report of the Secretary of the
Navy, 1885
,
(Washington, 1885), p. XXXVIII.
8. Ibid.
, p. XXXIX.
9. Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare, (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1908), p. 63.
10. William D. Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain
Alfred Thayer Mahan, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1939), pp. 240-241.

own critic and prepares a defense in place of looking for a remedy."^
Many Congressmen enjoyed working with the bureaus. It simplified
the quest for "pork barrel. " A Congressman like Ernest Roberts
could go to Rear Admiral Charles O'Neil, Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance, and ask him to include in his appropriations estimates, a
naval magazine in the home district and also "to impress the matter
upon the Secretary [so that] he can be induced to follow up [the]
recommendation with another equally strong. "" - Other Congressmen
looked on the Navy Department "not as a unit but as several pieces -
like a federation of states loosely held together. "^ A less partial
and more recent commentator, in a survey of naval administration in
the nineteenth century found that:
the Navy suffered on the one hand from overpowerfui bureaus,
each jealously guarding its respective prerogatives, unwilling
to yield authority to secure coordination, professionally
arrogant, and unmindful of the needs as such; and on the other
hand from the correlative vice of the Secretaries whose talents
were at times deficient and whose office was inadequately
staffed to enable them to exercise the powers of control that
were nominally those of the Secretary of the Navy. "
11. Richard Wainwright to Lieutenant Commander William S.
Sims, June 20, 1904, Sims Papers, Division of Naval History,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C. ; hereafter referred to as
the Sims Papers.
12. Roberts to O'Neil, August 22, 1902, Rear Admiral Charles
O'Neil Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
13. Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor to Rear Admiral Stephen B.
Luce, April 8, 1902, Luce Papers, Library of Congress.
14. Leonard D. White, The Republican Era, 1869-1901
,
(New
York: Macmillian Co. , 1958), p. 162.
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The first test of the bureaus' wartime responsiveness came during
Hostilities with Mexico, and as one historian notes, they were "unequal
to the task before them. " While the sea captains performed creditably,
it was in spite of and not because of the support which they received
from Washington. ^ This may have been the reason why Secretary of
the Navy Gideon Welles decided at the very beginning of the Civil War
to effect changes in the Navy's organization thus making it more re-
sponsive to war's demands. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Navy was established and filled by an ex-naval officer, Gustavus
V. Fox. It was his responsibility to ensure Lhat the bureaus worked
together as a team in providing logistics support to the forces afloat.
Welles also wanted to have professional advice on planning the war's
naval strategy and developing the specific operations to guarantee
success at sea. Accordingly, he organized the "Commission of Con-
ference" which was not unlike the old Board of Naval Commissioners. *"
The performance of the Navy during the Civil War was a source
of great satisfaction to many observers but in the eyes of the bureau
15. K. Jack Bauer, United States Naval Operations During the
Mexican War" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana
University, 1953), p. 550.
16. Charles O. Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration
in America, 1861-1911, Part I, " United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 38 (December, 1912), pp. 1319-1326.
The Commission of Conference has been called the "General
Board of the Civil War." Captain William L. Rodgers, "The
Relations of the War College to the Navy Department, " United




critics, the praise should not have fallen on the bureaus but on a
commendably extemporized organization, a capable Secretary, and an
experienced Assistant Secretary. 1? However in the mind of the public
and particularly Congress, the war proved conclusively that the
bureaus had withstood a severe test and came through triumphantly.
This conviction created a wall of security around the bureau system
which the advocates of change found almost impenetrable.*** Of
course the necessity to layer a patchwork of temporary bodies
between the bureaus and the Secretary gives fairly strong evidence
that the system of naval administration left much to be desired. In
tbe view of one distinguished officer who served in the war and who
later spearheaded the 'drive for a change, 'the Civil War brought out
the fact that . . . Naval Administration was organized on the theory
of perpetual peace. "*^ Another veteran described the performance
this way:
the Civil War came, and Departmental Chaos gave way to a
scrub strategy board which in turn gave way to an assistant
secretaryship filled by an ex-naval officer, not, however.
TT. Paullin, "Naval Administration, 1861-1911, Part II, " United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 39 (March, 1913),
p. 192.
18. Rodgers, "The Relations of the War College to the Navy
Department, p. 843.
19. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, "The Relations between the
War College and the Line Officers of the Navy, " lecture
delivered by Luce at the Naval War College, June 3, 1911,
Naval War College Archives.

without wading through Pinaforean experiences before reach-
ing some sort of possible system. 20
With the end of the war came the end of the wartime super-
structure, including the assistant secretaryship, and the Navy
resumed its peacetime organization. Attempts were made to preserve
some of the innovations of Gideon Welles but they met with failure. 21
Naval thinking between the end of the Civil War and the 1880's was not
conducive to reform. The unparalleled violence of the war revulsed
even the military officers. 22 The Navy was said to be "comatose"23
and was allegedly regarded by the public soley as an instrument of
"protection against the wholly improbable danger of [the American]
coast being attacked, " and "a thing to be admired and to be proud of,
but not to be used. "24
It was not until the renascence of the Navy in the 1880's that the
movement to adapt the organization to wartime needs met with
success. 25 Three organizational changes, during this era contributed
20. Captain McCarty Little, The Strategic Naval War Game or
Chart Maneuver, " lecture delivered by Little at the Naval
War College, June 10, 1911, Naval War College Archives.
21. Paullin, "Naval Administration, 1861-1911, Part III, " United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 39 (June, 1913),
pp. 737-738.
22. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear
Admiral
,





25. In this connection it is of interest to note that the period from
1881 to 1897 was marked by an unusually long tenure in office
by successive Secretaries, averaging 3. 2 years. Paullin,
"Naval Administration, 1861-1911, Part V, " United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 39 (September, 1913),
p. 1247.

to the creation of the General Board. In March of 1882, Secretary
., .iliam H. Hunt established the Office of Naval Intelligence under
the Bureau of Navigation, and charged it with the mission of gathering
information for the Navy's use in war and peace. 26 [n June of 1889,
Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy expanded the role of the Bureau of
Navigation to encompass the supervision of the Tleet. Both events
revealed an increasing awareness of the importance of adequate
preparation in advance of war and a concomitant inability of the
bureaus to satisfy the needs of the "new Navy. " The third and most
significant contributing factor which gave rise to the General Board
was the establishment of the Naval War College.
The College was founded in October of 1884 by Secretary
William E. Chandler, capping many years of effort on the part of
Commodore Stephen B. Luce. Luce had long expressed concern
about the "crass ignorance" of naval officers in the art of war and the
"imbecility 1 of the Navy Department as a director of naval operations
during war. He wanted to elevate "naval warfare from the
empirical stage to the dignity of a naval science. "28 Luce's
experiences in the Civil War later led him to conclude that there
26. This act has been termed the first step in the direction of
organized preparation for war. " Rear Admiral Richard
Wainwright, "The General Board, " United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 48 (February, 1922), p. 192.
See also, Henry P. Beers, "The Development of the Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations, " Military Affairs , Vol. 10
{Spring, 1946), p. 47.
27. Luce to Mahan, July 15, 1907, Naval War College Archives.
28. Ibid.

,,. k .s a need for an institution of strategic study to parallel the remark-
able developments which had taken place in the area of naval
material. He had been tremendously impressed with the knowledge
...uch General William Sherman demonstrated during a meeting Luce
; id with him in connection with the campaign against Charleston,
S. C. in 1865, and he came away with the indelible conviction that not
only were there underlying strategic principles which governed land
campaigns, but naval warfare as well. How essential it was then to
have naval officers trained in those principles so that there would be
a body of naval officers to advise the Secretary in both peace and
war. ^ As early as 1877, Luce laid before Secretary Richard W.
Thompson a proposal to establish a school for senior naval officers,
patterned on the Army's Artillery School at Fort Monroe, Virginia,
and devoted to the teaching of the strategic and tactical use of the
new tools of naval warfare. ^ However it was not until seven years
later that a sympathetic Secretary, William Whitney, gave life to
Luce's dream. lie appointed a board of three naval officers, one of
whom was Luce, and directed it to provide him with specific
29. Conversation between Mahan and Commander C. G. Flach,
Royal Swedish Navy, and quoted in a lecture delivered by
Commander Flach at Stockholm, November 24, 1894, Naval
War College Archives.
30. Albert L. Gleaves, Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen
B. Luce, U, S. Navy, Founder of the Naval War College
,
(New York: Putnam's, 1925), p. 102.
31. Luce to Richard W. Thompson, August 8, 1877, Luce Papers.

recommendations tor a post graduate course, or school ot appuca-
,ion. "^ Luce and his colleagues reported that the school ought to be
established at Newport, Rhode Island, should teach law, history, and
the science and art of war, and be pledged to the true pursuit of the
33
naval profession - war.
The actual contribution of the War College to the Navy's war
readiness was very limited during the first 10 years of its existence,
but it planted the seed for additional* growth in the direction of a war
planning organization within the departmental hierarchy, and it did
give Mahan an opportunity to develop his Sea Power theories. In him
Luce had found someone who would do for naval science what "jomini
did for military science. ,,,:*4 The refinement of Mahanvs thinking
while at the War College and the popularization of his theses gave
courage to those who were searching for a form of organization
worthy of executing Mahan's doctrines.
In 1893, under the presidency of Commander Henry C. Taylor,
the College began to exercise some of the functions of a war plan-
ning agency. Taylor, one of the most dominant and influential naval
officers of this period, had the confidence of all segments of the
navy, and not just the line officer insurgents. Once convinced of a
32. U. S. , Congress, Senate, Executive Document No. 68 , 48th
Cong., 2nd sess.
,
(Washington, 1885), p. 2.
33. Ibid.
, pp. 3-8.
34. Luce to Mahan, July 15, 1907, Naval War College Archives.

particular course to follow, he demonstrated incredible persistence,
but without alienating those of a less progressive mind. He was also
a devoted naval expansionist and believed that the Navy, as an integral
component of the nation, should grow, physically and organizationally,
with the nation. ^5 Taylor instituted a system of war games at the
College and developed plans of campaign against likely enemies but
his efforts were frustrated by the realization that, while the College
atmosphere was useful for "theoretical discussion, " it could not
perform as a practical war planning agency without detracting
seriously from its primary mission of education. Something else was
needed - a general staff - not at Newport but in the national capital,
and designed to generate the plans which the War College experience
had shown to be so essential to readiness for war. 36 Taylor pointed
to two events in recent history which demonstrated the need for a
general staff: the Virginius affair and the Chilean "crisis" of 1891.
Taylor saw in both instances examples of gross unpreparedness for
war and felt that if the Navy had actually been tested, "national
35. Captain Richard Wainwright, Remarks at the Unveiling of
Portrait of Rear Admiral H. C. Taylor, " delivered at the
Naval War College, September 7, 1906, Naval War College
Archives.
36. Taylor's testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee,
April 11, 1904, U.S., Congress, House, Naval Affairs Com-
mittee, Hearings on Appropriation Rill for 1905 Subjects and
on H. R. 15403 for General Board , 58th Cong. , 2nd sess.
,
House Report No. 164, (Washington, 1904), p. 950.

disaster might have been the result.
^ Taylor was appalled to find, p 13
n response to his inquiry,
that no bureau or office in the Navy
Department would acknowledge responsibility
for the preparations of
war plans.
38 Yet he was convinced that:
the events which precede and follow war progress
too quickly
to allow time for general or special reconnaissance
of the
theatre of operations, either at home or abroad. Hence this
work which took place formerly in time of war should be
made
now in time of peace .... [The] measures taken
upon the
eve of war - a time of emergency and excitement - will
naturally be imperfect, ill digested and extravagant.
lie then began at the War College a study of possible
general staff
agencies for the Navy. He and his officers examined many
different
forms of organization including the Brit'ish Board of
Admiralty and
the General Staff of the German Army. The German
organization
looked ideal to Taylor except that it would have to be
modified "to
suit the different political conditions" in the United
States. 40
"37 Taylor's testimony before the House Naval Affairs Committee,
April 11, 1904, U.S., Congress, House, Naval Affairs
Com-
mittee, Hearings on Appropriation B ill for 1905 Subjects and
on n r 15403 for General Board , 58th Cong. , 2nd sess. ,
House Report No. 164, (Washington, 1904), p. 904. During
the Chilean affair, an informal strategy board was
convened
in Washington. Mahan and others acted as consultants to
Secretary Benjamin F. Tracy but they exercised little or no
influence upon him. Mahan to Luce, September 20, 1897.
* Luce Papers.
38. House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on
Appropriations
for 190 5 and for General Board , p. 950.
30. Taylor to Governor Brown ot Rhode Island, February
10,
1894 War College Archives.
40. Roar Admiral Henry C. Taylor, "The Fleet," United
States
Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 29 (December, 1903)
p. 803.
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Naval officers were impressed with the efficiency of the German
litary machine which overwhelmed the French in 1870 and they
concluded that the ease with which the Germans accomplished the
transition from war to peace was traceable to the studies and work of
the German General Staff. 4 *
While Taylor's goal was to emulate the Germans, realism dic-
tated something less. He would settle initially for a change which
would combine the Naval War College with the Office of Naval
Intelligence under one head and with general staff duties. This body
would at first be only advisory in character but eventually evolve
into a complete general staff apparatus. ^ Even this minimum
orogram met with little encouragement in Washington. Taylor found
that his soundings revealed "overwhelming opposition" to his
proposals. Secretary Hilary Herbert was uninterested and despite
Taylor's urgings, he was unable to 'get his mind on it for ten
seconds. "^^ Herbert's Assistant Secretary, William McAdoo was
more sympathetic. He told the War College officers that while he
41. Captain French E. Chadwick, "The Naval War College,"
lecture delivered by Chadwick at the Naval War College,
March 4, 1902, Naval War College Archives.
42. Taylor, "The Fleet, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Vol 29 (December, 1903), p. 803.
43. Taylor to Luce, January 13, 1896, Luce Papers.
44. Taylor to Luce, June 22, 1896, Luce Papers. Ironically,
Taylor sensed that Secretary Herbert was at the time using
the War College as a general staff and he (Taylor) as a chief
of staff. Taylor to Luce, January 13, 1896, Luce Papers.

thought the Secretary of the Navy was doing the best possible job under
:.. burden of an inflexible organization, he was convinced that the
advent of war would require many substantial changes in naval admin-
l.-iration to ensure success. 45
Taylor v/as forced to conclude that the general staff would have
to "grow slowly by a process of natural evolution in the Bureau of
Navigation. ' ^ . The best way to achieve this was to "create a situa-
tion gradually. . . then let legislation or regulation ratify such
condition. "^7 Luce hoped that if evolution were the only practicable
solution then it would occur at the War College and not at a Bureau.
,T;-ylor replied that this would not be acceptable to the administration
principally because of the resistance of the Chief of the Bureau of
Navigation, Rear Admiral Francis F. Ramsay, long a nemesis of the
College. 48
Taylor's departure from the War College in 1896 and his assign-
ment to sea duty made it more difficult to carry on his campaign but
he did manage a visit to Washington in December of 1897 to
determine whether or not the atmosphere had changed with the
arrival in office of Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and his new
assistant, Theodore Roosevelt. It had not. Taylor reported that
4$. William McAdoo, Opening Address at Naval War College, "
delivered June 2, 1896, Naval War College Archives.
46. Taylor to Luce, January 13, 1896, Luce Papers.
47. Taylor to Luce, October 1, 1896, Luce Papers.
48. Taylor to Luce, January 22, 1896, Luce Papers.

while Roosevelt was "well disposed" but not "eager", Long was some-
what "cold" to his ideas.
49
The Spanish- American War provided the bureau system with
another test of its effectiveness and armed the general staff proponents
with more evidence for their case. Captain (later Admiral) George
Dewey, who had not yet aligned himself with the advocates of change,
foun*i serious problems associated with his efforts to get ready for
his tour as squadron commander in the Far East. Prior to taking
command he had searched the Department's files for information on
en
the Philippines and the latest available was dated 1876. u Not one
ship of his squadron had even a peacetime allowance of ammunition
and some ships had only 60 per-cent of allowance. ^1 Throughout the
whole navy there was a serious shortage of the superior smokeless
powder, the coal was of inferior quality, the fleet suffered from a
severe imbalance in that tnere were not enough colliers, supply,
repair, and hospital ships. There was an inadequate reserve of
personnel to meet the demands of the many ships suddenly acquired
and commissioned. The principal naval base at Key West was not
capable of rendering logistic support to the fleet. In short, the Navy
49. Taylor to Luce, December 3, 1897, Luce Papers.
50. Commander Nathan Sargent, "The Preparations at Hong Kong,
Battle of Manila Bay, Enforcement of Blockade, and Opera-
tions Resulting in the Surrender of Manila, " unpublished mss.
prepared by Sargent under the direction of Dewey, Dewey





was not prepared for war, "only less unprepared than Spain.
" 32 War
plans, albeit crude ones, were available but since they originated in
different offices they often conflicted in assumptions and strategy. *
After the war began, Secretary Long, at the urging of Taylor
hurriedly organized the Naval War Strategy Board, with Roosevelt,
Mahan, and several other naval officers as members. The Board's
functions involved most of the duties which Taylor had considered
appropriate to a general staff, including war plans, employment of
the fleet, and the gathering and collating of intelligence information. *^
The activities of the War Board were marked by considerable success;
U Was in the view of one naval officer, "the only organization either in
the War or Navy Department that was unembarassed by the pressing
administrative details. It being ready and willing, the President
turned to it because nobody else was free to answer his demands. "^^
Although the war interrupted the proselytism of Taylor, Luce
v/v,s still available and he continued to exert influence whenever and
52. Captain Bowman H. McCalla, Lessons of the Spanish
American War," unpublished mss. dated 1899, Naval War
College Archives.
53. Plans for War against Spain, General Board Papers, Office
of Naval History, Washington, D. C.
54. Wainwright, "The General Board, " p. 193; Little, "The
Strategic Naval War Game or Chart Maneuver,"; Paullin,
"Naval Administration, Part X, " United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 40 (January, 1914), p. 116.
55. Rodgers, "The Relations of the War College to the Navy
Department, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings
,
Vol. 38, p. 844.

wherever he could. He wrote Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, criticized
? management of the war effort and asked him to support the passage
56
of a law providing for a general staff. Lodge, while sympathetic,
disputed Luce's contention of mal-administration. It was obviously
not the time to suggest to a Republican Senator that the Republicans
were demonstrating ineptitude in the conduct of the war. ^7 Luce also
enlisted the willing support of Mahan, expressing the hope that the good
work of the Naval War Strategy Board would be instrumental in
achieving a permanent general staff organization after the war. 58
Mahan did try, without success, to convince Secretary Long of the
merits of Luce's arguments. 5y Long's response left little doubt
where he stood. As soon as the war concluded he disestablished the
Strategy Board and returned to the peacetime organization. However,
the Board's work on the one hand, and the unpreparedness of the
Navy on the other served to make many of the doubters within the
service aware that a change, looking to the creation of a permanent
war planning body, was sorely needed. ^®
Taylor resumed his quest after the war ended and although he
was offered the prestigious position of superintendent of the U.S.
Naval Academy, he declined and told Long that he would prefer a less
56. Luce to Lodge, May 24, 1898, Luce Papers.
57. Lodge to Luce, May 27, 1898, Luce Papers.
58. Luce to Mahan, August 25, 1898, Luce Papers.
59. William D. Puleston, Mahan: The Life and Work of Captain
Alfred Thayer Mahan, U. S. N.
,
(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1939), p. 204.
60. House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on Appropriations
for 1905 and for General Board, pp. 950-951.

demanding assignment, one which would permit him to devote more
Tie to the development of a general staff, lie felt this way despite
Long's continuing resistance to any talk of a general staff
because of
the association which it had with a "royal or imperial
government. "
But slowly, Taylor's persistence began to pay some dividends.
Lang
finally agreed to listen to Taylor's specific proposals.
Fortunately for Taylor, Long was presented with another diffi-
culty. What would he do with the hero of Manila "Bay, George Dewey?
He had been promoted by Act of Congress to the rank of "Admiral of
the Navy" with lifetime tenure. He was too senior to hold a bureau
position or even a fleet commander's job. Although he did toy with
the idea of seeking the Democratic presidential nomination, both he
and the Democratic bosses recognized that he was no match for
William Jennings Bryan. Some of his friends in the service urged him
to become President of the Board of Inspection and Survey, act as
arbiter of the many inter-bureau disputes, and strengthen the hand of
the "sea-going element of the Navy." 62 It was however most unlikely
61. Taylor to Long, January 30, 1000, Long Papers.
Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.
62. Rear Admiral Fred Rodgers to Dewey. October 9, 1899,
Dewey Papers. At the time, Rodgers was President of the
Hoard of Inspection and Survey, and had, six months before,
led a movement within the Department to expand the role of
his Board and develop it into a "Board of Control." with
Congressional sanction, to curb the independence of the
bureau chiefs and become the principal organ within the Navy
Department for the development of naval policy. Rodgers to
the Board on the Bureaus of the Navy Department, May 31,






I that Dewey would be willing to return to a position which he had held
I a Captain prior to the war.
-
i
Taylor, recognizing Long's dilemma, lost no time in working out
a plan for a general staff, and he submitted one on February 14, 1900.
a
v
He prefaced his proposal with a warning to the Secretary that a change
I
was needed as a matter of urgency for any more delay would result in
"grave injury to the country's future. "^3 Taylor wrote of the need for
a staff to direct the business of war and the peace-time planning for
war. He would assign to the staff three basic functions: to gather
information on foreign powers; to prepare war plans; and to train
officers in the art of war making and war planning. While he agreed
that the Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence con-
tained the basic general staff structure, their work had to be
coordinated by a common superior - either an Assistant Secretary of
the Navy or the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. Taylor sensed the
Congressional resistance to the general staff by advising Long not to
get Congressional sanction prior to announcing the formation of the
staff, Instead he should lot it develop until its usefulness was demon-
strated, then ask Congress to legalize it.
Taylor's general staff machinery included:
1) Chief, Bureau of Navigation to be the Chief of General Staff;
63. Taylor to Long, February 14, 1900, Long Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society.

2) The general staff would consist of the officers attached to
:ne Naval War College and the Office of Naval Intelligence;
3) Two boards would be created to pass on the work of the
staff. The first would consist of five members: Chief, Bureau of
."Navigation, President of the Naval War College, the latter's principal
assistant, the Chief Intelligence Officer and his principal assistant.
This board would meet frequently and ".consult as to war plans and
information. " The second board would consist of nine members, the
five listed above and, in addition, the senior officer of the Navy, (at
the time Dewey), his Chief of Staff, the Commander of the North
Atlantic Fleet and his Chief of Staff. This second board would meet
once a year and pass on the work accomplished by the general staff
during the preceding 12 months. The Chief of the Bureau of Naviga-
tion would have custody of the war plans and would be charged with
the general direction and supervision of the Naval War College and the
Office of Naval Intelligence. When the war plans required imple-
menting action by the bureaus, the general staff would transmit them
64
to the Secretary of the Navy.
Long saw merit in the part of Taylor's scheme which called for a
board under the leadership of George Dewey, but he was unwilling to
go along with it completely. While he recognized that "the experience
of war with Spain showed the need of a general staff, " he did not think
64. Memorandum by Captain Henry C. Taylor forwarded to
Secretary of the Navy, February 14, 1900, copy in Luce
Papers; also published in United States Naval Institute
. Proceedings, Vol. 26 (March, 1900), pp. 441-448.
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that the Navy was "quite ready for such a comprehensive change" as
.'aylor posited. ^5 He feared that a general staff would challenge the
principle of civil control of the military, lead to excessive
expenditures, promote professional jealousy between line and staff
officers, and make the Secretary of the Navy a "mere figurehead. "66
Although Taylor felt that his plan embodied a general staff of the
"simplest kind, " he thought some organization however weak was
better than none and, after consultation with Dewey, he modified his
recommendations to provide for only one board and he eliminated all
reference to the terms "general staff" and "chief of staff. " Long was
willing to buy this version and, accordingly, on March 13, 1900, he
authorized the creation of the General Board of the Navy.
How tenuous was the Board's birth is best revealed by Long's
threat to Taylor that he was creating it "avowedly as an experiment"
and "would dissolve it the moment it was not useful. "6? Ironically,
the problem of Dewey's disposition, a major factor in Long's decision
to accept the organization, provided the Board with a prestigious
president and a degree of survivability which would make Long's
warning easier to issue than to implement. 68
65. John D. Long, The New American Navy (2 vols. , New York:
The Outlook Co., 1903), Vol. 1, pp. 122-123.
66. Ibid.
, Vol. 2, pp. 183-186.
67. House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on Appropriations
for 1905 and for General Board, p. 951.
68. Testimony of Rear Admiral Cameron Winslow, U. S. N.
,
Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on
Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 1916
,
(Washington, 1916), Vol. 1, p. 1401.

CHAPTER II
THE TAYLOR ERA, 1900 - 1904
The history of the General Board from its inception in March of
1960 until mid- 1904, centers for the most part on Its most ctdminaiit
member during the period, Captain (later Rear Admiral), Henry C.
Taylor. Taylor originated the idea of the Board, and guided it
through its somewhat stormy first years. Admiral George Dewey,
the Board's famous president, exercised a good aeal of influence, \>ut
he deferred to Taylor in the critical management of the Board's
development, and left to him the business of defining and refining the
Board's role in naval administration. He considered Taylor an indis-
pensable member of the Board and, after Taylor had denied a report
that he planned to leave it, Dewey expressed great relief. "I am
glad to know, " he wrote Taylor, "you do not contemplate leaving the
Board. It would be a great mistake, for I fear no one would be able
to take your place at present. Let's get it well underway before
going below. Ml
1. Admiral George Dewey to Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor,




Taylor's goals for the General Board, all more or less endorsed
Dewey, were to preserve its existence in the face of Secretary
John D. Long's threat to disestablish it the moment it proved not
useful; to use it to increase the Navy's war readiness, and to expand
it into a more powerful and authoritative organ, akin to a general staff.
Taylor, an evolutionist when it came to naval administration, was well
aware that the opposition to the general staff idea, inside and outside
the service, could only be overcome by patience, persistence, and
tact. Sudden death ended Taylor's endeavors in July of 1904, and
while he did not achieve his long' sought general staff, he did
accomplish the Board's survival by demonstrating its value.
Secretary Long's directive of March 13, 1900, drafted by
Taylor, specified, rather briefly, the Board's membership, function,
and frequency of meetings. There were to be two categories of
membership: ex-officio and individual. The ex-officio members
were: the Admiral of the Navy, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
the Chief Intelligence Officer, the President of the Naval War College,
and the principal assistant of the last two officials; individual mem-
berships were to be three in number of or above the rank of
Lieutenant Commander. The Board's stated purpose was to "ensure
the efficient preparation of the fleet in case of war and for the naval
2. Taylor to Dewey, March 15, 1900, Dewey Papers.

defense of the coast. " The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was
designated the custodian of the Board's war plans and was to act as the
presiding officer in the absence of the Admiral of the Navy. Meetings
were to take place at least once each month, but two of the monthly
sessions during the year had to include daily meetings of at least one
week's duration. Finally, a quorum was to consist of at least five
members.
The General Order summarized above was designed for service-
wide publication and had to be followed up with more detailed and
confidential instructions for the guidance of the Board. These came
in a letter from Long which was based largely on a memorandum
which Taylor had submitted to him. 4 Secretary Long's letter is of
such key importance to the Board's early history that most of it is
quoted below:
The purpose of this General Board is to devise plans which
will employ our naval force to the best advantage; to organize
during peace a proper defense of our coasts; to utilize fully
the naval reserves and merchant marine for the service of
the general government; to effect by frequent consultation
with the army chief, a full and cordial cooperation of the two
services in case of war; to be prepared at all times to advise
the Secretary of the Navy, when so directed by him, as to
the disposition of the Fleet under the various war conditions
which may arise.
Further; to prepare plans of campaign for such theatres of
war at home, in our dependencies, or abroad as may in any
3. Navy Department General Order Number 544, March 13, 1900,
Record Group 80, National Archives.
4. Taylor to Long, March 29, 1900, General Board File 401.

case become the scene of hostilities; to fix upon th^ naval bases
indicated by strategy in such theatres; to become acquainted
with them familiarly and to recommend to the Secretary such
action as may be needed to prepare these bases for the purpose
intended; to observe the probable base of foreign navies in such
fields of action; to measure their forces; and to deduce there-
from their plans of campaign, and base our preparations upon
them, having in view their special features of strength and
weakness as developed by our investigation.
The General Board, unless otherwise directed by the
Secretary, shall decide upon the fields of action to be studied.
The Department desires the General Board to give its
attention first to the following subjects, which are regarded by
the Department as of urgency:
(a) Plans for defense of our dependicies including consider-
ations of the strategic value of adjacent territory of importance,
and its military relation to our possessions. The location of
naval bases, and the numbers and kind of ships needed for the
maintenance of our power in our dependencies in case of war.
(b) Complete plans of campaign applicable to various war
conditions in the Philippines and their neighborhood.
The Department wishes to impress upon the Board the
importance of confining its work to the large field indicated in
tho forofjoin/; and of concentrating its efforts upon the essential
principles described therein, to the exclusion of technical
questions of material and manufacture, which are in charge of
the various Bureaus of the Navy Department.
It is not with the constructing, manning, arming and equip-
ping of the ships that the General Board is concerned, but with
recommendations as to the proper disposition of the Fleet. **
This is a truly remarkable document, for not only did it show the
vast responsibilities thrust upon the Navy as a result of the territorial
settlement with Spain, but it also underlined the need for some
organization other than the bureaus to address these requirements.
Long's cautionary advice to the Board, contained in the last two
paragraphs, was inserted at Taylor's request and is expressive of
Taylor's fear that disputes between the bureaus and the Board would
~. Long to Dewey, March 30, 1900, General Board File 401.
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undermine the lattcr's usefulness.
Soon after Long's instructions were received, Taylor drew up a
plan of work and it was presented to the Board at its first meeting in
the State, War, and Navy Building on April 16, 1900. At Taylor's
suggestion, the members decided to begin planning for three con-
tingencies listed in order of decreasing probability: seizure of
Puerto Rico by Germany; war with Germany over occupation of South
American territory; and war with "England over the control of the
Isthmian Canal. It was also agreed to develop position papers with
respect to coast defense, logistics, mobilization, force requirements,
base requirements, and disposition of the fleet. '
The initial service reaction to the birth of the Board was mixed.
Maximists like Commander Richard Wainwright were disappointed .
that the Secretary had not given the Board the teeth to execute as well
as develop naval policy. He feared that without Taylor's ability and
Dewey's prestige, it would become a useless appendage. * On the
other hand, Dewey had high hopes for the Board. He saw it as the
twentieth century successor to the Board of Navy Commissioners.^
6. Taylor to Long, March 29, 1900, General Board File 401.
7-. Dewey to Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowninshield, April 11,
1900, General Board File 401; General Board Minutes,
April 16, 1900, Vol. 1, p, 3.
8. Wainwright to Lieutenant Commander William S. Sims,
June 20, 1904, Sims Papers, Office of Naval History,
Washington, D. C.
9. Dewey to Taylor, May 6, 1901, Taylor Papers, Naval Histori-
cal Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress; Dewey to Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce,
February 17, 1903, Luce Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress.

Taylor looked upon the Board as "a natural centre and head of a
General Staff. . . [which] will be of continuing benefit to the service,
and will in time come to speak with an authority, not due alone to
powers conferred upon it by Departmental orders but to its own
inherent strength of position. . . and to the solid logic of its war plans. 10
Dissatisfaction was registered by the staff corps officers. They resented
their exclusion from membership and viewed General Order 544 as a
move to place the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, a line officer in a
position superior to the bureau chiefs who were members of the staff
corps. Bureau advocates were concerned that the Board would erode
their large role in the naval hierarchy. ** The staff officers, upon
whom the line depended for pay, supplies, health care, logistic
facilities, and the construction of ships, continued to resent this slight
in the years to follow and, while it was only one of many sources of
contention between the line and staff, it did contribute to the rift between
them. One of the staff corps officers told a group of line officers at the
Xaval War College that "the existing status [between line and staff] might
truly be said to represent two hostile camps, between which messages
urc sent only under a flag of truce. . . . Efforts to work in harmony
10. Taylor to Dewey, October 27, 1900, Dewey Papers.
11. Army-Navy Journal , March 24, 1900, Vol 27, p. 700. In
fact, Long did consult with the chiefs of bureau prior to
issuing his order and they offered no objection to it. Taylor
to Dewey, March 15, 1900, Dewey Papers.

are attempted but are treated as suspects. The motto for each
appears to be T imeo Danaos et Dona Kerrcntcs. n1 ^
Taylor sought to assuage the critics and reassure the bureaucrats
that the General Board had enough to do without meddling in bureau
business. "I understand it to be the Department's wish, " wrote
Taylor, "that the 'General Board' shall confine itself to this large
field of work [war plans] and avoid all questions of material or
personnel which. . . are already cared for intelligently and efficiently
by the able Chiefs of Bureau .... "^
Although Long had provided for a'total of nine members on the
Board (six ex-officio and three designated by name), he initially
appointed eleven officers. Those assigned by name were: Taylor,
Captain Robley D. Evans (Taylor';; brother-in-law), Captain Charles
E. Clark, Captain French E. Chadwick, and Colonel George C.
Reid, U. S. Marine Corps. ^ Reid's selection was somewhat of a
surprise but he was included at Taylor's insistence that the interests
of the Marine Corps be represented. 1* In April of 1901, member-
ship provisions were changed to eliminate the assistants to the
President of the Naval War College and the Chief Intelligence Officer
and to permit the Secretary to designate by name any number of
12. Pay Inspector T. H. Hicks, The Need for Economy and
Coordination in the Navy, " lecture delivered at the Naval War
College, September, 1909, Naval War College Archives,
Newport, R. I.
13. Taylor to Editor, Army-Navy Journal
,
published in Army -
Navy Journal, June 16, 1900, Vol. 37, p. 996.
14. Long to Dewey, March 29, 1900, General Board File 401.
15. Taylor to Long, March 29, 1900, General Board File 401.

members of the grade of Lieutenant Commander or higher. This
l revision was undoubtedly provided to give the Secretary more
flexibility in Board assignments. *6
Many of the officers listed above had duties outside the Board
which meant that they could not devote full time to the work that had to
be done. Recognizing this, Taylor enlisted the assistance of the War
College and Office of Naval Intelligence, and the heads of these two
institutions each assigned one officer to work full time on Board
matters. *• Taylor also attempted to augment the staff of the Board by
assigning to it full time experienced junior officers, fresh from sea
cu;y, but '-<ong refused to acquiesce. *° Taylor persisted and, in
pril 1902, after Long's departure from office, and after Taylor
became Chief of the Bureau of Navigation with control over personnel
assignments, officers began to be assigned to the Board for full time
duty, not as voting members, but as staff assistants.
As has been indicated earlier, Dewey did not get involved with
Hoard details; these he left to Taylor. However, when it came to the
selection of individuals for duty with the Board, Dewey maintained
tight control. He insisted that all who came had to be outstanding naval
officers; consequently the Board's roster for the period of his
If. Navy Department General Order Number 43, April 16, 1901,
Record Group 80, National Archives.
17. Taylor to Dewey, November 26, 1900, Dewey Papers.
18. Taylor to Dewey, November 26, 1900, Dewey Papers.

presidency looks like a Who's Who of the U. S. Navy. 19 An officer
who graduated from the Naval Academy between 1865 and 1892 had, on
the average, a 13 per cent chance of becoming an Admiral. ^0 In
contrast, 79 per cent of the officers attached to the General Board
from 1900 to 1914 made flag rank sometime after their assignment."*
The turnover of officers on the Board was about average. Tour
lengths varied from officer to officer but the mean for staff and mem-
bers was two years and two months. ^
Affiliation with the Board soon became indicative of career
success and hence many of the ambitious officers who aspired to high
leadership positions within the Navy sought duty with it, either as a
member or on the staff. 2 ^ One officer, Lieutenant Commander
Arthur MacArthur, brother of Douglas MacArthur, enlisted the
support of his famous father, General Arthur MacArthur, to get
orders to the Board. ^4 Captain Charles S. Sperry wanted Board duty
19. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske to Dewey, August 13, 1914,
Dewey Papers; Lecture delivered at the U.S. Naval Academy
by Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, October 6, 1923, copy
in General Board File 401. Rodgers was assigned to the
Board in 1903, 1911 to 1913, and 1915 to 1916. Dewey was
President of the General Board until his death in January of
1917.
20. Ronald G. Spector, "Professors of War," (Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Yale University, 1967), p. 73.
21. Based on an analysis of General Board records and Naval
Personnel Registers.
22. General Board Rosters, 1900-1914. Dewey is not included in
the average because of the unusually long length of his tour
with the Board - 17 years.
23. G. B. Bradshaw to W. K. Harrison, April 25, 1910, Sims
Papers.
24. General Arthur MacArthur to Dewey, January 20, 1912,
Dewey Papers.

because he felt it provided "the best training for the duties of a flag
officer. "^5 Another viewed duty on the General Board "the best
possible duty a captain could have on shore, especially if he cherished
aspiration toward flying his flag afloat. " 26 Still others found that
their experience with the Board gave them a broadened perspective
2 7
not attainable in other sea and shore positions. In recalling his
service with the Board, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske wrote that:
the members carried on with the most remarkable absence of
anything like personal self-seeking. . . The aim of every man
seemed to be to find out and urge whatever was best for the
navy, ^nd it was considered a virtue in a man to be willing to
say that he had made a mistake and to change his opinion on
proper evidence. Nothing was considered more deplorable
than pride of opinion. ^°
The Board's membership policy justified Dewey's statement in 1913
that "the program to which the General Board has adhered throughout
the past. . . years may safely be accepted as expressing the best
thought of the Naval Service " 29
25. Sperry to wife, August 25, 1902, Sperry Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
26. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear
Admiral, (New York: The Century Co., 1919), p. 475.
27. Lieutenant Commander Ridley McLean to Commander
William S. Sims, May 18, 1911, Sims Papers; Captain
Albert Gleaves to Dewey, July 10, 1910, Dewey Papers.
28. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral, p. 476.
29. Dewey to A. H. Dutton, October 19, 1913, Dewey Papers.

Board decisions were taken by vote, each member, regardless of
ank, receiving one vote. There were a number of occasions when the
senior officer in the Navy, Admiral Dewey, found himself in the
minority but, suppressing the traditional veto power of seniors over
juniors, he forwarded, over his signature, recommendations which
had been agreed to by the majority. 30 Dewey's disdain for seniority
in this rcspcaet applied as well to the senior rear admirals who vrero
assigned to the Board in the few months preceding their retirement!
Although they out-ranked everyone but Dewey, the latter refused to
assign them a role commensurate with their expectations, and he did
not allow them to vote because they were not fuil-fledged members.
One of them expressed considerable rancor over Dewey's altitude and
complained to a member of the House Naval Affairs Committee that
the denial of voting privilege placed htm in a "mortifying" position
with respect to his juniors.
Apportionment of work within the Board was done through a
system of committees. The first of these, the ''Executive Committee,*'
was appointed at the Board's initial meeting. Its members were the
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, the President of the Naval War
College, the Chief Intelligence Officer, and Captain Taylor. Taylor's
status on this committee was unique since he alone did not have
30. Dewey to President Marine Journal Company, March 23,
1904, Dewey Papers.
31. Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick to Congressman Alston G.
Dayton, February 15, 1004, Dayton Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of the University of West Virginia.
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,>x-oiTicio membership. ^2 The function of the Executive Committee
' to prepare the agenda for the Board meetings, to direct the efforts
of the Board's staff, and to prc-digest the material to be considered
by the full Board. 33 it is quite apparent from a reading of the Board
Minutes that the Executive Committee exercised great influence; while
the full Board averaged seldom more than 40 meetings per year, the
Executive Committee was in session almost on a daily basis. Taylor
was in turn ablfc to play a dominant role within the Executive Committee
since he was the only committeeman unencumbered by extra-Board
duties. Although Dewey, by virtue of his position as President of the
ucneral Board, was eligible to attend Executive Committee meetings,
he seldom did so; however he was aware of the Committee's work and
was pleased with its performance. 34
The Executive Committee remained the only permanent Committee
until September of 1902, when it was decided to appoint two additional
groups, the First and the Second Committees. The First Committee
assumed cognizance over fleet organization, combined operations
32. Memorandum attached to letter from Dewey to
Crowninshield, April 11, 1900, General Board File 401;
General Board Minutes, April 16, 1900, Vol. 1, p. 3. It is
of interest that the April 11, 1900 document, prepared by
Crowninshield, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, was
typewritten except for Taylor's name which was added in
script presumably by Dewey before he returned it to Crownin-
shield. This may indicate that Crowninshield did not want to
include Taylor on the Executive Committee for fear that he
would, with his wide knowledge and reputation, dominate the
Board and dilute Crowninshield' s influence as Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation.
33. General Board Minutes, August 2G, 1902, pp. 191-192.
34. Taylor to Dewey, November 26, 1900, Dewey Papers.

with ihc Army, mobilization plans, and analyses of foreign fleets.
; he Second Committee was assigned the responsibilities for war plans,
naval militia affairs, and sea transport. 35 Prior to the time that
these two committees were appointed, the practice had been for the
Executive Committee to divide the Board work among the staff and
members in accordance with their qualifications.
Formal decisions on matters originating within the Board or
referred to it by the Secretary of the Navy, were taken at the Board
meetings. These lasted an average of two hours and began with a
nummary of the work of the committees since the last meeting; then
the questions up for decision were briefed, discussed, and voted.
With very few exceptions, the position adopted by the Executive
Committee on the various issues were endorsed by the full Board.^6
The relationships between the General Board on the one hand, and
the Bureau of Navigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, and Naval War
College on the other were very close. Together they acted as an
embryonic general staff for the Navy Department, "a little ragged in
its workings, " but the best patchwork available short of reorganiza-
tion. ° ' The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation had supervision over
ship movements, personnel, and both the Office of Naval Intelligence
and Naval War College. He was looked on as the representative of the
35. General Board Minutes, September 23, 1902, Vol. 1, p. 195.
36. General Board Minutes, 1900-1914, Vols. 1-4.
37. Taylor to Luce, February 13, 1903, Luce Papers.

line faction of the Navy, those who had to fight the ships. The
Secretary frequently called on him for advice on "military problems"
as opposed to the technical matters occupying the other bureau
chiefs. 3 ^ As the only bureau chief on the General Board, he became
the liaison between the Board and the Secretary, briefing and explain-
ing to the latter the Board position on the many matters considered by
it. lie was also empowered to execute the recommendations of the
Board which touched on his area of interest and would most likely do
so since he participated in the Board's decision-making process.
Finally, because he was in charge of officer personnel, he could and
did present Dewey with a list of talented officers from which to choose
lioard members and staff. Evidently the effectiveness of the relation-
ship between the Board and the Bureau of Navigation depended in large
measure on the attitude of the Bureau Chief. From 1900 to April 1902,
Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowninshield occupied this position and he was
succeeded by Taylor. The contrast in the disposition of Taylor and
Crowninshield toward the General Board was marked indeed; Taylor
had a vested interest in the Board's success; Crowninshield did not,
and while he did nothing to hinder the Board's progress, he didn't
significantly contribute to it. Crowninshield' s approach to the Board
is partially explained by the strained relations which existed between
33. Charles O. Paullin, "A Half Century of Naval Administration
In America, Part VII, " United States Naval Institute Proceed -
ings, Vol. 39 (September, 1913), p. 1257.

•:r. and Dewey, based on the former's disparagement of Dewey's
39
exploits at Manila Bay.
Taylor's ascendance to the Eureau of Navigation resulted in an
expansion of the Board's influence. As Chairman of the Executive
Committee he was able to guide the Board's thinking, then represent
it in person to the Secretary, and execute as much of it as lay within
his power as bureau chief. The method of operation became so
efficacious that Taylor could declare in 1S03 that tne Bureau of Navi-
gation, acting jointly with the General Board, was virtually doing the
business of a general staff. 40
Another member of the General Board "family" was the Naval
War College. It provided the General Board with an intellectual
reservoir from which it could draw to develop and support its
recommendations. During the early period of the Board's existence
there were very few officers in the Navy who had had any training in
strategic problem solving, and the vast majority of these were to be
found at the War College. 41 The practice of submitting questions to
the War College for study gave the students there actual practice in
the solution of concrete issues and increased their value to the Board
39. Crowninshield to Dewey, November 6, 1899; Dewey to
Crowninshield, November 10, 1899, Dewey Papers.
40. General Board Minutes, December 28, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 378;
Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, October 1,
1903, Annual Reports of the Navy Department, 1903
,
(Washington, 1903), pp. 498-499.
41. Memorandum by Rear Admiral Harry S. Knapp, February 17,
1922, General Board File 401.

and to the .\avy. 4 ^ The College played a key role in the consideration
of war plans; the plan's assumptions were tested on the College game
board and either proved or revised in accordance with the results
obtained. 43 The fact that the President of the War College was a
member of the Board sealed the bond between the Board and the
College and, of course, ensured a mutuality of effort.
The Office of Naval Intelligence was the Board's "collector of
information. " It channeled to the Board information about foreign
developments essential to proper judgment. 44 Here again the rela-
tionship was solidified by the assignment of the Chief Intelligence
Officer to Board membership. Intelligence collection and evaluation
proved to be the weakest elements in the Board's decision making
process. A large portion of the information flowing in to the Office of
Naval Intelligence was gathered by naval attaches. However there
were only a few of them assigned; one was expected to cover the whole
of France, Russia, and Germany; another all of Japan and China;
none were sent to Latin American countries on a permanent basis until
1910. 4o Oftentimes the quality of the attaches left much to be desired.
Commander Reginald R. Belknap, a former attache himself, complained
42. Captain Charles S. Sperry to Captain William Swift, March 25,
1904, General Board File 421.
43. Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, June 29, 1901, General Board
Letters, Vol. 1, p. 247.
44. Ibid.
45. Henry P. Beers, "The Development of the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, Part I, " Military Affairs, Vol. 10
(Spring, 104G), p. 47.

ijuit the assignment and employment of attaches were not taken
.seriously, attaches weren't adequately trained, they compared un-
favorably with their foreign counterparts, many were lacking in
language training, and were often ignorant of even the rudiments of
national policy. Attaches were prone to concentrate too much on
technical aspects of foreign navies, such as details of ship construc-
tion and ordnance, and too little on a potential enemy's intentions,
capabilities, port defenses, and the like. ' So deficient was the in-
t'ormation, at least with respect to Germany, that one officer proposed
that a Navy ship be detailed to make an extensive European cruise,
"o: »ensibly to 'show the flag 1 but in reality to make a special
business ... of securing information of military character, relating
both to ships and harbor defenses. "
Until July of 1903 there were no continuing formal relationships
between the Army and Navy except at the Cabinet level. The Spanish-
American War had illustrated the need for cooperation, but even
before that attempts had been made by Taylor and Assistant Secretary
o? the Navy William McAdoo to weld the services together, for they
46. Commander Reginald R. Belknap, Naval Attaches,
unpublished mss. ,' December 18, 1913, General Board File
429.
47. Captain William L. Rodgers, "The Relations of the War
College to the Navy Department, " United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol. 38 (September, 1912), pp. 846-
847.
48. Memorandum by Commander Joseph L. Jayne, Secretary of
the General Board, January 5, 1910, General Board File
420-1.

had mutual interest in many areas, particularly in coast defense. ^9
en Taylor was President of the Naval War College he had seen the
importance of a "Joint Board of the Army and Navy, " and he worked
toward the establishment of such an organization. 50 One of the
difficulties operating against the meshing of the two services was the
lack of a body in either service which specialized in strategic functions.
With the formation of the General Board in 1900 and the Army General
Staff in February of 1903 the way was clear to join hands and, in July
of 1903, the War and Navy Departments agreed to form a "joint
board . . . for tne purpose of . . . reaching common conclusions re-
garding all matters calling for the cooperation of the two services, "
Admiral Dewey, Rear Admiral Taylor, Captain John E. Pillsbury,
and Commander William J. Barnette, all members of the General
Board, were selected as the Navy representatives on the Joint Board,
and Dewey, because of his seniority, became chairman. »*1 It is not
surprising then that the Navy views put forward at the Joint Board
meetings were actually expressive of General Board policy. In fact,
on major issues, Navy members of the Joint Board were formally
instructed by the full General Board prior to their conferences with
their Army counterparts.
49. William McAdoo to Taylor, April 27, 1896, Naval War
College Archives.
50. Taylor to Luce, October 1, 1896, Luce Papers.
51. Navy Department General Order Number 136, July 18, 1903,
publishing the Army and Navy departmental agreement of
July 17, 1903, Record Group 80, National Archives.

The relations between the Board and the bureaus (other than the
'ureau of Navigation), were, for the most part, disharmonious,
strained, non-productive, and harmful to the Navy. Despite the fact
that the bureau chiefs had offered no objection to Long's move to
establish the General Board, they saw in it a vehicle which would
eventually undermine their great power and independence. They were
well aware that the Board represented only the first small step by
Taylor in the direction of a general staff which would" insert itself
between them and the Secretary, and most of them were bound and
dr termined to do all they could to stem any such movement. When
President Theodore Roosevelt described the General Board as
"fostering the creation of a general sta'ff, " their estimate was con-
firmed and their concern escalated. °2
There were two categories of bureau chiefs: line officers and
staff corps officers. The line officers were always assigned to the
Bureau of Navigation and usually to the Bureau of Equipment, Bureau
of Ordnance, and Bureau of Steam Engineering. ^ Staff Corps
officers were given the Bureaus of Yards and Docks, Construction
52. Fred L. Israel, ed. The State of the Union Messages of the
Presidents, 1790-1966, (New York: Chelsea House-Robert
Hector, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 2041.
53. Prior to 1899, the Chief of the Bureau of Steam Engineering
was a staff corps officer but by the Personnel Act of 1899,
the Engineer Corps was merged with the Line. Paullin, "A
Half Century of Naval Administration in America, 1861-1911,
Part XII, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 40
(May, 1914), p. 675.

intj liepair, Supplies and Accounts, and Medicine and Surgery. The
jurcau chiefs who were line officers identified more with their bureaus
than they did with the line, and were consequently refractory to any
incursions by the General Board in their fields of expertise. The
staff corps bureau chiefs felt the same way but, in addition, were
suspect of the Board because it represented the line element of the
Navy. Secretary of the Navy Long wanted to suppress any internecine
quarrels - obviously there existed the potential for many - and
therefore warned the Board through Taylor to avoid stepping on the
toes of the bureau chiefs. The early Board records do indicate that
Taylor and Dewey tried to pay heed to Long's advice, and they
therefore took a restrictive view of the Board's mission even though
Long's letter of instructions to it encompassed a large area. But
Long had placed them on the horns of a tortuous dilemma. How could
they on the one hand, deal with the selection of naval bases and coaling
stations, and on the other hand, avoid conflict with the Chief of the
Bureau of Equipment, Rear Admiral Royal 3. Bradford, who had
nominal control over such matters? The fact is that they could not.
At first, the Board approached the matter gingerly: although it had
arrived at positions with respect to bases in the Caribbean and China,
it decided not to submit them to Long until he asked for them. ^4
54. General Board Minutes, April 17, 1900, Vol. 1, p. 5.

When Taylor noticed a trend developing in some of the Board
- mbers to get involved in "refereeing" inter-bureau disputes, he
expressed concern that not only was the principal work of the Board,
war plans, being neglected, but also the Board's existence was being
jeopardized. In his words:
if the Board maker- itself the centre of a worthy Genl Staff by
means of solid . . . plans of war, "all other things' as the
Bible says 'will be added unto us. ' We can advise the Sect
[Secretary of the Navy] and decide between conflicting bureau
chiefs
. . .
but there can be no permanence to that position'
unless based on that function for which the Board was created,
. . .
plans of war. ... If we drop that business from its high
and principal place, we will cease to be of great advisory
value, and a change of administration may easily wipe us off
the slate. 55
In 1902 a dispute arose between the Bureau of Navigation and the
'ioard on Construction^" over the installation of underwater discharge
torpedo tubes aboard battleships. Taylor's assistant at the Bureau of
Navigation, Commander William S. Cowles"* ' asked the General Board
to n.^diate the dispute; the Board refused, stating that it was a matter
which the Board on Construction should decide. 5 °
55. Taylor to Dewey, June 22, 1901, Dewey Papers.
56. The Board on Construction was organized in 1889 and con-
sisted of the Chiefs of the Bureau of Construction and Repair,
Steam Engineering, Equipment, Ordnance, Yards and Docks,
and the Chief Intelligence Officer. It was given the general
supervision over the design, construction, and equipping of
new ships. Beers, "Office of Naval Operations, " Military
Affairs, Vol. 10 (Spring, 1946), p. 52.
57. Cowles was President Roosevelt's brother-in-law.
58. Cowles to Dewey, August 25, 1902, General Board File 420-3;
Memorandum for the Record signed by Lieutenant Frank
Marble, General Board Secretary, February 21, 1903,
General Board File 420-3.

This evident concern for bureau sensitivities was not reciprocated.
ly in its existence the Board experienced difficulty in acquiring
information from the bureaus, necessary to the intelligent prosecution
of its planning function. Prospects for voluntary bureau cooperation
were not bright so Dewey asked Long to issue instructions which would
authorize direct communication between the Board and the bureaus, a
practice then current in inter-bureau correspondence. 59 Long
refused and directed the Board to channel requests for information
through him in order to keep him current. 60 This procedure resulted
in long delays, and frequently the Board was not able to forward its
recommendations be:ause it could not get substantiating data from the
bureaus. 61 In one instance the Board requested that a certain
Hydrographic Office chart be kept confidential inasmuch as it per-
tained to the military reconnaissance of Nimrod Sound in China. The
letter was delayed in its circuitous routing and received by the action
addressee after the chart had been issued for public distribution. 62
On other occasions, matters forwarded to the Secretary by the
fleet commanders suggesting that they be brought to the attention of
the Board, were sidetracked by the bureaus and never seen by the
59. Dewey to Long, December 19, 1900, General Board File 401-1,
60. Long to Dewey, December 21, 1900, General Board File 401-1.
61. Commander Walter S. Crosley, "The Naval War College, the
General Board, and the Office of Naval Intelligence, " United
States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 39 (September, 1913),
p. 969. Crosley was attached to the Board from 1902 to 1904
and again in 1912 and 1913.
62. Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, General Board File 425-2;
Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, July 1, 1904, General Board
File 425.

Board. Thus, in 1902, Rear Admiral George C. Rcmey, Commander
.e Asiatic Fleet, sent the Secretary a report highly critical of the
Navy's gunnery marksmanship. Because it reflected on war readiness,
he recommended that the Board review it. The document first went to
the Bureau of Ordnance whose chief declined to send it on to the Board
because, in his view, it involved matters strictly within the purview
of the Bureau of Ordnance. ^3
The* conflict of jurisdiction between the Board and the bureaus, the
jealousy of the latter for the former, and the unwillingness or inability
of Secretary Long to maintain firm control led to a serious dispute
which nearly terminated the Board's existence, and helped ensure
defeat for a movement to expand its stature. As indicated earlier.
Rear Admiral Bradford, the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, was
charged with matters relating to the Navy's coaling supplies and
coaling stations. "** Bradford was a controversial figure. He excited
few neutral reactions from his naval officer colleagues. One
described him as "a bit of a brute, " but, "with all his peculiarities .*.
.
the most honest and single minded man in the Navy Department - no
duty time server. ' J Another characterized him as a "liar" who
63. Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, June 22, 1904, General
Board File 420-11.




65. Sperry to wife, September 7, 1902, Sperry Papers.

"could not be trusted. "°° Because of the intimate connection between
oul and war plans, the Board suggested to the Secretary, in June of
1900, that reference be made to it prior to the establishment of any
coaling stations in order that it might comment on the site's strategic
value. 67 Long replied that Bradford had charge of appropriations for
coaling stations and he (Long) did not want any jurisdictional disputes
to arise between the bureaus and the Board for otherwise, the latter's
"usefulness" might be impaired. He did concede however that the
Board had a legitimate interest in the matter and he promised to send
Bradford to consult with the members. 68 Bradford met with the
Board in August of 1900 and discussed the situation, but it is evident
that the conference settled nothing. In mid- 1901, Bradford and the
Board crossed swords over the question of the use of Dry Tortugas
in the Florida Keys as a site for a coaling station. Bradford had for
many years urged the use of this location, 69 but the Board took
exception because it felt that Tortugas was "incapable of any but
imperfect defenses. "™ Bradford challenged Crowninshieid, then
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to produce the Board document
66. Commander T. J. J. See to Congressman Alston G. Dayton,
Dayton Papers, University of West Virginia Library.
67. Dewey to Long, June 2 7, 1900, General Board File 414-1.
68. Long to Dewey, July 24, 1900, General Board File 414.
69. Bradford to Long, April 22, 1901, General Board File 414-3.
70. Commander William S. Cowlcs to Long, April 24, 1901,
General Board File 414-3.

which made that conclusion/ 1 and Crowninshield answered that he could
-ot but he knew it was the sense of the Board membership that Dry
Tortugas was valueless as a coaling station. '^ Then Crowninshield,
on the Board's behalf, invited Bradford to confer once again with the
members to argue his case for Tortugas.73 Bradford, now more in-
censed than ever, refused the invitation, curtly declaring that the
General Board was precluded by its charter from considering the
74question.
Meanwhile Taylor, greatly concerned that the dispute might give
Long cause to abolish the Board or, at least, curtail its activities,
assured the Secretary that the two organizations would be able to work
out their differences, and reminded him that the Board had enough
vO do without encroaching on the bureaus' domain. ?5 Dewey also
sought to persuade Long that "these differences of opinion [werej only
.natural" and, as a matter of fact, the Board was eager to utilize the
wisdom of Bradford's long experience. '"
Taylor then hit upon a possible solution: he proposed to Dewey
that Bradford be made a member of the General Board. Taylor wrote:
71. Bradford to Crowninshield, June 3, 1901, General Board
File 414-3.
72. Crowninshield to Bradford, June 7, 1901, General Board
File 414-1.
73. Crowninshield to Bradford, June 22, 1901, General Board
File 414-1.
74. Bradford to Crowninshield, June 26, 1901, General Board
File 414-1.
75. Taylor to Long, June 8, 1901, Gardner Allen, ed. , Papers of
John Davis Lonff, 1897-1904, (Massachusetts Historical
Society Collections, Vol. 78), p. 367.
76. Dewey to Long, June 28, 1901, General Board File 414.

there is no reason why the Chief of Equipt. should not be made
a member of the Board. His relation to coal supply is suffi-
cient to justify this. It may be that this is the only way to
avoid ceaseless opposition, that is to absorb in our own Board,
the obstacle which tends to retard our efforts for the good of
the service. . . . We are not building for ourselves but for the
Navy that is to follow us - not for these two or three years,
but for the generation to come. ' '
Dowey considered Taylor's proposal a "masterstroke" and he heartily
agreed with it. "° Long also concurred and Bradford reported as a
member of the General Board in August of 1901. 79
John D. Long transferred the Office of the Secretary of the Navy
nnd the Bradford- Board problem to William H. Moody on May 1, 1902.
.Moody was President Roosevelt's first appointee to the post, Long
being a carryover from the McKinley Administration. He adopted a
much more sympathetic attitude toward the Board than had his pre-
decessor, prompted in part by the influence of the recently appointed
Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Henry C. Taylor.
Only two months after Moody entered office he dispelleo. the un-
certainty as to the Board's right to comment on the selection of
coaling stations by directing it to "take under consideration the
-subject
. . . and . . . report in full to the Department the recommenda-
tions of the Board in regard to them. "^0 Despite this clear and
77. Taylor to Dewey, July 14, 1901, Dewey Papers.
78. Dewey to Taylor, July 17, 1901, Taylor Papers.
79. General Board Minutes, August 20, 1901, Vol. 1, p. 98.
80. Moody to Dewey, July 18, 1902, General Board File 414-1.

authoritative .statement, Bradford, even though still a Board member,
Desisted in his belief that the Board's precept did not legally allow
Moody to do what he had done. * The unyielding Bradford, obviously
defeated in his attempt to preserve intact this key portion of the
Bureau of Equipment's empire, finally wrote Moody to say that his
many duties as a bureau chief would no longer allow him to attend
Board meetings and he withdrew. °2 Bradford was not, however
finished with the Board; he would in the months to come deal Taylor
a crippling blow in the latter's attempt to enlarge the Board's power
and responsibilities.
• The General Board fell far short of Taylor's organizational ob-
-:tives, but it did give him an opening wedge with which to achieve his
target - a general staff. He had first to keep the Board alive and prove
its usefulness. Confident that he was successful in these endeavors,
and encouraged by a sympathetic President Roosevelt, Secretary
Yiowdy, and Admiral Dewey, he would begin his move toward the final
goal. His patience was not shared by other general staff advocates
like Hear Admiral Stephen B. Luce; less than two weeks after the
Board's first meeting, he urged Taylor to put before Congress a plan
to create a Chief of General Staff with the rank of Assistant Secretary,
81. General Board Minutes, August 26, 1902, Vol. 1, p. 185.
82. Bradford to Moody, October 11, 1902, Serial 65379, Record
Gioup 80, File 11158/28, National Archives.
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and fill it with a naval officer who would exercise control over the
jureaus. ^ Taylor, more realistic, felt at the time that the develop-
ment of a general staff was "beyond all expectation"^ and it would be
more prudent to cultivate "the sentiment for higher and better things"
and then let the law sanction them." 5 Taylor's evolutionary philosophy
was best set forth in a letter to the revolutionist Luce in which he
wrote, "long weary tapping is needed before we break through the
crust of custom - t'is tedious this 'damnable iteration' - but nothing
comes without it. "°" Dewey was, all the while, well aware that
Taylor was nurturing the general staff and, in fact, gave his blessing
to him. 87
Taylor's first step was to consolidate the gains thus far achieved
and, in June of 1901, he asked Long to seek Congressional sanction
for the Board. °® Long's refusal prompted Taylor to declare that
"some further evolution is necessary if this board is to be, as
originally contemplated, the nucleus of a great general staff; and
something more than an advisory council. ... or the good that has
begun will fade before fruition. "° Taylor enlisted Dewey's support
83. Taylor to Luce, May 3, 1GT00, Luce Papers.
84. Taylor to Luce, March 4, 1901, Luce Papers.
85. Taylor to Luce, May 3, 1900, Luce Papers.
86. Taylor to Luce, April 8, 1902, Luce Papers.
87. Dewey to Taylor, undated but circa February, 1901, Dewey
Papers.
88. Taylor to Long, June 8, 1901, Long Papers, Massachusetts
Historical Society Collections, Vol. 78, p. 367.
89. Taylor to Long, August 12, 1901, Long Papers , Massachu-
setts Historical Society Collection, Vol. 78, p. 387.
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for a scheme 10 create, within the Bureau of Navigation, a general
staff which would not supplant the General Board, but be in a position
to effectuate its policies. 9 ^ Again Long demurred, stating that he
was "disinclined to such action both in the interest of the continued
good work of the Board, and especially of that simplicity of depart-
mental organization . . . which . . . should be increased rather than
diminished. "91 Taylor traced Long's reluctance to the Board's dispute
with Bradford, but it was also due to his distaste for anything con-
nected with a general staff. 92 Dewey's impression, received in a
conversation he had with Long, was that the Secretary would act
eventually, but he did not consider just then an opportune time.
Dewey revealed to Taylor that Long said, "if we waited, everything
would come to us. "93 Nothing did come during Long's tenure of office.
His successor, William H. Moody, would now be tested.
.Taylor had not neglected the importance of the Navy's staunch
supporter in the White House, Theodore Roosevelt. In April of 1902
-he had prepared a memorandum for him on the necessity of a general
staff for the Navy, but apparently decided to forward it over Dewey's
famous signature. 94 in this document, the old arguments were
90. Dewey to Long, June 28, 1901, General Board File 401.
91. Long to Dewey, July 10, 1901, General Board File 401.
92. Chapter I, p. 19; Taylor to Dewey, July 14, 1901, Dewey
Papers.
93. Dewey to Taylor, July 17, 1901, Taylor Papers.
94. Taylor to Luce, April 8, 1902, Luce Papers.

p. stated: the Germans and Japanese have General Staffs,
so should
,, e u#s . Navy; the General Board was a start
but it lacked executorial
teeth; modern warfare demands advance preparation
and only a general
staff can ensure it.
95 Roosevelt, predictably, thought the Dewey .
argument worthy of congratulation and "conclusive."
96
By February of 1903, Secretary Moody had made his decision
to
support the introduction of legislation looking to
the formation of a
creneral staff. Many obstacles had to be overcome, the first
and
foremost being formidable congressional resistance. The
most out-
spoken opponent in the Congress was Senator Eugene
Hale. He had
told Moody that as long as he remained in the Senate, no general
staff
bill would ever become law. ^ Hale's motives were mixed; some
prac-
tical, some ideal. His pacific sensibilities were injured by the
imperialistic venture of 1898, and since the Navy was the primary
tool of the imperialists, he wished to dull its edge, physically and
organizationally. President Roosevelt thought that his pacifism and
animosity toward the military would actually invite war. " Undoubtedly
95
—Dewey to Roosevelt, June 3, 1902, General Board File 401..
96 Roosevelt to Dewey, June 4, 1902, General Board File 401.
97. Taylor to Luce, February 13, 1903, Luce Papers. One
General Board officer reported that "General Staff matters
are booming as far as the President and Secretary are con-
cerned and the only man we have to kill is Hale and I think we
can kill him. " Commander William J. Barnette to Luce,
July 9, 1903, Luce Papers.
98. Elting E. Morison, Admiral Sims and the Modern American
Navy7 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. , 1942), p. 181.
99. Roosevelt to Melville Stone, July 26, 1907, Elting E.
Mor.son, ed. , The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1952), Vol. 5, p. 728.
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these ideological factors contributed in a large way to Hale's position,
' it he was also a close ally of Bradford, the Board nemesis. Both
were from the State of Maine; Hale had been part owner of some land
in that State which, with Bradford's cooperation, was sold to the Navy
Department and became the Frenchman's Bay coal depot. The deal
created suspicions, at least in the mind of Moody, of undue influence. *•""
The principal antagonist in the House Naval Affairs Committee was
not the Chairman, but Congressman Alston G. Dayton of West Virginia.
ile was considered the "real leader" of the Committee. *"1 Dayton was
on close term? with Bradford and R.ear Admiral George Melville, Chief
of the Bureau of Steam Engineering, also in the anti- Board faction.
Dayton had promised Bradford that he would support him for the
prestigious Bureau of Navigation job and Melville offered to "take some
active steps" to enhance Dayton's quest for a federal judgeship,
because of the latter's service to the Engineer Corps. * ^ Another
influential member of the House Naval Affairs Committee was John F.
Rixey. He too was adamantly opposed to the General Board and the
100. Sperry to wife, November 21, 1902, Sperry Papers. Sperry
told his wife thnt because of the sale, Moody considered Hale
a "jobber. " Seward W. Livermore, "American Naval
Development 1898-1914, With Special Reference to Foreign
Affairs," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard Univer-
sity, 1943), p. 24.
101. Lieutenant Commander William S. Sims, handwritten
description of Dayton on the back of a letter, Dayton to Sims,
March 28, 1904, Sims Papers. Sims was an astute observer
of, and participant in, the Washington scene during the
period of this study. Morison, Admiral Sims.
102. Bradford to Dayton, May 6, 1904, Dayton Papers; Melville
to Dayton, June 15, 1901, Dayton Papers.

.rmeral staff, and was undoubtedly disposed in that direction by his
brother, Surgeon General Presley M. Rixcy, Chief of the Bureau of
Medicine and Surgery.
Congressional preference for the bureau system was based not
only on the distaste for a germanic system of administration, but
also because Congress could maintain considerable control over the
Navy Department. The bureaus spoke as many voices and with many
budget requests, most of which would effect local economies. Bureau
chiefs were also appointed to four year terms subject to confirmation
by the Senate, and were hard to remove once ensconced without
embarrassment to the Executive. All of this tended toward an
alliance of mutual interest with Congress and an independence from the
Secretary which, was vastly different from current practice. On the
other hand, the General Board controlled no funds, had no favors to
dispense, and would hardly support large expenditures for a navy
yard in Senator Hale's home State if it did not square with its
strategic program.
The prospects for a general staff were indeed dismal, but Taylor
and company began their crusade. Luce was asked to use his
influence "with
. . .
pen and with the politicians. "103 a pamphlet
containing articles in support of a general staff by such luminaries as
103. Commander William J. Barnette to Luce, September 26,
1903, Luce Papers.
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;upporl the "campaign of
education. *« The members of the
House
.aval Affairs Committee
were wined, dined, and
briefed aboard the
L,., yacht. Oolohin.^ President Roosevelt was as.ed
and
agrced t0 endorse the general
staff measure in this
annual message
L Congress. "6 Moody even considered
reducing the size of the
Board to demphasize. in
the mind of Congress, its threat
to the bureau
tructu-e
107 The War College was directed
to forward a summary of
Stances in military htstory
where good war plans gained
victory and
improPer plans or no
plans at all ensured defeat.
^S Commander
WUUam a. Barnette used his contact,
on the New^Ierald to
pubnsh an editorial which, in
vituperative language, too,
Congressman
or .e E. Foss. Chairman of
the House Naval Affairs
Commtttee. to
task for opposing a biU which
would have dualized the pay of
Army
and Navy officers. He then
wrote Congressman Dayton, a
Foss
opponent, endosing the editorial,
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the Herald to "swat" Foss. 109 Finally, Moody and Taylor included
in their annual reports strong criticisms of the bureau system, and
equally strong recommendations for some form of general staff. HO
The opposing bureaus lost no time in presenting their "case.
"
Seizing on the General Board practice of meeting at the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island, during the summer months, they
mocked the Board as "a pleasant place for those who wish to winter
in Washington and summer in Newport. "Ill However devoid of truth,
this charge was so effective that Moody and Taylor prevailed on
Dewey to cancel the Newport sessions for the summer of 1903, even
though some of the members, and most of the records, were already
there. 112
Bradford, in an attempt to counter Moody's and Taylor's pleas
for a general staff in their annual reports, issued a scathing attack
on the activities of the Board and on Moody's administration of the
Department. Characteristically, he opened with a statement of
concern not for the Navy but for the Bureau of Equipment. He
claimed that the General Board had violated its instructions and
109. Barnette to Dayton, April 2, 1004, with clipping from New
York Herald, April 2, 1904, Dayton Papers. Congressional
hearings on the General Board/general staff bill began nine
days later.
110. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, November 23, 1903,
Annual Reports of the Navy Department for the Year 1903,
(Washington, 1903), pp. 3-5; Report of the Chief of the
Bureau of Navigation, October 1, 1903, Ibid.
, pp. 498-499.
111. Taylor to Dewey, June 27, 1903, Dewey Papers.
112. Ibid. ; Taylor to Luce, July 23, 1903, Luce Papers; General
Board Minutes, July 28, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 321.
'
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involved itself with bureau business. In a direct affront to Moody,
'e wrote, "after an experience of six years in the Department, the
Chief of the Bureau [of Equipment] believes that it is the adminis-
tration of the Deprtmcnt that needs attention, rather than its
organization, particularly in the direction of expenditure of money
and in confining the subordinates of the Department to their legiti-
j x • - ti 1 1
3
mate duties.
Taylpr wanted to avoid the use of jid hominem argumentation
and keep the debate on a high plane. While he estimated that the
opponents had "ten times the influence with Congress. . . and ten
times the power with the press, " he also realized that resort to
bitter rhetoric and personal attacks would leave an indelible scar
on the Navy's body politic, "smell bad a year or two later, " and
alienate Congress for many years to come. He was anticipating
defeat in the short term, but hoped for victory in the long run. "I
have impressed my ideas about using proper and large methods
upon my colleagues and subordinates, " he wrote Luce, "and we are
Kall now prepared to go ahead in a deliberate and dignified manner,
but at the same time with a sustained'energy and persistence." 1^
113. Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment,
September 17, 1903, Annual Reports of the Navy Depart -
ment, p. 390; Bradford to Dayton, January 13, 1904, Dayton
Papers.
114. Taylor to Luce, September 11, 1903, Luce Papers.
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At this juncture Taylor had two plans in mind: the maximum
orogram called for Congressional authorization of a full general staff
and a chief of staff with control over the bureaus in the areas of fleet
logistics, ships, ship characteristics, force levels, and naval bases;
the bureaus would be reduced to a support function only. H* The
General Board would be abolished, and in its place a "General
Council" would be formed to advise the Secretary on "broad policy
matters. "H6 j^c minimum goal was to get Congress to recognize
the General Board legislatively, and to provide for a "chief of staff"
to the Secretary; this scheme did not provide for either a general
staff or direct reduction of bureau power; the chief of staff would be
selected from among the General Board members. " • The climate
n Congress indicated that there would be no chance at all for the
maximum program, and so little for the minimum program, that
Taylor was tempted to abandon all effort. 118 Moody elected to
move forward with the minimum program, and requested Congress
115. Taylor, "The Fleet, " United Sta.es Naval Institute Pro -
ceedings Vol. 29 (December, 1903), p. 806.
116. Taylor, "Memorandum on the Necessity of a General Staff
and the Method of Supplying It, " undated but circa October
1903, General Board File 401.
117. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Naval Affairs,
Hearings on II. K. 1540 3 for a General Board, 58th Cong.,
2nd sess. , House Report No. 146, bound in Hearings before
the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives,
Appropriation Bill for 1005 Subjects and on H. R. 15403, for
General Board. (Washington, 1904), hereafter referred to
as General Boara Hearings, p. 912; Taylor to Moody,
April 10, 1904, William H. Moody Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
118. Taylor to Moody, April 10, 1904, Moody Papers.




It was absolutely essential
that Dewey testify enthusiastically
Ln favor of the
measure; without his support the bill
didn't stand a
chance. aylor wanted the
Secretary to persuade Dewey to take the
Chief of Staff position because,
if his name were associated with
the
measure in that fashion.
Congress might be reluctant to defeat
the
proposal and thus disparage the
popular Admiral. "« Dewey balked;
not only did he not want the
job. but he also objected to the phrase.
"chief of staff" because of the odium
which critics had generated for
it and the term, "general staff.
"I 20 Finally, after a series of hur-
ried conferences between Taylor,
Dewey, and Moody, it was agreed
'
to change the title to "military
adviser/'"* and Dewey promised
both Taylor and Moody that he would
support their plan in full.
122
The House Naval Affairs Committee
hearings began on April 11.
,
1004 and, during the ensuing two
weeks, testtmony was received
from twelve Navy Department witnesses.
Of the eight bureau chiefs
who testified, only two were in absolute
agreement with the bill.
Taylor and Rear Admiral Henry N. Manney.
Chief of the Bureau of
Equipment. 123 Rear Admiral George A.
Converse, a line officer
119. Taylor to Moody, April 1U. 1904,
Moody Papers.
In. 'Taylor to Dewey, undated but
circa. April. 1904. Dewey
122 Tavlor to Moody. April 10, 1904. Moody
Papers.
23* Bradford left for sea duty in October of
1903. not as part of
12
*
a plo by Moody and Taylor to prevent
him from testifymg.
but because he was long overdue
for such an assignment.
Besides, his views were well known through
his contacts
with Dayton and Hale.

and Chief of the Bureau of
Ordnance, told the Committee that he
, lg ht the General Board was
too large and, while he would Inter-
pose no strong objection to the bill, he
was concerned that Us
passage might permit a future Secretary
to place an expansive inter-
pr etation on the Board's mission.
124 Brigadier General George F.
Elliot, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
said he would support the
measure only if Marine Corps representation
were guaranteed. 125
U,ar Admiral Charles W. Hue, Chief
of Iho Bureau of Steam
Engineering, nominally a line officer, but
really identifying more
with the old Engineer Corps, joined the
other staff corps bureau
chiefs in a unanimous and adamant
rejection of the scheme.™ The
one common thread unifying their
testimony was the fear that the
role of the bureaus would be narrowed
if the bill were to become
law. !27
Moody sought to destroy the arguments of
his subordinates and
antagonists by pledging that the General
Board would not be the instru-
ment for reducing the civilian control
of the Navy, 128 nor would it
"supervise the operations of the bureaus ....
"
129 He related that
he had offered the job of military adviser
to Dewey, but he had re-
fused because he was not prepared to
undertake such a strenuous
'i ;'... General Board Hearings, pp. 954-955,
125. Ibid. , pp. 989-991.
126. Ibid. , pp. 946-991.
127. Ibid. , pp. 946-949.
128. Ibid. , pp. 912, 918.
12D. Ibid., p. 913.
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assignment at his advanced age (66 years). ^0 ^e explained that the
Mil added to his powers in only one respect, and that was the crea-
tion of the position of military adviser, with a rank superior to any
other rear admiral. In other provisions, it either confirmed what
the Secretary had already done, or limited his powers insofar as it
detailed the maximum number of officers who could be assigned to
the Board, and specified the length of their tours of duty. 3 * Moody
favored these last two restraints in order to:
quiet the solicitude - expressed not only in committees and
in Congress, but in the service itself - that the General
Board may develop into a large body of officers who gradu-
ally may accumulate for themselves great power in the
administration of the Navy and great power over the fortunes
of the individual officers of the Navy, and that thereby there
shall be created a military oligarchy here at Washington
.... With this provision enacted into law that can never be.
The body will be small. It must be representative. It must
soon resolve again into its elements, which will return to
their duties, either at sea or on land. 132
It was no surprise that Taylor strongly favored the bill. Ke
summed up his feelings this way:
If the General Board were authorized by Congress, it would
put the military management of the fleet upon the same
ground ... as is now occupied by the bureaus in their rela-
tions to the Secretary. The opponents of this measure fear
130. General Board Hearings, pp. 914, 938. Taylor was







that it will produce bad results. I do not agree with them;
but so great is the Navy's need that I respectfully urge the
committee to take that risk rather than to leave the Secre-
tary of the Navy with no authorized advice upon the questions
now become vital to the Navy and the country in case of
war. 133
The testimony of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Charles H.
Darling reveals, as nothing else could, just how fantastic a menagerie
was the Navy Department of 1904. Here was an appointee of President
Roosevelt, owing allegiance to the Executive and particularly to the
Secretary of the Navy, and yet appearing before the House Naval
Affairs Committee and condemning the General Board in stronger
language than that used by the bureau chiefs. 134 Darling stated that
his opposition was well known to Moody and was offered with the
latter's "knowledge and consent. "135 Darling disapproved of the
measure for three reasons: it would make the Secretary an "orna-
mental figurehead;" it would promote militarism; and it would be
superfluous since the "military element of the Navy Department
already [had] all the power and all the influence it ought to have, "
either in the field of departmental administration or in the matter of
congressional recommendations. 3 ° Moreover, Darling favored
restricting the Board's duties rather than enlarging them as Moody
intended. He criticized the Board for inflating its mission and for
133. General Board Hearings
, p. 952.





^. . | H|.p,|

carrying out duties of no tactical or strategical import. He con-
cluded with the warning that the bill really authorized a general staff,
an "old world idea" not in consonance with the American system of
government. xo '
Interestingly enough, just four months before this testimony.
Darling wrote Dewey and asked that the General Board concern it-
self not only with the preparation of plans but also their manner of
execution. In his view, the "necessity for the constant cooperation
of the General Board with the Department has become marked as of
late." 13 **
Tke House Naval Affairs Committee had heard enough. So com-
plete was the defeat of Taylor's plan that the Congressmen didn't
even dignify it with a Committee report. While Darling's testimony
was not the sole contributing factor, it gave vivid evidence of how
hopeless were Taylor's chances for success. The antipathy within the
iVavy Department and Congress was too overwhelming. The balance
of power lay with those who favored the bureau system.
Taylor accepted the rout with equanimity. Brushing aside Luce's
suggestion that the Secretary do by executive fiat what Congress re-
fused to do, he wrote:
137. General Board Hearings, pp. 934-935.
138. Darling to Dewey, January 4, 1904, General Board File 401,
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as to being defeated, we certainly have not gained what we
want, but I should not consider it a defeat until Congress
passed some law which would prevent our trying to im-
prove things. We have been afraid of that, and with reason.
. .
. We have not had to fall back any yet, and do not doubt
that by continuing as we are going now we shall, in a few
years, obtain what we want and obtain it in the right way. *39
Taylor was right. I^one of the General Board adversaries dared go
so far as to suggest the disestablishment of Dewey's Board. Its
existence, however dependent on the whim of a future Secretary, was
confirmed, and even its most bitter critics admitted its value.
Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor died on July 26, 1904 and the
Taylor era ended. A little more than one year earlier, in an appraisal
of the General Board, he wrote:
It is of course a little ragged in its workings as a General
Staff, it having no official status but it is gradually being
recognized as such, and is used effectively by those who
wish to better the Navy and heartily opposed by those who
wish the old order preserved. . . . You perceive there is
nothing very triumphant in this statement, and in truth there
is not the amount of success for which we make great parade
and blow trumpets, but in certain ways I am heartily satis-
fied with the present results . . . even if I should leave it
tomorrow.
139. Taylor to Luce, June 29, 1904, Luce Papers.
140. Taylor to Luce, February 13, 1903, Luce Papers.

CHAPTER III
THE BOARD, THE BUREAUS,
AND THE INSURGENTS, 1904 - 1914
After Taylor's death in 1904 the General Board achieved a degree
of recognition and permanence which it had never enjoyed while he
was alive. But without his leadership, the line began to split into two
factions: those who favored retaining the Board as the principal voice
of the seagoing officers; and a group of insurgents who still saw it as
an evolutionary mutation in the growth towards an all-powerful general
staff. Their actions added a new dimension to the continuing turmoil
and disunity within the Navy Department. Relative calm came in
1909 thanks to strong secretarial leadership, but it proved to be only
a cease-fire. Four years later, the struggle was renewed, and' it led
to the Board's loss of the function for which it was founded - war
planning.
As noted in Chapter II, one of Taylor's aims was to acquire suf-
ficient approbation for the Board to ensure its survival from bureau
attacks and to permit it to speak with the voice of authority. The
1904 hearings failed to do this but the disappointment was short-lived.
During the hearings, Admiral Dewey, in response to a request by the
House Naval Affairs Committee, submitted a list of duties which the
65

Board would perform if the bill then under consideration were to
^come law. It had been drafted by Rear Admiral Taylor, 1 and
included all of those functions which were contained in Secretary
John D. Long's letter of March 29, 1900 plus the following: deter-
mination of level of war reserve supplies, fleet logistics requirements,
manpower needs; advising on naval operations, maneuvers, tactics,
organization, and training; coordination of the work of the Naval War
College and the Office of Naval Intelligence. 2 There was nothing
surprising about this list; the Board had been doing these things for
many years. Its significance lies in the fact that Taylor wanted to
codify the Board's practice, for the guidance of the bureaus, and to
use as a shield to prevent future attacks of the Bradford pattern. At
the time, the Board's duties had not even been included in the Navy's
bible, "Navy Regulations, " which spelled out in considerable detail
the functions and inter-relationships of the several Navy Department
components.
Taylor's successor as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear
Admiral George A. Converse, suggested in October of 1904 that the
General Board should be formally recognized as a "permanent
1. Memorandum from Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor to Admiral
George Dewey, April 19, 1904, Dewey Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
2. U. S. , Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on H. R. 15403 for a General Board , 58th Cong. , 2nd sess. ,
House Report No. 146, bound in Hearings before the Committee
on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, Appropriation Bill
for 1905 Subjects and on H. R. 15403, for General Board,





element of the Navy Department.
"
>:S Secretary of the Navy, Paul
lortorij William l\, Moody's successor, concurred and the Navy
Regulations published in June of 1905 gave to the General Board a
stature, permanence, and legitimacy far exceeding that accorded to
it in the early days. Since the regulations were approved by the
president, the members deemed the action most significant to the
future of the Board. 5 It gave the members a sense of independence
never enjoyed in the early years. They were now in a position to
remind the bureaus whenever they failed to refer to the Board those
matters properly coming under its cognizance. Thus, the Secretary
wan told that the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks should not
have submitted a budget request for facilities at San Juan harbor
without consulting the Board. His action was deemed inconsistent
with the long- held conviction that spending priority should go to the
base at Girantanamo. 6
"Three weeks before Taylor died, he met with President
Roosevelt, Secretary Moody and Admiral Dewey and told them that if
Congress did not authorize some "superior direction of the fleet,"
. 3. Annual Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation,
October 17, 1904, Annual Reports of the Navy Department,
1904
,
(Washington, 1904), pp. 468-469.
4. Regulations for the Government of the U.S. Navy, 1905,
(Washington, 1905), p. 19.
5. Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry to son Charles, May 12, 1905,
Sperry Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
6. Dewey to Secretary of the Navy (hereafter cited as Secnav),







the administration should "discourage the building of more fighting
.ips. " He was convinced that without a general staff, and in the
event of war, the ships would be easily captured by the enemy and,
although the Navy "would fight and die bravely . . . [its] history
would be full of heroic defeats; but they would be defeats still, and
the country would be humiliated. . . . "
'
This was Taylor's legacy but who would carry on? His death
"left the Navy without a leader. "° Dewey was getting well on in years,
was not in the best of health, and did not want to invest his prestige
and popularity in what was a very unpopular movement. ** He wanted
to avoid the airing of controversial questions in the public forum. 1"
It is true that he had supported Taylor's endeavors, but principally
because of the great trust he had in him, and now that Taylor was
gone, he was unwilling to transfer this confidence to other members
of the general staff movement. While his health declined, his
prestige did not; even as late as 1913 Dewey was able to get a
7. Taylor to Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, June 29, 1904,
Luce Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
8. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear
Admiral, (New York: The Century Co.
, 1919), p. 371.
9. Dewey to son George, March 24, 1904, Dewey Papers,
Division of Naval History, Washington, D. C.
10. He told the author who "ghosted" his autobiography, Frederic
Palmer, to "soften the truth" about his confrontation with the
Germans at Manila Bay in order to avoid a renascence of the
rancor which this episode had provoked when it occurred.
Palmer to Dewey, February 6, 1912 and June 12, 1912,
Dewey Papers.
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Congressman assigned to the important House 2\aval ^iiairs
Committee. * 1
In addition to these supporting factors, Dewey did not believe in
a general staff. This is not to say that he did not see room for
improvement in the Navy's organization; he made many proposals to
this effect including one which would have replaced the bureaus with
three offices: financial, military, and technical with an operating
head over each reporting to the Secretary. 12 But he thought the
General Board was better than any general staff system and he once
called it the "best General Naval Staff in the world, "^ ^nd "superior
to the Army General Staff organization. " 14
Whether Dewey's distaste for the general staff was based wholly,
• artially, or not at all on concern for the loss of stature it would
bring for h-im and the General Soard,' is unclear. However, one of
his descriptions of the general staff modus operandi reveals less than
a clear understanding of its function. Dewey was quoted as saying:
"If you have a general staff, and you give it administrative as well
as advisory powers, you get too many officers each of whom has the
right to issue orders, and in the end there is no final authority."^
11. Congressman Peter F. Gerry to Dewey, June 3, 1913, Dewey
Papers.
12. Dewey to Secnav, November 16, 1906, General Board File
446.
13. Dewey to Congressman Lemuel Padgett, April 3, 1913,
Dewey Papers.
14. Dewey to Josephus Daniels, March 5, 1915, General Board
File 446.




llis opposition, if not his understanding, was shared by another
^-ominent naval officer and member of the General Board, Rear
Admiral Charles S. Sperry. He wrote:
it is commonly said that the army general staff is doing ad-
ministrative work in matters of material instead of confining
itself-to giving military advice and making plans for the
handling of the army in war. An attempt was made to pro-
cure a similar establishment for the navy but I am pleased
to say it failed. The General Board lets questions of mate-
rial alone most wisely and handles only military questions
or such as require the cooperation of several bureaus. 16
But who would see to it that the bureaus cooperated? Not the General
Board; it was limited to advice and could not require the bureaus to
act. The only coordinating element was the Secretary himself.
President Roosevelt had no less than six Secretaries in a little
over seven years. Yet one who had some naval experience prior to
becoming Secretary, believed that no "man can understand the Navy
Department in less than two years of continuous, earnest applica-
1 7
tion. Secretary of the Navy Victor H. Metcalf, who spent a large
part of his tenure away from Washington, was reluctant to tackle the
Navy's organizational problems because he would be in office only a
short time, and he did not wish to stir up "strife. ,f*° Dewey
16. Sperry to son Charles, February 22, 1906, Sperry Papers.
17. Testimony of Secretary Truman H. Newberry, February 1,
1909, U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Naval Affairs,
Methods of Conducting Business and Departmental Changes,
60th Cong. , 2nd sess. , Senate Doc. No. 693, (Washington,
1909), p. 22.
18. Luce to Rear Admiral Willard H. Brownson, August 22, 1907,
Luce Papers. Draft copy with notation, "never sent, " but in
which Luce records conversation he had with Metcalf.




described the Secretaryship during Roosevelt's administration as a
"'kaleidoscopic post . . . ; no one remains there long enough to become
conversant with the duties of the office or to make himself in the
least identified with the ideas, aims, necessities or customs of the
service. "^ Secretary of the Navy Charles J. Bonaparte, a
descendant of Napoleon I, inspired little confidence; he admitted that
the position required "a man who is interested in his work and has
some force of character to keep these autonomous Bureaus in due
subordination and, ... to retain control. . . . "20 But he delegated
most of his functions to his assistant, was not considered to be a
"hustler, " and was seldom at his office. 21
Attempts were made by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce to
interest Dewey and the Board in general staff measures but without
success, even though they were offered with the assurance that they
19. Dewey to Brownson, October 26, 1906, Dewey Papers.
Although he described the situation as "unsatisfactory, " he
al* » indicated that Roosevelt's "intense interest. .. in naval
matters" was a "redeeming point. "
20. Bonaparte to Roosevelt, September 8, 1906, Bonaparte
Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
21. Dewey to Captain Nathan Sargent, December 26, 1905 and
June 5, 1906, Dewey Papers. As one competent student of
American naval policy has said:
The short-term Secretaries usually do little more than
learn the routine of their office, render a few decisions
at the bidding of their subordinates, and vex, through
lack of knowledge or misplaced zeal, the already
troubled waters of the Navy. Charles O. Paullin, "A
Half Century of Naval Administration, 1861-1911, Part
VII, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 39
(September, 1913), p. 1247.

would strengthen the Board's position. 22 One observer, Park
benjamin, told Luce that the "General Staff movement was dead,"
and that Secretary Paul Morton considered the General Board as
meeting "all necessities. " 2 ^ Benjamin was wrong; the movement
wasn't dead, it had gone underground.
Ironically, the reformers came from Dewey's own organization,
the General Board. All of them, Captain William J. Barnette,
Captain William Swift, and Lieutenant Commander Philip Andrews,
received succor from Admiral Luce, and none of them felt bound to
use the "proper and large methods" which Taylor had advocated. 24
Beginning in late 1905, these insurgents began their undercover
campaign ("plot" would perhaps better describe their method).
Warning that "publicity would be fatal, " Barnette unfolded their plan
to Luce. The Secretary would be persuaded to relieve the Chief of
the Bureau of Navigation of his many details and assign them to his
assistant. He would thus become a de facto chief of staff with
responsibility under the Secretary for war preparation. Later, a
clause would be inserted in the Naval Appropriation Bill authorizing
the Secretary to "assign to the Asst. Chief of Bu. [Bureau of Navi-
gation] such duties as the exigencies of the service may require."
The General Board would remain but the Chief of the Bureau of
22. Luce to Dewey, March 27, 1905, General Boaxd File 446.
23. Benjamin to Luce, April 25, 1905.
24. Taylor to Luce, September li, 1903, Luce Papers.
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\avi r ation would be in a position to control it because of his release
m\\ the bondage of detail which encumbered pervious Chiefs,
Dewey's status would remain unchanged. Captain Barnette described
their scheme to Luce, writing:
1 want to make clear- to you again that my plan presumes the
status quo so far as Dewey is concerned (unfortunately) but
when he is unable to perform further duty, (may that be
soon) then the Chief of BuNav comes into his own. Dewey,
so long as he acts, will of course be the President of the
G. B. [General Board] but the Chief of BuNav has the power
and is therefore the executive head. . . . - ,)
Uarncttc then went on to ask Luce to go to the President and obtain
his approval for only he could "coerce" the principal obstacle to
legislation of the sort described, Senator Eugene Hale. w0 Whether
.-uce did or not is unknown, but in any event nothing came of the plan.
.Several months later the idea was resurrected but with some
interesting new twists. Again an amendment would be attached to the
Naval Appropriation Bill to allow the assistants to the Chief of the
bureaus of Navigation, Equipment, Construction and Repair, and
Yards and Docks to "transact such duties of their respective Bureaus
as the Secretary may direct. " The last three were included only to
mask the real intention: to free the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation
from his day to day routine so that he could "devote his time to
25. Barnette to Luce, October 15, 1905, Luce Papers.
26. Ibid.

ithe larger questions, " and "execute the will of the General Board of
vhich he will be Head when Dewey steps down . . . . " Then, in
Barnette's view, the insurgents would be well on their way to
achieving their goal, power to control the bureaus. 2 '
They were quite sanguine about success; Barnette indicated that
he had assurances from the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs
Committee, George E. Foss, that Senator Hale would cooperate
because the former had "helped Hale get an assistant to the BuEngr
[Bureau of Engineering] as a personal favor. "28 a few days later,
Barnette updated Luce:
nothing must be done and no move made in any direction until
after the naval appropriation has passed both houses with the
amendment attached. Foss has to play the game for me and
you know he is a very slippery proposition. Please remem-
ber that no one but yourself and Andrews [Lieutenant Com-
mander Philip Andrews, assigned to the General Board's
First Committee] knows what is really behind the innocent
little amendment not even Cowles [Rear Admiral William S.
Cowles, President Roosevelt's brother-in-law and Chief of
the Bureau of Equipment]. ... 29
Barnette's optimism did not prove justified. Hale remained
true to his long- held antipathy toward a general staff to which he
related "like a red rag to a bull. "30 President Roosevelt was unable
27. Barnette to Luce, May 3, 1906, Luce Papers.
28. Ibid.
29. Barnette to Luce, May 16, 1906, Luce Papers.
30. Luce to Dr. W. Wharton Hollingsworth, May 4, 1906, Luce
Papers.

or unwilling to exercise his influence to bring him around, 31 and
nally Dewey's support, so essential to success, was just not
available. 32
The stormy Bureau-Board relationships which marked the first
four years of the General Board's existence continued. While the
particulars of contention changed, the fundamental causes did not.
Now the chief issue would be the design of ships; the disputants
were the General Board on the one hand and the Bureau of Construc-
tion and Repair and the Board on Construction on the other.
Secretary Long's letter of instructions to the General Board
called for it to "give its attention to ... . the numbers and kinds of
ships needed for the maintenance of . . . power . . . . *'33 The Navy-
Regulations of 1905 authorized it to "consider the number and types
of ships proper to constitute the fleet. . . . "34 The Board found that
Its advice could not be limited to ship numbers and general categories
but necessarily involved the military characteristics of the ships.
The term "battleship" or "cruiser" meant little unless amplified with
a description of displacement, armament, speed, armor, and so on.
Therefore the Board, in support of its war planning function, felt
constrained to provide the Secretary with counsel on such matters.
31. Luce to Dr. W. Wharton Hollingsworth, May 4, 1906, Luce
Papers.
32. Barnette to Luce, December 15, 1905, Luce Papers.
33. Long to Dewey, March 30, 1900, General Board File 401.
34. Navy Regulations, 1905, p. 19.
(t
and in doing so, it came into conflict with a bureau and an mter-
bureau agency which had been advising the Secretary on the same
matters.
The bureau was the Bureau of Construction and Repair, Led by
a staff corps officer, it was charged with "all that relates to de-
signing, building, fitting, and repairing the hulls of ships. ..."35
The inter- bureau agency was the Board on Construction. Its mem-
bership included the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Equipment, Ordnance,
Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering and it was orga-
nized in 1089 to provide the Secretary with professional advice on
the Navy's shipbuilding programs. 36 ri'he officers from the Bureau
of Construction and Repair,, called Naval Constructors, dominated
this Board principally because they were regarded as the only ones
who were professionally qualified to address the complicated prob-
lems of warship design; but, in the view of many of the line officers,
they planned the ships not with the user in mind, but in accordance
with their own concepts, borne of too much theory and too little
practicality. ** ' Some of the bureau chiefs on the Board on Con-
struction were in fact line officers but they were so busy conducting
their own affairs that they did not have time to devote a large effort
35. Navy Regulations, 1905, p. 15.
36. Navy Regulations, 1905, p. 458.
37. Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske to Commander William S.
Sims, February 25, 1905, Sims Papers, Division of Naval
History, Washington, D. C.
'-"W"»*"l^iW*pWP<BWW»*?W«!»^^pemjj

to what they considered a peripheral activity. Rear Admiral Charles
O'Xeil, for seven years the President of the Eoard on Construction,
admitted that ship design procedures neeced changing and agreed
that the members didn't have time to go into necessary detail. This
produced an attitude of conservatism - an unwillingness to
experiment. **" Xo wonder then that a member of this Board, when
asked by a line officer why he opposed turbines for new battleships,
replied: "Because I know what reciprocating engines can do, and
I'm not taking risks with any improvements. If you fellows [the
hive] can get Congress to assume the risk, I'll build the turbines." 3 *
Not surprising either was the response of the Board on Construction
when it was told that two battleships under construction had serious
design deficiencies which substantially affected their capability. It
agreed but added that the "designs were prepared many years ago,
. . .
and to institute extensive changes, would involve the Government
in serious complications as to contractual obligations.
As in the case of naval base policy, the General Board entered
the field of shipbuilding with considerable caution. It voiced concern
to Secretary Long in October of 1900 that the Navy's programs,
expressed in the Board on Construction recommendations, were
~3Q~. Attachment "B" to letter Dewey to Secnav, May 28, 1906,
General Board File 420.
39. Handwritten comment by Sims on back of a letter from A. T.
Bowles to Truman H. Newberry, December 16, 1908, copy
in Sims Papers.
40. Board on Construction endorsement, attached to letter
Dewey to Secnav, May 28, 1906, General Board File 420.
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jsymctricul and would lead to overconstruction of battleships and
undcrconstruction of cruisers, gunboats, destroyers, and auxil-
iaries. 41 beginning in October of 1003, the Board began to include
not only numbers and kinds of ships but also their characteristics
including sustained speed, steaming radius, armament, armor,
freeboard, and displacement.^ 2 The naval constructors and the
Board on Construction took affront at this challenge to their pre-
viously exclusive domain and criticized the General Board's ship
desiderata as unreal. ** Confronted with this dilemma, the
Secretary, William H. Moody, decided to use the General Board's
suggestions as to the numbers and types of ships but still relied on
the design professionals for the characteristics. Another Secretary,
Charles J. Bonaparte, infuriated the General Board members by
submitting their recommendations to the Board on Construction and
then accepting the latter's advice on the extent to which they should
be carried out. ^4 in the opinion of the General Board this procedure
vitiated "one of the chief objects for which. . . [it] was organized" and
tended to "continue the uncertainty as to what building program the
Department should recommend to Congress. "45
41. Dewey to Secnav, October 12, 1900, General Board File 420-2.
42. Dewey to Secnav, October 17, 1903, General Board File 420-2,
43. Rear Admiral Charles O'Neil, President, Board on Construc-
tion to Secnav, November 27, 1903, General Board File 420-2.
44. U.S., Congress, House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 1906,
59th Cong.
, 1st scsa. , House Doc. No. 123, (Washington,
1U0G), p. 1119.
45. Dewey to Secnav, February 16, 1907, General Board File 401.
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Several incidents reinforced the Board's conviction that line
officers should have a "controlling voice in the character and
qualities of the instruments with winch they have to deal. " In
March of 1904, the Board told the Secretary that the ammunition
hoists in battleship turrets were so constructed as to permit hot
powder to fall directly down to the powder handling rooms, possibly
47
causing fire or explosion. ' Two weeks later, a turret explosion
4
occurred in U. S. S. Missouri , and burning powder fell from the
barbette to the handling room, spreading the fire, and contributing
4ft
to the deaths of five officers and twenty-five men. ° In the face of
this, the Board on Construction defended the design because it had
nothing "on file" to reflect criticism on the system of direct hoists.
Nothing was done, and again in April of 1906, a similar episode took
place in U. S. S. Kearsage, and the death and destruction were once
more exacerbated by the direct path from the gun turret to the
handling room. "
The General Board made two general suggestions for improve-
ment. One was to strip the Board on Construction of its duties and
transfer them to a "Board on Designs" composed of two civilian naval
4G. Dewey to Secnav, January 28, 1909, General Board File 446.
47. Dewey to Secnav, March 31, 1904, General Board File 420-11.
48. Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Annual Reports
of the Navy Department, 1904, (Washington, 1904), pp. 576-
577.
49. Dewey to Secnav, December 5, 1906, General Board File
420-11.
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architects and live naval officers none of whom would be bureau
chiefs. The sole duty of this board would be to examine all designs
on new construction ships and make appropriate recommendations
to the Secretary. Another was to break from the long tradition of
the past which restricted the design function to the Navy only; the
Hoard wanted the Navy Department to amend its rules and invite
private shipbuilding firms to develop plans of their own which would
be placed in competition with those of the naval constructors. The
Board on Designs would then have a real choice and the Navy would
benefit from the "outside ideas and experience. "°^ Both ideas were
too revolutionary to be immediately accepted by traditionalists in
the Navy. Rear Admiral Washington L. C'apps, Chief of the Bureau
of Construction and Repair, told the Secretary that he was opposed
to the use of the designs of private industry because of the difficulty
in granting access to the secret information on which the designs
were based, and because the procedure did not conform to that
practiced by the world's leading maritime powers. *1
Dewey was so distressed at the inability of his Board to influ-
ence the Navy's ship design policy that he told Senator Henry Cabot
Lodge that the Navy "was going to hell, " and he advised President
50. Dewey to Secnav, December 29, 1905, General Board File
420.
51. Capps to Secnav, 2nd endorsement to letter from Rear
Admiral Richard Wainwright, Senior Member Present,
General Board to Secnav, June 28, 1910, General Board
File 420.
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Roosevelt that if the disputes between the General Board and the
Board on Construction were antagonistic to Secretary Bonaparte, he
would ask to be relieved as President of the General Board. Later
Bonaparte assured Dewey that he would "recognize and settle the
sowers" of the two organizations. Nothing came of Bonaparte's
promise and the line, frustrated by its failure to assert itself
through the only departmental forum available to it, would seek other
avenues of change.
The ship design controversy was one among many problem areas
which fragmented the Navy Department, and so much so that its
senior naval officer, Admiral Dewey, felt the need to include a
special plea in his service-wide Christmas message of 1906. He
wrote, "Let us have neither cliques or grudges, but all stand to-
gether for the good of the country and the service. "53
Secretary of the Navy Victor Metcalf sensed the growing dis-
satisfaction and, in an attempt to relieve it, he issued a directive
encouraging naval officers to stfbmlt suggestions to him for improve-
ment of the naval service. 54 For some naval officers this did not
go far enough. One suggested that article 252 of Navy Regulations
forbidding the unauthorized use of the public press to discuss
52. Mrs. George Dewey's diary entry January 20, 1906, Dewey
Papers.
53. Washington Times, December 25, 1906, Dewey Scrapbook,
Dewey Papers.
54. Navy Department General Order Number 49, June 20, 1907,
Record Group 80, National Archives.

departmental policies^ be amended to allow "all officers of the
Navy ... to discuss openly in public print over their own signatures
all service matters not obviously confidential . . . . " In his view,
this would encourage naval officers to air their grievances "in the
•mooted questions of policy and design .... " 56 Needless to say.
Article 252 remained unchanged. Nevertheless, a few line officer
activists, convinced that their only recourse lay with the press,
began a muckraking publicity campaign. Captain Barnette, still
with the General Board, informed Luce that articles to be published
in The Navy would "bear fruit" and that Mc Lure's Magazine and
The New York Times would also be coming out with pieces which
would trigger "investigations and reforms.
Barnette's prediction was indeed accurate for in January of
1908, an article appeared in McLure's which shook the very founda-
tions of the Navy Department and led to an inquiry by Senator Eugene
Hale's Naval Affairs Committee. Ironically, (but probably not co-
incidentally) it arrived on the news stands less than one month after
the departure of the "Great White Fleet" on its cruise around the
55. Navy Regulations, 190 5
, p. 65.
56. Tracy B. Kittrcdge, unpublished mss. on the life of Admiral
• William S. Sims, Division of Naval History, Washington,
D. C.
,
citing letter from Rear Admiral Casper Goodrich to
Secnav, August 12, 1907, p. 828. Kittredge's manuscript
was based on Admiral Sims Papers and was written with the
latter' s consent, supervision, and active cooperation. Many
of its pages contain notations in Sims' own handwriting.
57. Barnette to Luce, October 19, 1907, Luce Papers.

world. Public pride in the Navy was at an all-time high. What
ttcr time to burst the public image and expose the truth. The
author, Henry Reuterdahl charged that there was little basis for con-
fidence in the Navy for it was "unprepared for war.
" 5 ° He pre-
sumably spoke with some authority for he was the American editor
of Jane's Fighting Ships, an associate of the United States Naval
Institute, and a respected observer of naval affairs. He was also a
frequent correspondent of Commander William Sims, Inspector of
Target Practice and President Roosevelt's naval aide. As a matter
of fac't, Sims was the source of much of the material on which the
article was based, for the line officer insurgents felt that to be
effective the charges had to be accurate and capable of substantiation. *>9
Sims had been for many years an outspoken critic of the bureaus' con-
servatism. His "theory of reform consisted solely of running down
the management of the naval establishment at every opportunity in
the expectation that the harsher the criticism the greater the desired
improvement. "^0
Reuterdahl' s article summarized many of the well-founded com-
plaints which had been put forth by the line officers and General Board
for many years: the main armor belts on battleships were too low in
58. Henry Reuterdahl, "The Needs of Qur Navy," McLure's
Magazine, Vol. 30 (January, 1908), pp. 251-263.
59. Kittredge mss.
, p. 841.
60. Seward W. Livermore, "American Naval Development 1898-
1914 With Special Reference to Foreign Affairs," (Unpub-
lished Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1943), p. 49.
1
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the water for adequate shell protection; ships had extremely Low
"-eeboards which minimized the capability of the guns in even a
moderate seaway; the powder handling system in turrets was anti-
quated and dangerous; guns of the secondary batteries were poorly
shielded; there was a critical shortage of torpedoes for destroyers;
the bureau system was refractory to change. The startling thing
about Reuterdahl's effort was not the content but the audience; for
the first time many of the defects, well known in naval circles be-
came matters of wide public knowledge. Many newspapers through-
out the country called their readers attention to the article and some
published summaries of it. Demands for investigation and reform
ran high. President Roosevelt, unaware that the charges were to be
published, suffered considerable embarrassment, but resisted
attempts by Secretary Metcalf to court-martial Sims and his
colleagues. °^
The Senate Naval Affairs Committee, under Eugene Hale, began
an investigation of the charges in February of 1908. He had appar-
ently received assurances from the involved bureau chiefs that
Reuterdahl's accusations were without merit. 63 Hale's habitual
resistance to organizational reform and his unflinching support of
61. A ship's freeboard is the height from the edge of the main
deck to the waterline.
62. Kittredge mss.', p. 8*8, pp. 861-864.
63. Ibid.
, p. 864.
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the bureau structure left little doubt in the minds of the line officers
iat their grievances would receive little sympathy from him. An
examination of the Senate inquiry confirms this view, and the investi-
gation not only did not lead to reform, but no report of it was ever
64
issued. Hale's reply to the criticisms was to introduce a bill on
January 9, 1908 which was designed to abolish the General Board. 6 ^
Although tlft General Board did not actively participate in the
Reuterdahl episode, Hale saw it as the salient of the line officers
from which the bureaus were "unjustly and unreasonably assailed. ..."
It was his belief that his bill woulcl "unify the Department" and "rid it
oi these troublesome, vexations and jealous questions that have
arisen in years past. . . . " 66 The effect of course would have been to
drastically reduce the influence of the line and to return to the pre-
1900 system of planning for war. One officer called Hale's plan "the
most villanous measure ever put into words" and a "traitorous
act." 67
Although Hale was unable to translate his bill into law, the line
officer insurgents felt that time was running out. Their principal
64. U. S. , Congress, Senate, Naval Affairs Committee, Alleged
Structural Defects in Battleships of the U. S. Navy,
(Washington, 1908).
65. Army and Navy Journal, January 11, 1908, Vol. 45, p. 496.
Hale's bill read in part: "no permanent board of any kind
shall be . . . continued in operation unless expressly prp-
vided for by law. ..."
66. Army and Navy Journal
, January 18, 1908, Vol. 45, p. 520.
67. Commander William F. Fullam to Sims, February 25, 1908,
Sims Papers.

supporter, Theodore Roosevelt would be in the White House only for
another year. No successor would probably have his enlightened
outlook on naval affairs. Reform must take place now or be deferred
for many years to come. There was also the selfish concern that
unless their position in the Navy Department was solidified by orga-
nizational change, they would become the target for reprisal after
Roosevelt's departure. Although sympathetic, the President hesi-
tated to move without a mandate from the press, the public, and
Congress. Besides he was not at this juncture convinced that the Navy
needed a general staff and a chief of staff. He analysed the trouble as
due to the presence of old and incapable officers at the heads of the
bureaus, and concluded that the solution might have to be a gradual one
aimed at lowering the age of the Navy's flag officers. 68
The General Board kept clear of the controversy. It had already
gone on record with respect to the substance of the deficiencies and
was in no position to act in the independent and radical fashion of
Sims and the other reformers. Hale's threat gave adequate testimony
to the Board's vulnerability. Even as late as 1910 there was an
attitude prevalent among the Board members that caution was prudent
in the face of bureau enmity and Hale's power. °"
68. Commander Albert L. Key to Sims, April 16, 1908, Sims
Papers. Key summarized for Sims a recent letter he had
received from Roosevelt; Key to Roosevelt, April 14, 1908,
copy in Sims Papers.
69. Bradley A. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral,
(New York: The Century Co. , 1919), pp. 477-478.
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The ship design controversy erupted anew in June of 1908. Com-
mander Albert L. Key, a former associate of the General Board, a
former aide to President Roosevelt, and one of the leading line officer
insurgents, wrote Secretary Metcalf and expressed grave concern over
many of the features of the battleship North Dakota then undergoing
construction at the Fore River Shipbuilding Company in Quincy, Mass.
His comments were forwarded in response to General Order 49 and
as part of the continuing campaign to demonstrate the ineptitude of
the bureaus. '° The complaints were essentially those discussed in
the Reuterdahl article. ' * Sims called President Roosevelt's atten-
tion to the letter and told him that the "criticisms are perfectly
sound. " '2 Sims then recommended that the President order the
Secretary to refer the problem to a joint conference of the General
Board and the Naval War College. 73 On July 2, 1908, the Acting -
Secretary of the Navy, Truman H. Newberry, so directed and the
meeting convened at the Naval War College on July 9, 1908.*^* Later,
additional officers were sent to participate so that the final total,
fifty, would be representative of the entire Navy, The conference
70. Key to Sims, May 2, 1908, Sims Papers.
71. Key to Secnav, June 9, 1908, copy in General Board File
420-6.
72. Sims to Roosevelt, June 23, 1908, Sims Papers. Prior to
Key's letter to the Secretary, he and Sims agreed that the
latter would show it to the President. Key to Sims, May 12,
1908, Sims Papers.
73. Sims to William Loeb (Roosevelt's private secretary),
June 29, 1908, Sims Papers.
74. Dewey to Secnav, November 11, 1908, forwarding a resume
of the Newport Conference, General Board File 420-2.

did not accept as justified all of Commander Key's criticisms but
enough of them to confirm previous judgments that significant
changes were needed in the Navy's ship design system. One of the
resolutions adopted by the Newport Conference by a vote of 35 to 14
called for future battleship designs to be submitted to a special board
of officers for examination and recommendation. This was a clear
condemnation of the Board on Construction and actually presaged its
doom.
"
The unwillingness of the General Board to agree to all of Key's
points enbittered Sims, Key, and the other insurgents. Sims wrote
President Roosevelt and unjustifiably accused the Board of having
"systematically defended the Bureaus and condemned the critics. "^°
Although Dewey had not participated in the conference, '* he too came
under attack for a speech in which the criticisms were minimized and
the Navy's efficiency exalted. Key called the speech an "outrage"
and accused Dewey of "deliberately attempting to deceive" the
nation. ^
The events of 1908 - the Reuterdahl article and the Newport Con-
ference - created a momentum for change which was to result in a
75. Dewey to Secnav, November 11, 1908, forwarding a resume
of the Newport Conference, General Board File 420-2.
76. Sims to Roosevelt, November 15, 1908, Sims Papers.
77. Dewey had for many years made a practice of absenting him-
self from all the summer meetings of the General Board. In
addition, the Newport Conference was oriented to the techni-
cal and Dewey was not considered very apt in this area. Sims
to Taylor, December 18, 1902, Sims Papers.
78. Key to Sims, November 27, 1908, Sims Papers.
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rather dramatic shift in naval administrative practice. President
Koosevelt sounded the keynote when he departed from the position
that it was not the system but the people that needed attention, to the
view that "no matter how excellent may be the individual officers at
the head of the bureaus, [the organization] tends to a certain
woodeness of administration, to a lack of initiative and flexibility,
which is not advantageous.
"™
Roosevelt's sixth Secretary of the Navy, Truman H. Newberry,
took office on December 1, 1908. He had the benefit of prior naval
service and had been the Assistant Secretary for over three years.
Dewey was quite pleased with his appointment and, as a matter of
fact, had favored him for the Secretary's job back in 1906. ^0
Newberry's solution to the Navy's internal problems was a moderate
one. He looked on the General Board as the organization which, if
modified, could unify the Navy, the line and the staff, the bureaucrats
and non-bureaucrats. He called the General Board "the very
essence.
.
. of the naval establishment" and the best source of advice
which the Secretary had. Testifying before the House Naval Affairs
Committee, he said, "if the Secretary has \ny doubt in his mind he
has the General Board ... to caution him when he is new and to
79. Roosevelt to Acting Secretary Truman H. Newberry,
August 28, 1908, copy in Sims Papers.
80. Dewey to Congressman William A. Smith, June 16, 1906,
Dewey Papers. Dewey asked Smith to propose Newberry's
name to President Roosevelt as Bonaparte's successor.
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advise him as he goes along. I do not know how he would get along
without it. " He would not however favor granting the Board "execu-
tive authority" because that would be "absolutely incompatible" with
the American system of government. 81
Newberry amended Navy Regulations to eliminate the Board's
membership restrictions with respect to numbers and rank. 82 He
planned to increase its size to 15 members and include on it repre-
sentatives* from each bureau. He hoped to enlarge the Board on
Construction, adding to its rolls a representative from the General
Board and several other officers somewhat more liberal in outlook
than the bureau chiefs. 83 tie indicated that in doing all these things
he would be creating within the General Board a true general staff. 84
At first, President Roosevelt endorsed Newberry's plan85 Dut
the insurgents persuaded him to change his mind and he directed
Newberry to hold all reforms in abeyance. They saw in his scheme
an attempt to expand bureau influence and to "destroy the General
Board's usefulness as an impartial military adviser. "86 To stem
any movement in this direction, Sims prevailed on Roosevelt to
81. U.S., Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings





(Washington, 1909), p. 879.
82. Army and Navy Journal, December 5, 1908, Vo. 46, p. 375.
83. Army and Navy Journal , December 26, 1908, Vol. 46, p. 63.
84. Ibid.
85. Fred L. Israel, ed. The State of the Union Messages of the
Presidents, 1790-1966 (New York: Chelsea House-Robert
Hector, 1966) Vol. 2, p. 2335.
86. Sims to Roosevelt, December 30, 1908, Sims Papers.
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appoint a mixed commission to report on the Navy's organizational
needs and, on January 27, 1900, the so-called Moody Commission
was formally constituted. It consisted of two former Secretaries,
Moody and Morton, an ex-Congressman, Dayton, and Admirals Luce,
Mahan, Robley D. Evans, William M. Folger, and William S.
Cowles. °
'
Meanwhile, Newberry began to modify his plan to expand the
General Board. Its membership would be reduced to nine; no bureau
chief, (other than the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation) would be
members? it would consult daily on all subjects "affecting the greater
interests of the Navy.
. . .
;" Dewey, or in his absence, the Chief of
the Bureau of Navigation, would "practically be the Chief of Staff,
representing the views of the General Board on all matters. " The
changes would be accomplished by Executive vice Congressional
action, and, after a trial of 12 months, Congress would be asked to
sanction them. **8
Late in January, 1909, several members of the Moody Commis-
sion met with Newberry and endorsed his revised plan as a temporary
measure pending their final report. ^ It is probable that this move
was designed to save Newberry considerable embarrassment, for
87. U.S., Congress, Senate, Naval Affairs Committee, Certain
Needs of the Navy, 60th Cong.
,
2nd scss. , Senate Doc. No.
740, (Washington, 1909), p. 1.
88. Newberry to Roosevelt, January 12, 1909, copy in Luce
Papers.













despite this qualified endorsement by the Commission, his proposals
never went into effeet.
The Moody Commission made its final report to President
Roosevelt in late February, 1909. It recommended a tight system
of bureau control and a division of the Department into five functional
areas, one of which would be headed by a Chief of Naval Operations.
lie would become the Secretary's principal military adviser. The
General Board would no longer report to the Secretary but would
become one of the divisions under the Chief of Naval Operations, ^0
The Commission's organizational philosophy was based on the long-
held conviction of one of its members, Admiral Mahan, that advice
should be individual and not corporate. He criticized the General
Board because it was "irresponsible, " i. e. , its recommendations
were forwarded in the name of the Board rather than one person
and, if the advice proved faulty, it would be difficult to hold the
whole Board accountable. 91
Evident also in the Commission's report is the desire to








No. 743, (Washington, 1909) (hereafter cited as Report of
the Moody Commission ).
91. Alfred T. Mahan, Naval Administration and Warfare,
(Boston: Little, Brown, Co., 1908), p. 5. When Mahan first
reported to the Naval War Board of the Spanish-American
War, he tried unsuccessfully to get Secretary Long to dis-
establish the Board and in its place appoint a naval officer to
acl as his executive for naval strategy. His reasoning was
based on the virtue of individual vice corporate responsibility.
Mahan to Long, May 10, 1898, Papers of John D. Long,
Massachusetts Historical Society Collection, Vol. 78,
pp. 119-120.
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drastically curtail the General Board's influence and, in so doing,
solace Dewey. lie would certainly not accept the arduous assign-
ment as Chief of Naval Operations and lie could not, with his high
rank, be placed in a position subordinate to him. It has been shown
that the General Board's role in the Newport Conference generated
antipathy on the part of the line insurgents. This coupled with their
desire to concentrate advice in one man, and their feeling that the
General Board members had a mission to shape naval policy but were
not doing so, because they were lacking in "backbone and simply
letting, things drift along with the most comfort to themselves, " con-
tributed to the clear prejudice of the Commission toward the General
Hoard.
Despite President Roosevelt's characterization of the Commis-
sion's Report as "conservative" and "nothing drastic, " it was
obviously too revolutionary for Congressional leaders to digest and
it was never seriously considered by them. It is true that Roosevelt
was without much power as an outgoing President, but it is also
conceivable that he forwarded the proposals, not with a realistic hope
of their implementation, but as a beau geste to the line insurgents.
With President William Taft's arrival in office came a new
02. Commander William F. Fullam to Sims, May 4, 1909, Sims
Papers. Fullam was the Recorder of the Moody Commission
and in a position to join with his allies, Luce and Mahan, to
influence the findings.
93. Report of the Moody Commission, p. 1.





Secretary of the Navy, George von Lengerke Meyer. The fact that
s son-in-law was a naval officer, and his vantage point as Roosevelt's
Postmaster General, undoubtedly contributed to his familiarity with
the organizational difficulties of the Navy Department. Where others
had failed however, he was determined to succeed. He managed to
instill a great amount of confidence in all of the line officers. One
called him a "secretary in fact as well as name. " y<* Another des-
cribed him as having "the best conception of what the Navy ought to be
of any secretary in many years. "95 Even Kaiser Wilhelm praised him
as the "American von Tirpitz. " 96
Meyer's relationships with the General Board were unusual in
that he made a practice of meeting frequently with the members.
Only once before had a Secretary complimented the Board in this man-
ner. ^ ' Naturally, this instilled a sense of pride in the membership
and a renewed feeling of value. While Meyer was satisfied that he had
in the General Board an effective policy making organ, there still re-
mained the problem of executing the policy.
Meyer began his search for reform by consulting with the "best
minds in the Navy, " and by reviewing all of the studies on
94. Sperry to son Charles, May 16, 1909, Sperry Papers.
95. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral, p. 526.
96. M. A. DeWolfe Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer
,
(New
York: Dodd, Mead, and Co.
, 1920), p. 496.
97. Secretary Paul Morton met with the Board in October of 1904.
General Board Minutes, October 26, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 54.

reorganisation that had been produced in the previous 20 years. ^°
On July 13, 1909 he appointed a board of line officers, called the
Swift Board after its Chairman, Rear Admiral William Swift. These
officers were given carte blanche to determine deficiencies and come
up with a solution to the Navy's organizational problems. Their con-
clusions were much the same as those offered by the Moody Commis-
sion: the Navy needed a system to manage the fleet and coordinate
the bureaus; the General Board was not able to do these things
because it had no means to implement its policies, it was not able to
keep rtself current on the daily business of the Department, it vio-
lated the Mahanite principle of individual, as opposed to corporate
responsibility, and the quality of its advice was lacking because it
had no responsibility for executing it. Swift and his colleagues
wanted to concentrate the war planning function under one person and
give him broad powers to define policy and coordinate the bureaus in
support of the policy. The General Board would remain, but become
subservient to the war planning office, could not initiate recommen-
dations, and would be limited to advising on matters specifically
referred to it. ^9
Implementation of the Swift plan would have stripped the Board of
98. Meyer to Roosevelt, March 10, 1910, cited in Howe, George
von L. Meyer
, pp. 465-473.
99. The Swift Board Report, October 11, 1909, General Board
File 446.
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the function for which it had been created - war planning, and as in
"he case of the Moody Commission Report, would have prompted
Dewey to sever his connection with the Board. This is precisely
what many of the line officers wanted. To them, the Board was an
anachronistic organ, born out of compromise, never intended to be
anything more than an opening wedge to a general staff, and together
with its President, an obstacle to complete control of the Navy
Department. Its reputation as an impartial adjudicator of the Navy's
needs might act as a restraint on the advanced ideas of some of the
line officers.
Meyer had been told by Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry that
"no one officer however intelligent and single minded" could replace
the studied and impartial advice of the General Board, and he strongly
recommended that its role be preserved. 1®® Meyer heeded Sperry's
counsel, and while he adopted the Swift Board recommendations look-
ing to greater control and coordination of the bureaus, he refused to
accept those which would have curtailed the General's Board's inde-
pendence and stature.
Meyer had two options: he could request Congressional approval
of his changes, or he could take action on his own. He decided to
choose the latter course, and prior to the reconvening of Congress,
100. Sperry to son Charles, May 16, 1909, Sperry Papers.
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«and after receiving assurances from the Attorney General that his
moves would be covered by the law, he issued change number nine to
Navy Regulations, authorizing the establishment of the "Aid
System. " 101
Four line officer Rear Admirals, called Aids, were placed in
charge of Navy Department activities in the areas of Fleet Operations,
Material, Inspections, and Personnel. Each would coordinate the
work of those bureaus whose functions related to the particular area,
(for example: the Aid for Material would supervise the Bureaus of
Ordnance, Construction and Repair, Equipment, and Steam Engi-
neering). Two of the Aids, Material and Operations, became
ex-officio members of the General Board. The Aid for Operations
and the General Board had almost identical areas of responsibility
but they were to work in conjunction with one another, with the Board
being pre-eminent in the field of policy, and the Aid for Operations
in its execution. The Board on Construction was discontinued and
its duties were transferred to the General Board. 1UA
The Meyer system was regarded by many line officers as a
great leap forward; the old nemesis and voice of arch-conservatism, .
the Board on Construction no longer existed; bureau independence would
be curbed; the policies developed by the General Board would be well
101. Regulations for the Government of the U.S. Navy, 1909,
change number 9, (Washington, 1909).
102. Ibid.
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represented at the Secretary's level and their execution well super-
vised; the Board would define the measures necessary for the prepara-
tion for war and the Aids would see to their implementation. '
The attitude of Congress to this dramatic shift was somewhat
surprising. Faced with a fait accompli which could be overcome only
through legislation, it agreed to adopt a wait and see attitude. Dewey's
influence may have been a factor in this decision for he had written to
persuade members of the House Naval Affairs Committee to give the
Meyer System a "free and unrestricted trial. "10-* The two great
antagonists, Senator Hale, and Congressman Foss, were opposed to
the development but, while they had the pov/er to prevent legislative
approval, they were not able to muster the strength to initiate
disapproval.
A quite remarkable calm settled over the Navy Department during
the period from 1909 to 1913 and it was no accident that the four years
coincided with Mr. Meyer's term of office. His reorganization and
strong hand checked both the bureaus and the line insurgents. The
fact that he remained in office twice as long as five of his immediate
predecessors gave to the Office of the Secretary of the Navy a degree
of experience and stability markedly absent in the earlier years.
103. Dewey to Congressman George A. Loud, January 31, 1910,
Dewey Papers. Many years earlier, Dewey had used his
prestige to get Loud a seat on this Committee.
i
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The relations between the Board and the Aids could have been
taught with difficulty. After all, both organizations addressed what
was essentially the same problem area and, while one focused on
policy and the other on its implementation, it would have been quite
easy to confuse the two. In practice however, the two groups worked
in close harmony and with a "unanimity of purpose. "104 Not au Q f
the Board programs were translated into action but under Meyer's
regime there was a confidence that they would be properly presented
and, if accepted, adequately implemented.
About three weeks before Meyer's departure, his Aid for Opera-
tions, Rear Admiral Charles E. Vreeland, took sick and was relieved
by the Aid for Inspections, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. Fiske
.vas strongly identified with the line officer extremists. His philos-
ophy was purely and simply militaristic: he admired the absence of
strife in the shipboard community and saw in its admixture of Law
and Justice, a model for the nation and the world. *05 He looked with
envy on the German Navy which permitted its senior officers direct
access to the Kaiser and he expressed the wish that the United States
had a similar system, i. e. , the elimination of the Secretary of the
Navy. The elevation of Fiske to the post of Aide for Operations
placed him in a key position, for he was, in effect, the Secretary's
link with the professionals.
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While Fiske was an ex-officio member of the General Board, he
ickly sought to reduce its influence. Coincident with his appoint-
ment as Aid for Operations, Secretary Meyer addressed a communi-
cation to the General Board defining its relationship with the Aids.
It is highly probable that Fiske drafted this document; Meyer, as a
man with less than three weeks to serve had little to gain. The di-
rective called for the Board to forward along with its decisions, a
tally of the voting, it made the Aid for Operations the point of contact
between the Board and all offices and bureaus of the Navy Department,
and finally, it specified that the Aids who were ex-officio members of
the Board would be required to state their personal recommendations
^n Board decisions irrespective of their vote. Meyer explained that
these procedures would strengthen the General Board in its relation
with future Secretaries. This might very well have been the intent but
the actual effect was to Solidify the power of the Aid for Operations for
.it freed him from the requirement to represent the General Board
view. If he did not agree with its decision, he could present a strong
case to the Secretary for his own viewpoint and correspondingly
minimize that of the Board. 106 of course, he could have done this
without a directive from Meyer, but having it made things much
easier.
The theory was soon to be confirmed by Fiske's practice. In a
106. Meyer to Dewey, February 10, 1913, Dewey Papers.

rather unusual move, the General Board's Secretary, Commander
vard H. Campbell, forwarded a memorandum to the General
Board's Executive Committee which described the disturbing decline
of the Board during Fiske's regime as Aid for Operations. Members
felt isolated from the Secretary; they were convinced that their
recommendations were not being presented to him as their thinking
but rather that of Fiske. On occasion, Ffske had the lone dissenting
opinion in an otherwise unanimous decision, but his prevailed because
he was able to persuade the Secretary to accept his position. Campbell
concluded with the remark that Fiske had so much prestige as Aid for
Operations that he should be willing to share a little of it with the
General Board. 107
There was another cause for concern: Dewey's health was not
good. It was rumored that he suffe^d a stroke in June of 1914, and.
some members were apprehensive that the Board without Dewey's
prestigious signature on its papers would cease to exist or at the
least, decline greatly in influence. 10* Dewey sensed this too, for
about the same time he wrote a letter to Rear Admiral Charles J.
Badger, (who would eventually succeed him as the Board's senior
officer) stating that he was convinced that the General Board would
survive, "with all its power for good to the navy and the country, "
only if men of Badger's quality were associated with it. 1**9
107. Memorandum prepared by Commander Edward H. Campbell,
July 30, 1914, General Board File 401,
108. Ibid.
109. Dewey to Badger, June 18, 1914, Dewey Papers.

While the relationship between Fiske and the Board left much to
b. desired, so did that between him and Meyer's successor, Josephus
Daniels. It would be hard to imagine two men with more antipodal
philosophies. One pacificistic, the other militaristic; one a strong
advocate of a general staff; ihe other a proponent of a pluralistic
approach to naval administration; one concentrating his efforts on
honing the Na/y's tools of violence, the other developing plans' to
transform the Navy into a "school of the nation. "
Daniels reversed the trend established during Meyer's admin-
istration; he didn't particularly admire the Aid System and although
he did not abolish it, he did for the most part, deal directly with the
b.'^eau chiefs. A notable exception to this policy was his continued
use of the Aid for Operations, Admiral Fiske. "« This was borne
not out of desire but of necessity. He distrusted Fiske and suspected
that he was trying to get power into his own hands and "Prussianize
the American Navy. "*H He also remembered former Secretary
Me/er's warning to him to be Qrc^guard against overcentralization
within the Department lest it prejudice the principle of civilian
control. 1*2
Daniels was very much impressed with the work of the General
110. Josephus Daniels, The Wilson Era: Years of Peace 1910 -
1917
,




112. Ibid., p. 119.

Board. H** He referred to it as the "Supreme Court of Naval
Poncy"H^ and paid its members the singular and unprecedented
honor of including a summary of their work in his first annual re-
port. H^ He admired the General Board because, unlike a general
staff, it was consonant with the "ideals upon which . . . [the] Govern-
ment was founded. "H6 At the same time he wanted to keep it small
by reducing the number of ex-officio memberships. 117
Daniels' deteriorating relations with Fiske, the renaissance of
the bureaus, and the crisis in Europe reopened the Pandora's Box
which Meyer had closed and sat upon. The line insurgents, led by
Fiske, were loosed again and they began a movement designed to
er % t into law a provision which would assign to one officer in the
Navy the power, responsibility, and personnel resources for the
general direction of the Navy and in particular its readiness for
war. H8 The implications of this measure were tremendous. It was
not the Secretary but the Chief of Naval Operations who would have
had the responsibility for the Navy's readiness for war. It repre-
sented a giant step forward for Fiske and the insurgents, backward
113. Fiske to Rear Admiral Charles E. Vreeland, July 22, 1913,
General Board File 401.
114. Daniels, The Wilson Era, 1910-1917, p. 322.
115. Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Annual Reports of the
Navy Department, 1913, p. 29.
116. Daniels to Dewey, April 11, 1916, Dewey Papers.
117. Dewey to Captain William L. Rodgers, April 15, 1913,
Dewey Papers.
118. Henry P. Beers, "The Development of the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, " Part II, Military Affairs,
(Fall, 1946), p. 12.

r Daniels, Dewey, and Dewey's heir apparent and General Board
member, Rear Admiral Charles J. Badger.
Daniels' opposition was founded in part on his disinclination for
centralization and the concomitant effect it would have on the powers
of his office, but also because the enactment of Fiske's plan would
have substantially lessened the role of the General Board and re-
duced the stature of its President, George Dewey, H* Dewey, con-
sistent with his past convictions, refused to support Fiske. 120
Badger was also totally opposed to military centralization; he found
it "contrary to the genius" of the American people and government.
At the same time he advised Daniels that there was "ample room
f greater military influence . . . without encroaching upon, or in any
way lessening the civil control in all matters of importance. "***
Neither the hopes of Fiske nor the fears of Daniels, Dewey and
Badger were realized. However, the war in Europe broke down the
traditional Congressional resistance to naval reform arid they voted*
a compromise measure, authorizing the creation of the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations to direct fleet operations and develop war
plans. *22
119. Daniel to Dewey, March 4, 1915, General Board File 446.
120. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admi ral, p. 550. Fiske
rationalized Dewey's defection by attributing it to the latter's
illness.
1121. Badger to Daniels, January 26, 1915, Daniels Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congrens,
122. Beers, "Development of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, " Military Affairs, (Fall, 1946), p. 12.

The act was passed on March 3, 1915, almost 15 years to the
,. lt v that Secretary John D. Long issued General Order 544, Institu-
tionalizing for the first time the function of war planning in peace.
While John D. Long's experiment and He^ry C. Taylor's compro-
mise lost the function for which it was created 15 years earlier, it
continued in existence for 35 more years as a source of advice to




THE WAR PLANNING SYSTEM 1
The General Board was not the first organization within the Navy
Department to produce war plans. When the Office of Navel Intelli-
gence was established in 1882, it was assigned war plans as one of
its many duties. * in 1895, concurrent with the "crisis" with Great
Britain over the Venezuelan boundary, the Naval War College began
producing plans for war. »* The impending trouble with Spain over
the Cuban question prompted these two organizations and several
ad hoc boards to produce plans offering strategic and tactical
guidance for the projection of American sea power, **
To Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, these efforts left much to
be desired. They were, for the most part, responses to immediate
1. Although all of the General Board's activities could be included
under the phrase, "war planning, " the term is used in this
chapter in the restricted sense, and is defined as the admin-
istrative process which produced documents providing general
and specific guidance to fleet commanders in the event of war.
2. Rear Admiral Richard Wainwright, "The General Board, "
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 48 (February,
1-922), p. 192.
3. Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, "The Fleet, " United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 29 (December, 1903),
p. 803.
4. Rear Admiral William L. Rodgers, "The Relations of the War
College to the Navy Department, " United States Naval Institute
Proceedings
,
Vol. 38 (September, 1912), pp. 843-844.
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-rises rather than well considered analyses of the merits of various
i
courses of action. No less than four war plans for action against
i
Snain were available: one produced by the Naval War College, two
i
%
by ad hoc Navy Department boards, and the last by the Office of
I
Naval Intelligence. The War College plan was rejected by the first
board. D A second board hypothesized operations against both Spain
and Japan. None of the plans were consistent in their assumptions
or courses of action, and vividly illustrated how the Navy's best
thinkers were unable to agree on even the basics in preparing for
war against Spain. The lesson of the confusion was clear to Taylor
and it led to the centralization of the war planning function in the
C neral Board. Now the aim woulc* be to "prepare studies for all
eventualities" and to furnish a commander-in-chief in war with com-
plete studies of the theatre of war ... to enable him to act unhampered
by the necessity of forming a judgment off-hand regarding a great
variety of questions on which hasty judgment cannot safely be
made." 7
"All eventualities" was the determinant which motivated the
Board's war planners. While more attention was devoted to the
5. Plan of Operations Against Spain, prepared by a board headed
by Rear Admiral Francis M. Ramsay and forwarded December,
1896, General Board War Plans File.
8. Plans of Campaign Against Spain and Japan, prepared by a
board headed by Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard and for-
warded on June 30, 1897, General Board War Plans File.
7. Captain French E. Chadwick, President of Naval War College,
"Opening Address, " delivered at the War College, June 4,
1902, Naval War College Archives, Newport, R.I.

cases of war against Germany and Japan, the other world powers,
ivussia, France, and England were not ignored. The Board devel-
oped plans for attacks on French possessions in Saigon;** on
England's bastions at Halifax, Bermuda, Jamaica, Esquimalt, and
in the Great Lakes;^ and on Russia's great Pacific port of
Vladivostock. It was this broad scope approach which distin-
guished the pre- 1900 war planning system from that adopted by the
Board. The perspective was changed from immediate contingencies
to a vast range of possible naval actions, based not only on U. S.
unilateral interventions, but on alliances with friendly foreign
governments. One of the Board's early plans for action in the West
icific envisioned the possibility of war in Chinese waters between
Germany, France, and Russia on one Side, and Great Britain,
Japan, and the United States on the other. H
While the Board's objective was to plan for "all eventualities"
it fo'ui-^ itself very much. unprepared for the Japanese-American
"crisis" which bloomed in October of 1906. On October 27, 1906,
Mr. William Loeb, Jr., President Theodore Roosevelt's private
.
8. Memorandum from Second Committee, July 29, 1903,
approved by the General Board the same date, General Board
' File 425.
9. Ibid.
10. Acting Secretary of the Navy (hereafter cited as Secnav)
Frank W. Hackett to Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers,
February 16, 1901, General Board File 425-2. Letter drafted
by General Board.
11. List of Contents, War Portfolio Number Two, June I, 1904,
General Board File 425.

secretary, asked Secretary of the Navy Charles J. Bonaparte if the
jcneral Board is studying a plan of operations in the event of
hostilities with Japan. "^ Although Admiral George Dewey assured
the President that the "General Board has already studied the situ-
ation and that plans are now complete, "l* the Board was, as a
matter of fact, unequipped for such a contingency. The General
Board had no "studied" war plan against Japan prior to October of
1906 and indeed, in that month had advised the Secretary that the
West Indes was the "most likely and only probable theater of
war. When relations with Japan became strained in late
October, 1906, the Board "hurriedly prepared" a plan of action
against Japan and called it the "Orange Plan. " lo it was not until
December of 1906 that documents predicated on war with Japan
were placed in the Asiatic War Portfolio. ^
War plans were segregated geographically into three numbered
"portfolios. " Portfolio number one related to the Atlantic; number
two to the Western Pacific; and number three to the Eastern Pacific.
Each portfolio included: documents pertaining to the political,
12. Loeb to Bonaparte, October 27, 1906, General Board File
425-2.
13. Dewey to Assistant Secnav Truman II. Newberry, October 29,
1906, General Board File 425-2.
14. Dewey to Secnav, October 2, 1906, General Board File 404.
15. Memorandum by Commander Joseph L. Jayne, General
Board Secretary, November 23, 1909, General Board File 425.
16. Lieutenant Commander Samuel E. Kittelle, General Board
Secretary, to President Naval War College, December 4,
1 1906, General Board File 425-2.

strategical, and tactical situation in the area; detailed plans for the
secure of advanced bases; other plans "more general in scope or
having other objects in view" as for example the plan for the
occupation of Haiti-Santo Domingo or the capture of the Venezuelan
custom houses; harbor charts of foreign countries; and intelligence
17information.
Many of the Board's war' plans were strictly informational in
nature and had no "action" section. Thus, the War Plan for
Central America was nothing more than a Naval Officer's Baedeker
to Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. ^ j_n contrast
the War Plan for Haiti- Santo Domingo was replete with detail,
ev~n specifying the number of "wig-wag" flags necessary to support
the operation. This plan called for the seizure of Samaria and Fort
Liberty Bays by a Marine Expeditionary Force as soon as hostili-
ties with Germany commenced in order to deny their use to the
.rnemy. The Marines were to hold the sites for about, four to six
weeks until relieved by the Army for other operations* The speci-
ficity of this plan can best be shown by describing a small portion
of the section of the operation calling for the capture of Samana Bay.
A force of 14 vessels was prescribed, including two transports,
17. Memorandum by Commander Joseph L. Jayne, November 23,
1909, General Board File 425.
18. Naval War Plan for Central America, War Portfolio No. 1,
Reference No. 5R, General Board File Box 11.

and three gunboats. Each one of the ships was given a designation:
1. and T2 for tne transports, Dl, D2, D3 for the gunboats and so
on. Dl was scheduled to lie to near Tl, provide boats to assist in
the disembarkation of Tl, send her sailing launch and crew along-
side the collier to receive and plant mines, then embark a section
of Marines from Tl and proceed to the town of Santa Barbara de
Samana. There the ship was to bombard the barracks, assist in the
landing and occupation of the town, and on completion go to an
assigned position near the southern portion of the bay entrance,
sound the channels, and plant buoys or beacons where necessary,
as aids to navigation. Dl was also to mark the limiting points in
th" southern channels where mines were to be planted or boom
defenses to be placed. All of the other 13 vessels were given simi-
larly detailed assignments.
The general procedure which the Board used to formulate the
plans for each portfolio was first to select the area, then gather the
information, prepare and issue the documents to the appropriate
fleet commanders for their criticisms, and finally promulgate the
plans for the guidance of the commanders at sea and the bureaus
ashore.
Secretary John D. Long's original letter of instructions to the
General Board authorized it to "decide upon the fields of action to

be studied.
"^ This gave to the Board the initiative in selecting the
s i. j within each portfolio area where U. S. naval operations might
occur. The locales were chosen on the basis of "political conditions"
and after an analysis of the "natural strategic points where operations
may be expected in war. " The usual objective around which the plans
were designed was the seizure of an advanced base in foreign terri-'
tory, either to support U. S. forces or to deny its use to an enemy, 20
Information resources on which plans were built included fhe
Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy ships, U. S. Consuls, and
friendly foreigners. Undercover officer agents were placed ahoard
some ships engaged in training operations in areas of particular
ir^rest to the Board. 21 The Board also initiated the practice of
having flag officers at sea in various parts of the world discreetly
compile lists of "confidential agents" in foreign countries who could
"probably be approached to advantage, " in the event war threatened,
as transmitters of valuable information. 22 One such individual,
listed in Portfolio Number One, was Manuel Botini of Montevideo,
a ship chandler with "unusual facilities and ability to successfully
deal with Uruaguayan officials .... [and obtain] information when
19. Long to Dewey, March 30, 1900, General Board File 401.
20. Report of Special War Plans Committee, October 24, 1903,
General Board File 425.
21. Taylor to William H. Moody, December 22, 1902, William H.
Moody Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
22. Secnav to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, South
Atlantic Station, December 21, 1900, General Board File




Once the necessary data was gathered the Board would, in con-
junction with the Naval War College, write the document in such a
way as to give the commander at sea a full appreciation of the
strategic thinking which guided the war planners. They would include
objectives to be gained, whether policy was to be aggressive or de-
fensive, probably theaters of action, forces likely to be encountered,
minimum friendly forces necessary for success, bases available, and
routes to the war zones. Tactical suggestions as to the types of
screening, scouting and battle formations to use were also offered to
the fleet commanders, however their adoption was by no means
mandatory. 24
The next step in the process was to forward the plan to the appro-
priate fleet commander for his comment and evaluation. This not
only provided the Board with an independent and practical judgment of
its work, but also identified the fleet commander more closely with
a plan he might have to execute in the event of war. 2 ^ In the eyes of
the General Board, a war plan served primarily to guide a commander
in the event of war, but in addition it was designed to help him
23. Secnav to Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Fleet,
November 9, 1903, General Board File 425-1. Letter
drafted by General Board.
24. Acting Secnav Beekman Winthrop to Dewey, October 1, 1910,
General Board File 425. Letter drafted by General Board.
25. General Board Minutes, December 30, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 383.
I

evaluate his command's ability to execute a war-time function and,
.n the event a gap became evident between responsibilities and
capabilities, he would be expected to take appropriate corrective
action. 26
The Board was also sensitive to one oi' the traditional dangers of
centralized planning: restricting the judgment of the commander at
sea. Every plan forwarded to the fleet made it very clear that it was
not the intention of the officials in Washington to dictate specific
courses of action; on the contrary it emphasized that, the fleet com-
mander was authorized all the "sea room" he felt he needed,, At the
same time he was advised that "radical changes in the Plans, while
quite within the limit of
. . .
[his] power should be made on)y after an
exhaustive consideration of the situation. "2? The Board's deter-
mination to foster a healthy working relationship with the admirals at
sea led Taylor in November of 1900 to initiate a program whereby all
flag officers and their staffs enroute afloat assignments, visited the
General Board offices to familiarize themselves with the war plans
and the Board's strategic thinking. 28
Prior to the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Board in
July of 1903, the General Board experienced some difficulty in
26. Acting Secnav Charles H. Darling to Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Station, July 16, 1904, General Board File 425-6.
Letter drafted by General Board.
27. Acting Secnav Charles H. Darling to Rear Admiral Frederick
Rodgers, February 16, 1901, General Board File 425-2.
Letter drafted by General Board.
28. Taylor to Dewey, November 26, 1900, Dewey Papers.

coordinating its plans with the Army. The area of greatest concern
! vvi whe Caribbean and, at the initiative of the Board, Secretary
i
John D. Long wrote Secretary of War Elihu Root, asking him to
bend officer representatives to confer with the General Board on a
war plan centered on Haiti and involving Army forces. 29 The Army
did not respond until the invitation was re-extended over four months
later. ^0 Finally, over six months after the initial proposal an
inter-service agreement was made which called for the two branches
10 act in concert in war planning for the Caribbean in general and
Haiti in particular. 31
After the formation of the Joint Board, coordination was greatly
facilitated, not only because Dewey was its senior member and ' •
President of the General Board, but the other Navy representatives
were also members of the General Board. Cooperation between the
two services was further enhanced in 1904 when an arrangement was
made between the Army War College and the Naval War College to
consult on joint war planning matters. ^2
War plans were not always treated with significance by those
outside the confines of the General Board. In one instance Portfolio
29. Long to Root, December 13, 1900, General Board Letterpress
Vol. 1, p. 115.
30. Acting Secnav Frank W. Hackett to Root, April 24, 1901,
General Board File 413.
31. Root to Long, June 8, 1901, General Board File 413.
32. Taylor to President, Naval War College, June 28, 1904,
General Board File 42 5; Lieutenant General Adna Chaffe,
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to Dewey, March 1, 1905, General
Board File 425.

%,'umber Three, containing war plans for the Eastern Pacific area,
w»- forwarded via an officer courier to the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Station on July 16, 1904,^3 j-^ was no t received by him
until nine months later owing to the fact that the documents were
inadvertently left on board the former flagship when the Admiral
transferred to U. S. S. Chicago. 3^ A complete set of plans was
rc-issued to him but when the time came for him to be relieved he
forgot to turn them over to his successor. ^5 On another occasion a
war plan destined for the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic
Fleet v/as delayed in delivery seven months because the courier, the
Commander of the Caribbean Squadron, had carelessly mis-addressed
it ' -» the Naval War College. ^6 in smi another instance Admiral
Dewey thought it necessary to ask the Secretary of the Navy to
cuastise the Asiatic Fleet Commander for not expending more effort
in the evaluation and criticism of the Board's war plans. ^7
Even some of the General Board members evidenced disin-
teredness in the field of war plans. Taylor criticized them for look-
ing on this important facet of their responsibilities as solely an
33. Secnav to Commander-in-Chief Pacific Station, July 16, 1904,
General Board File 425-3.
3(i. Captain John F. Hunker to Secnav, March 13, 1905, General
Board File 425-3.
35. Rear Admiral William T. Swinburne to Secnav, October 16,
1906, General Board File 425-2.
36. General Board File, November 26, 1903.
37. Secnav to Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, April 26, 1906,
General Board File 425-2.

intellectual exercise. 3 ^ He went so far as to warn Dewey that their
a t ide, so antipodal to the philosophy which guided the Board's birth,
might presage the Board's dissolution for .without the war planning
function the Board would be stripped of a large share of its
"advisory value.
" 39
As has been indicated earlier, the Naval War College worked
closely with the Board in the production of war plans but not without
prejudice to its role as an educational institution. By 1911 the re-
quirements of the General Board became so demanding that the
officers on the staff on the College advised their President that they
could continue to assist the General Board, but only at the expense
of *he educative function. Continuance of the policy of the past would
result, in their view, in the existence of a fine body of plans but few
officers adequately trained in their interpretation and implementation.
They saw irony in the procedure which required them, to assist in the
formulation of war plans against Germany "in their spare moments"
when Germany was the country
that for a hundred years has made a systematic and thorough
study of war, and has during all those years endeavored to
educate its military forces in the proper conduct of war.
. . .
[and] whose plans of campaign in 1866 and again in 1870 were
so perfect that . . . [they] were world- startling successes. ^0
38. General Board Minutes, December 20, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 88.
Captain Richard Wainwright quoting from what he termed one
Rear Admiral Taylor's "last letters. "
39. Taylor to Dewey, January 22, 1901, Dewey Papers.
40. Report of a Special Committee of the Naval War College Staff,
October 19, 1911, to President Naval War College, General
Board File 425.

The War College President, Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers,
.
eed with his officers and asked Dewey to arrange for either an
augmentation of officers on the College staff or a removal of the
College from the war planning process. 41 Rodgers' staff was neither
augmented nor relieved of the additional duty involved in the war
plans; however Secretary of the Navy George Meyer did direct the
General Board to call on the Naval War College for assistance only
if it did not affect their educational mission. '2 This restriction
lessened the War College participation in the formulation of plans,
but it continued to provide some assistance to the Board until the




Members of the General Board could sympathize with the plight
of their fellow officers at the War College. The Board had been
formed as a war planning agency but by 1909, as a result of the dis-
solution of the Board on Construction, it became deeply involved in
the detailed and time consuming business of defining ship charac-
teristics without a concomitant increase in officer or clerical
personnel. War planning was bound to suffer. Captain Thomas B.
Howard of the Second Committee told the Board that the issuance of
41. Rodgers to Dewey, October 19, 1911, General Board File
425.
42. Meyer to Dewey, October 26, 1911, General Board File 425.

war plans was being delayed because of the shortage of clerks. 4 ^
\ . ,re serious indictment was made by Lieutenant Commander
i
Ridley McLean:
the condition of the navy as regards war plans must be regarded
as deplorable. A safe full of so-called 'war plans' consists
really of plans for a landing party seizing certain ports; and
our present organization is such that we can hope for no speedy
relief. A committee of three of the General Board is charged
with this, as one of numerous other duties. But when we con-
sider war plans, plans which should be prepared and ready for
instant use in case war is declared with Orange or Black
[Japan or Germany], or Yellow; plans of campaign including
all the questions which are the subiect of laborious discussions
during certain entire sessions at the college, - what can three
men, even if uninterrupted, accomplish? 4^
McLean's opinion was shared by another Board officer, Bradley
A .riske. He found the war plans
so general in character as barely to be war plans at all, and to
consist mainly of information of all kinds concerning various
countries, accompanied with suggestions for the commander-
in-chief of the fleet. 45
While the estimates of McLean and Fiske showed that the Board per-
formance as a war planning agency left much to be desired, they are
understandable; the small staff of the General Board had never
43. General Bdard Minutes, May 26, 1909, Vol. 3, p. 342.
44. Memorandum by Lieutenant Commander Ridley McLean,
September, 1910, William S. Sims Papers, Office of Naval
History, Washington, D. C.
45. Bradley A. Fiske, From Midshipman to Rear Admiral,
(New York: The Century Co., 1919), p. 477.

expanded since its establishment yet it had many more duties than in
and was attempting to plan a war involving a Navy which had
tripled in size in ten years. However, even with an expanded Board
and more detailed documents, there remained a more pressing
problem: how to support the plans logistically.
The General Board was not long in existence before it found that
the business of war planning was little more than a classroom
exercise withou'.- the means of implementation. What good was a plan
which called for the mining of a harbor when the Bureau of Ordnance
was unable or unwilling to provide the mines? The Haiti- Santo
Domingo plan alone called for the use of 173 mines when there were
less than 10U in the entire Navy. ° The Martinique plan was
delivered to the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Fleet
with the notation that it could not be executed due to lack of forces. 47
Attempts by the Board to establish depots of war reserve supplies
for use in the seizure of advanced bases met with great resistance,.
The bureaus were reluctant to press Congress for the necessary
appropriations to fund the material since they felt that it might result
in an equivalent reduction in a bureau- sponsored project. When the
General Board recommended in 1906 that the Secretary ask Congress
for money to procure 6, 000 emergency army rations for the use of
46. General Board Minutes, September 22, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 332.
47. General Board Minutes, October 27, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 354.

advanced base forces in the event of war, he declined arguing that the
procurement might be misinterpreted by the public, the President,
and Congress as an indication that the Navy would soon become
engaged in offensive military operations, and the occupation of
foreign and/or neutral territory. °
After struggling with this problem of war plan support for over
eleven years, the Board was able to win Secretary of the Navy George
Meyer's approval of a system designed to integrate the bureaus in the
war planning process. At the request of the Board, Meyer addressed
letters to each one of the bureau chiefs in which he described a war
situation derived from one of the General Board's war plans. The
tk .*aus were directed to submit to the Secretary a statement, ex-
plaining how they intended to apply their specialties to the plan's
requirements, and asking what steps the Secretary could take to
assist. In addition, the bureaus were directed to designate a
representative to maintain liaison with the General Board for war
plan affairs. ^9 while the system did not guarantee bureau coopera-
tion, it at least made it plainly evident to the Secretary their degree
of support. As a matter of fact, bureau response was generally good
although one waited 13 months before submitting a reply. 50
43. General Board Minutes, September 26, 1906, Vol. 2, p. 460,
49. General Board File 425, May 24, 1911.
50. Secnav to Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
June 25, 1912, General Board File 425.
<
Tb" General Board tried to prepare plans for many contingencies
LI the two which most occupied it were those predicated on wart
r
th Japan and Germany. The documents reflecting the Board's
.nking on these tw*> probabilities were euphemistically described as
e Orange Plan (Japan) and the Black Plan (Germany). They are
scussed below, not only because they were basted on probable
a ofoosed to possible), eventualities, but because they are among
h last plans formulated by the General Board and therefore pre-
imably the most sophisticated. *1
Each of the plans contained a Strategic Section and an Admin-
iitrative Section. The Orange Plan also had an Information Section"
omprising 165 pages of data on Japanese ports. The Black Plan had
o such data undoubtedly because the anticipated area of operations
/as in the Caribbean, while the war against Japan was to be waged
n the Pacific more or less adjacent to Japan. In addition, the
Grange Plans, unlike the Black", envisioned the possibility of \j. S.
aaval operations against Japanese harbors after the destruction of
the Japanese fleet. °*
The material in the Orange Plan Information Section was based
on data' supplied by the Office of Naval Intelligence and included
51. Not all of the General Board War Plans developed during the
1900 to 1915 period are preserved; the practice was apparently
to discard old plans as new ones were promulgated.
'52. War Portfolio No. 2, Reference No. 5-1, Orange Plan, Infor-
mation Section, General Board War Plans File, Box No. 6,
p. 1.
(
4sailing charts, photographs of prominent landmarks, and descriptions
of . rtifications and other military facilities. A typical (although
somewhat briefer than average) entry was that for the Goto Islands
off the western coast of Kyushu:
There are no defenses in these islands, and but a small
population (estimated at 200) available for military service.
They are fishermen, without present training.
The harbor of Tama No Ura will safely accomodate 20
large ships and 30 small ones, in anchorages safe from heavy
weather. Hostile vessels outside might fire on ships inside
and north of Kojima. Outside anchorages off the villages of
Tama and Arakawa would be secure in any weather except
N. W. gales.
The conditions of the immediate surroundings would permit
the seizure by us of this anchorage. There are excellent
facilities for a temporary defense requiring no longer than 48
hours.
A powerful radio installation here, coupled with telegraphic
communication to Fukaye (4000 inhabitants) and cable to
I Nagasaki would insure immediate knowledge of an attack by
us. 53
The ultimate aim of the Strategic Section was to come to a
decision as to the best course of action for the United States fleet to
I
pursue prior to and immediately after the outbreak of war. Follow-
ing a discussion of the conditions which might provoke a war, the
plans presented some general assumptions upon wh ; ch the Board
based its reasoning. In both the Orange and Black Plans, it was
i
*
53. War Portfolio No. 2, Reference No. 5-1, Orange Plan, Infor-
mation Section, General Board War Plans File, Box No. 6,
p. 1.

ssumed that Japan and Germany would initiate the conflicts and,
eca, of the comparative unreadiness of the United States for war,
}e in positions of marked superiority. The plans then provided
tudied comparisons of the forces involved, possible courses of
ction on both sides, probable enemy decisions, and finally a listing
f the best options open to the United States forces. 54
At the conclusion of the strategic discussion, the Board offered
[list of specific actions which should be taken by naval forces when
;ar became imminent or immediately after it had commenced. To
llustrate, the Orange Plan called for the Navy's Asiatic Forces
rhich were on station at the outbreak of war to:
'a) Remove the drydock and naval utilities from Olongapo
[Philippines] to a position behind the defenses of Manila Bay.
(b) Assemble in Manila Bay the MONTERY, MONADNOCK
and all cruisers, destroyers, and submarines on the station*
(c) Put out of commission all river gunboats except PALOS
arrl MONOCACY. Utilize the personnel thus made available
as crews for monitors, destroyers, and submarines.
(d) That the Commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Station will
employ this force in cooperation with the Army for the
destruction of enemy forces and the defenses of the entrance
to Manila Bay til the arrival of the Blue [United States] main
body.
(e) The defense of Guam should be obstinate and prolonged to
the utmost limit, in order that Orange, in case of success,
may be allowed as little time as possible to strengthen the
fortifications against attack by the Blue Fleet on its way to
the Philippines. The time element here is vital. 55
54. War Portfolio No. 1, Reference No. 5-Y, Black Plan, Gen-
eral Board War Plans File, Box No. 10, pp. 1-71; War Port-
folio No. 2, Reference No. 5-1, Orange Plan, General Board
War Plans File, Box No. 6, pp. 1-72.
55. Orange Plan, p. 76.

Some of the Black Plan's conclusions were: to maintain the
e fleet so as to be prepared for battle within seven days after
)' the declaration of war; to mobilize the fleet in the lower Chesapeake
Bay on the advance of the German fleet toward the Caribbean, then
direct it to proceed to Culebra off Puerto Rico; to concentrate the
I scouting effort in a "small area to the eastward of the Caribbean,
and possibly in special area near the Azores. "56
The last portion of both plans was called the Administrative
section. Here the Board dealt with the logistics necessary to support
strategy. The Board's appreciation of their inter-relationship was
1
i
clearly expressed in the opening pages of the Orange Plan.
The logical development of the strategy of a war with Orange
demonstrates how absolutely all operations depend upon the
logistics of the war - the exacting, ever present questions of
equipment, supply and communications. No strategic study,
in fact, is possible until it is definitely known, or can be
assumed, what are the means provided to initiate the war and
how complete the arrangements are to transfer the fleets and
flotillas to the area of operations and then adequately to sup-
port them there against the assumed power and dispositions
of the enemy. If the means are lacking to insure the arrival
of the full naval strength of a country in the area where the
decisive battles of the war must be fought, and to keep it
adequately supplied in that area, it is as overpowering a
national calamity as a decided inferiority in the equality of
the personnel and in the number and character of the fighting
ships. ^I
56. Black Plan, p. 63.
57. Orange Plan, p. 1.
i

The Administrative section listed the projects which had to be
;cor.. Ished by the Navy Department bureaus and offices in advance
war in order to ensure the successful deployment of the fleet. Tne
oard considered that:
the work outlined must be done thoroughly to ensure success;
and only by adequate preparation well in advance of hostilities
will it be practicable to act offensively upon a scale that the
military and naval power of the enemy makes imperative.
The time element is all important, and a delay in the sailing
of the fleet, and furthe'r delays in reinforcing and maintaining
the fleet may result in disaster. . . . "58
Several examples of the hundreds of elements of logistics support
icluded in the Board's plans follow:
- Bureau of Supplies and Accounts: to make arrangements for a
upply of 1, 200, 000 tons of coal and 175, 000 tons of oil "when war
nticipated" and thereafter, monthly deliveries of 250, 000 tons of
oal and 50, 000 tons of oil. 59
- Bureau of Navigation: to issue preparatory orders to all retired
fficers capable of performing duty. 60
- Bureau of Ordnance: be able on three weeks notice to load two
line depot ships to full capacity. 61
- Solicitor General: prepare blank forms to use for the expediting
f the delivery of vessels already being built for the Navy. "^
^. Orange Plan, Administrative Section, p. 1; Black Plan,
p. 146.
59. Orange Plan, Administrative Section, p. 29.
60. Black Plan, p. 160.
61. Orange Plan, Administrative Section, p. 70.
62. Black Plan, p. 189.

None of the General Board's War Plans were ever tested in the
cruiCible of conflict. Its most advanced effort, the Black Plan
prepared in 1914, was based on the assumption that the United States
would have to defend by itself a German onslaught in the Caribbean.
The Board never anticipated that the American effort would be
combined with Great Britain's many miles across the Atlantic.
Nevertheless, the Board's development of a system of war planning
in peace did much to create within the naval service an awareness of




It would have been very strange indeed if the General Board,
: chartered as it was for the production of war plans, did not find an
i
* enemy against which to prepare. Actually from the point of view of
I
i
the plans themselves, there was no shortage of adversaries. Every
j world power at one time or another was placed in the r-jle of aggres-
i
I sor, but none received more attention than Germany for it stood out
I in ; minds of the board members as the most probable foe.
I
1
U. S. naval preoccupation with Germany did not begin with the
I General Board. American officers had long suspected, with some
I
I justification, that their German counterparts had designs on the
»•
i
l Ccrib'-ean, and were therefore somewhat surprised that the settle-
I ment after the Franco- German War did not include the cession of the
:
French-owned island of Martinique. * In 1897, the Naval War College
debated the possibility of a U. S. -German confrontation and concluded
1. Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, "A Short Study in Naval
Strategy, " lecture delivered August 27, 1910 at Naval War
College, Naval War College Archives, Newport, R. I. ; Alfred
Vagts, "Hopes and Fes.rs of an American- German War, 1870-
1915" Part I, Political Science Quarterly , Vol. 54 (December,
1939), p. 515.
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that one could conceivably arise in Haiti over the question of forceful
| Qci .. 4an intervention to protect the interest of the many German sub-
*i jects residing there. Such an episode, it was felt, would give




1 challenge the Monroe Doctrine. *
i
Although the scene of future conflict between the two countries
f
was invariably placed in the Western Hemisphere, American naval
I officers found confirmation of German hostility in events in the Far
East. The first of these to give credence to the prospect of war was
the Gorman-American diapute over Samoa in 1388-1830. * American
i
:
naval officers sent there during the "crisis" found ample evidence of
| German intrigue. Beginning with the Spanish- American War and
I continuing through 1899 American naval strategists found that, "at




"** Perhaps the most significant dramatization
of this was the highly publicized dispute between Admirals George
\ Dewey and Otto von Diederichs in Manila Bay soon after the destruc-
tion of the feeble Spanish fleet. Many of the General Board members
2. ' War with Germany, prepared at Naval War College in 1897,
author unknown, Naval War College Archives.
3. Vag^.s, "Hopes and Fears of an American- German War 1870-
1915, " p. 517.
4. Rear Admiral L. A. Kimberly, "Samoan Hurricane, " Naval
Historical Foundation Publication, 1965, p. 3.
5. William C. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific,
1897-1909, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), p. 63.

during the period from 1900 to 1914 were there with Dewey and, like
.i, gained an indelible impression of German aggressiveness and
I bellicosity. Dewey and his officers viewed von Diederichs large
-
I
i force (outnumbering theirs), and their activities as malapropros
particularly when compared with the honorable and circumspect per-
formance of the British naval vessels under Captain Edward
Chichester. 6
One of these Manila Bay veterans was Commander Nathan
Sargent. He was a long time associate of Dewey and had been his
Aide when the latter was President of the Board of Inspection and
Survey from 1895 to 1897. ? Under Dewey's guidance, Sargent wrote
Mstory of the Battle of Manila Bay which reflects the bitterness
aroused by the German naval activities under Admiral von Diederichs. °
Sargent became a member of the General Board in 1902, stayed until
1904, took command of the U. S. S. Baltimore in the Far East, and
-
returned to the Board in 1906. A frequent correspondent with Dewey,
Sargent evidences the permancy of his anti- German bias in this letter
to Dewey written almost sev^n years after the event:
6. Thomas A. Bailey, Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay, "
American Historical Review , Vol. 45 (October, 1939), pp. 59-
81; Commander Nathan Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila
Campaign, (Washington: Naval Historical Foundation, 1947).
7. Lewis R. Hamersly, The Records of Living Officers of the U. S.
Navy and Marine Corps, (New York: L. R. Hamersly Co.
,
1902), p. 213.
8. Sargent, Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign, (Washington:
I Naval Historical Foundation, 1947).

The last German Vice Admiral to visit Manila was your friend
Von Diederichs, and since then his countrymen have had the
good taste to stay away from the locality in which they had
been guilty of such bad breeding and had so persistently
ignored your authority. Now however their Flagship FURST
Bismark, with Vice Admiral Von Pritwitz on board, has been
at Hongkong for the last two months, but had so effectually
worn out her welcome there that the English took away her
buoy off the city and forced her to anchor down by Kowloon.
In consequence her Vice Admiral decided to visit Manila, and
with the usual German finesse he timed his visit to coincide
with the birthday of the Kaiser. There have been many enter-
tainments in his honor, among others a dinner given on board
the Flagship by Admiral Stirling. Of course there is no
objection in extending to the Germans the customary courtesies,
but our people have slopped over a little too much, and today
the culminating point, and one which has excited a deal of com-
ment, has been, the unusual honors paid to the Germans by
our Fleet. . . . By the way, while on the subject of the
Germans, as an evidence of their tact and good sea manners,
I was informed by the English Officers at Hongkong, that while
enjoying the hospitality of that place for nearly the whole
winter and making its harbor a rendezvous for the German
squadron, they had noticed that when the German ships ran in
or out of port they exercised their batteries by training their
guns on the fortifications of the port; this was told me by the
English General in command and I only wonder that the
English did not fire on them. However this does not equal
their conduct in the Hebrides last summer when they took
bearings and soundings of the whole locality, they sent parties
of men ashore to thoroughly explore the Islands, noted the best
strategic points, the facilities for procuring food and water,
etc. , etc. , evidently with a view of seizing the island for a
temporary base in case of hostilities. ... P. S. Jan 28th.
The German Flagship has passed the fleet standing out to sea
and showing that her Admiral came here largely for the pur-
pose of having us honor his Kaiser. Had he possessed a
modicum of tact he would have remained a day or two longer, 9
£>ewey shared Sargent's mistrust of the Germans. The incidents
at Manila Bay enraged him to the point where he actually threatened
9. Sargent to Dewey, January 27, 1905, Dewey Papers, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress.

the Germans with war. 10 On his return voyage to the United States
- predicted that "our next war will be with Germany. "H After the
I? Venezuelan "crisis" of 1902-1903, he disparaged the capability of the
1 German Navy, and although he did not intend that his remarks be
published, they received wide circulation in the American and
German press. President Theodore Roosevelt tactfully chided Dewey
3
4
for "giving the impression that as a nation we are walking about with
>
g
$ a chip on our shoulder,
,f" but he privately endorsed Dewey's re-
%
|
marks and told him "much more than . . . [the latter] had said to the
newspapers. "** Another member of the General Board, Captain
-
I
Charles S. Sperry, held the Kaiser in great contempt and likened
~-_
him to "one of the Robber Barons of the Middle Ages. ""
I
With this background it is not surprising to find that a high
degree of germanophobia was present in the early thinking of the
General Board. Even prior to the first meeting Captain Henry C.
Taylor suggested that the Board's first task should be to analyze the
I
possibility of an attempt by Germany to seize territory in the
Caribbean or South America. 1 ^ Captain Charles D. Sigsbee, a Board
member and Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence, responded with
10. Bailey, Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay, p. 67.
11. New York Herald , July 29, 1899, cited :.n Ibid . , p. 79.
12. Roosevelt to Dewey, April 3, 1903, Dewey Papers.
13. Dewey to son George, April 7, 1903, Dewey Collection,
Office of Naval History.
14. Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry to son Charles, May 1, 1905,
Sperry Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
15. Dewey to Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowinshield, April 11, 1900,
with Taylor memorandum attached, General Board File 401.

the estimate that Germany intended to acquire territory in the
^nbbean and/or South America "in one way or another. '' The pos-
sibilities included possession by force, purchase, consent of an ally,
absorption of Denmark, and Holland and subsequent accession of the
Caribbean territories of these two countries. In Sigsbee's view,
Germany's preference would be to gain a foothold without resort to
arms, but if this were not possible then she would not hesitate to go
to war, for her strategy demanded a permanent base in the West
Indcs to further her colonization aims, to protect her South American
I. and Caribbean commerce, and to operate against the United States
fleet should war come, Germany coveted territory in Brazil,
Culcbra, Cuba, Santo Domingo, Haiti, St. Thomas, Santa Cruz, and
Curacao, Her greatest interest was thought to be Haiti, based
principally on the frequent visits of German naval training vessels
there, the splendid harbor sites available, and the weak position of
i
i
the h'aitien government, both politically and militarily. 16
Another officer who made frequent strategic studies for the
General Board in the early 1900's, believed that Germany's aim was
to "obtain a chian of naval bases across the Atlantic and Pacific,
trending through the American Isthmus, no link of which woold be
as long as that between Hawaii and Guam. M He felt that, in support
16. Office of Naval Intelligence Memorandum, Germany vs. the
U.S. - West Indes, " May 21, 1900, General Board File Box
11.

oi this objective, Germany would try to acquire either the Azores or
.
Mau-iras and territory in the West Indes, probably St. Thomas. *'
Captain French E. Chadwick, President of the Naval War College
and a Board member for almost four years, believed that "war is the
ii i ft
I outcome of commercial rivalry. 0 He looked on Germany as a state
plagued by a crisis of overproduction which could only be relieved by
further colonization. This would probably take place in Southern
Brazil and present the United States with a challenge to the Monroe
I 1 9
v Doctrine. xa
Captain Charles S. Sperry, a prominent Board member, saw the
seeds of conflict present in Latin America where on the one hand
the was a large amount of German capital investment and on the
I
other political instability caused by "rotten Latin-American despo-
tisms. " He predicted that "sooner or later" Germany would "rise
up in arms to protect and extend her interests. "
Rear Admiral Taylor, the most influential of the Board members
in the first few years of its existence was convinced in 1902 that the
17. Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, 'Sea Power of Germany,
unpublished mss. written at Naval War College in 1900,
Naval War College Archives.
18. Captain French E. Chadwick, "The Naval War College. "
lecture delivered at the Naval War College, March 4, 1902,
Naval War College Archives.
19. Chadwick, "Coal/ 1 lecture delivered at Naval War College,
1901, Naval War College Archives. Chadwick went on to
recommend to his officers that they read Brooks Adams,
whose philosophy that commercial rivalry lay at the basis of
all wars, was his philosophy too.
20. Sperry to wife, August 6, 1901, Sperry Papers.

United States and Germany would have a conflict in the not too distant
fu«.-.*'e.
21 He and his colleagues were reportedly "alert" to the
- German "danger" and "pretty well scared over the Monroe
Doctrine. ..."
In view of these individual estimates it comes as no surprise that
I the entire Board officially advised the Secretary of the Navy in 1906
that:
Germany is desirous of extending her colonial possessions,.
Especially, is it thought, that she is desirous of obtaining
a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, and many things indi-
cate that she has her eyes on localities in the West Indies, on
the shores of the Caribbean, and in parts of South America.
It is believed in many quarters that she is planning to test the
Monroe Doctrine by the annexation or by the establishment of
a protectorate over a portion of South America, even going
to the extent of war with the United States when her fleet is
ready. 23
These convictions as to the German threat were reinforced and
made even more credible by statements of leading State Department
ofucials like Assistant Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis who
told the officers at the Naval War College "in confidence" that:
Personal conversations with, and observations on the part of
divers European statesmen, diplomats, which have been re-
ported to me at first hand, lead me to believe that the ques-
tion of acquiring some sort of definite foot-hold in South
21. Army and Navy Journal, August 9, 1902, Vol. 29, p. 1246.
22. Lieutenant Alfred P. Niblack to Lieutenant William S. Sims,
December 29, 1901, Sims Papers, Office of Naval History,
Washington, D. C.
23. Dewey to Secnav, June 20, 1906, General Board File 438.

i America has not been wholly excluded from the thought of
certain governments in connection with their plans for
commercial political expansion. What has been done in the
way of giving effect to this thought, has, 1 fancy, been pure-
ly tentative in character, but the possibility of a European
nation seeking by the indirect method of its own colonization
associated to gain a political foot-hold in South America is
something not wholly fanciful. This is a contingency which
offers one of the most intricate and delicate problems that
can be suggested by our future relations in Latin- America.
The ultimate fate, declaration, scope and interpretation of
the Monroe Doctrine is indisolubly connected with it. 24
As if to demonstrate its impartiality, the General Board did
analyze the possibility of conflict with Latin America countries,
<
France, and England. The nations of the American hemisphere
we^e quickly eliminated as serious challengers because of their
weakness as compared to the United States. 25 England was not
deemed a probable aggressors because she was "particularly cordial,
largely for reasons of sentiment, kinship, . . . but even more so for
reasons of self interest. *° Indeed, the Board believed that in the
event of war with Germany, it was "not at all unlikely" that the
United States would be able "to secure the passive friendship of
England, and probably, if necessary, a treaty of mutual support and
24. Francis B. Loomis, The Influence of an Isthmian Canal
Upon Central and South America, " lecture delivered at Naval
War College, 1901, Naval War College Archives.
25. War Portfolio No. 1, Atlantic Station, "General Considera-
tions and Data," General Board File Box 1, p. l-a(l).
26. Ibid. \

protection. . . . "^ ' The chance of war with France was also con-
,-red remote largely because of that nation's "unusually friendly"
oosture. ^8 Equally improbable in the estimate of the Board members
was an Anglo-French alliance against the United States. 29
Thus the Board's logic of elimination left only one realistic foe
in the Atlantic - Germany - described by the Board as "the nation
most likely to engage in war single handed with the United
States... ." This confrontation, described in the color code sys-
tem as "Black vs. Blue"(Germany vs. United States), would begin
with the occupation of "Western Hemisphere territory under the
Black Flag. " 31 The Board's rationale supporting this conclusion
v/as officially presented in War Portfolio Number 1 as follows:
Germany is the uneasy state of Europe. With a population of
60.. 641, 000 in 1905, the annual increment is near 900, 000.
Since 1870 the population has increased at an average rate of
1. 14% and it is not a matter of many years before she will
2?. Dewey to Secnav, June 20, 1906, General Board File 438.
Despite these strong expressions of anglophilia, the Board
would not go so far as to support a continuance or extension
of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, delimiting naval arma-
ments on the Great Lakes. On the contrary, it advised the
Secretary of State through the Secretary of the Navy that it
would be preferable to abrogate the agreement entirely to
.
permit the United States to "inaugurate a shipbuilding policy
for the Great Lakes, whereby the United States may, if so
inclined, always have an armed force on the Great Lakes,
greater than the Canadian armed force. " Secnav to Secretary
of State, February 28, 1906, General Board File 420. Letter
drafted by the General Board.
28. "General Considerations and Data, " p. l-a(2),
29. Ibid., p. l-a(3).
30. "General Considerations and Data," p. l-a(4).
31. "Germany War Plan, " p. 10 (revised).

have outgrown her borders. Expansion is therefore a
necessity that becomes more pressing with every year that
passes and it is evident that the German government is fully
alive to the situation. Tims far Germany has not been for-
tunate with her colonies and the temperate regions of the
world that are feebly held have not been preempted. In South
America there are rich localities in a temperate climate that
might be seized from the holding nations were they the only
obstacles, and in southern Brazil there is already a large
community of Germans. But the Monroe Doctrine stands in
the way of such an enterprise which may not unreasonably be
assumed to be unfair to the German mind in view of their
problem of over-population. It also stands in the way of
their getting a foothold in the Caribbean which would be
desirable for trade reasons if for no other. When in addition
it is recalled that the United States was largely instrumental
in preventing the partition of China, it is seen that there are
latent causes that render a break with Germany more pro-
bable than with either of the other two great maritime powers
[France and England], and more probable moreover than with
any other European power. 32
Having constructed what to it was an adequate basis for the
German "threat, " the General Board looked and saw present all
around confirming evidence that its view was a correct one. First
came the German Fleet Law of 1900 which called for a tremendous
expansion in naval tonnage so that by 1917, the German Navy would
have a total of 422, 000 tons - a figure far greater than the entire
American Navy of 1900. To make matters more ominous, the Office
of Naval Intelligence received confidential information that the pro-
gram would be accelerated to completion some nine years earlier
than provided by the law. ^3
32. General Considerations and Data, pp. l-a(2)-la(3).
33. Ellicott, "Sea Power of Germany, " Naval War College
Archives.

In March of 1901 Commander Nathan Sargent, then Commanding
Of 2r of U. S. S. Scorpion filed a report indicating that the visit of
the German cruiser Vineta to the Margarita Islands off Venezuela
presaged their acquisition by Germany. Sargent's belief was based
on the unusually long hydrographic survey made by the ship (three
months), his understanding that the operations were being conducted
at the personal direction of the Kaiser, and the widely held opinion
in Venezuela that when the Congress met in September of 1.901, it
would lease or sell the islands to Germany. 34 Although Venezuela
denied that the transfer would take place, ^ 5 Sargent's observations
became the source of widespread concern within the Board. ^o
Further evidence of the German conspiracy was offered by
Commander John E. Pillsbury. He wrote Rear Admiral Taylor and
enclosed a clipping from a Port of Spain, Trinidad newspaper which
announced the arrival of a German Caribbean cruise ship with many
American tourists and "six guests of the German Emperor" aboard.
Pillsbury revealed that the "six guests" were actually German army
officers in search of military information. He added that it was his
impression that Germany "means to put all the pressure possible on
on
Venezuela. " Taylor, expressing great confidence in Pillsbury'
s
34. Henry Cabot Lodge to John D. Long, June 1, 1901, printed in
Gardner W. Allen, ed. , Papers of John Davis Long
,
(Boston:
The Massachusetts Historical Society), Vol. 78, p. 366.
35. Ibid.
36. Dewey to Secnav, April 24, 1901, General Board File 409.
37. Commander John E. Pillsbury to Taylor.. January 16, 1902,
copy in Dewey Papers.

• ud^ment, relayed the letter to Dewey and described its contents as
r
k <; .ificant "of the general trend of events.
" 3 °
»
The visit of the Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry, to the United
I States in February of 1902 was apparently a sincere attempt on the
I part of the German government to heal the wounds inflicted at Manila,
I
f ease the suspicion about German intentions in South America and the
Caribbean, and generally contribute to a lessening of the tensions
I
evident in German-American relations. ^9 However, it was welcomed
by Rear Admiral Taylor not for these reasons but because it would
postpone the inevitable war between the two countries and give the
United States Navy more time to prepare. °
I
There is no documentation available which reflects the Board's
reaction to the Venezuelan "crisis" of 1902-1903, but it is virtually
certain that it was viewed as another demonstration of German
I
aggressiveness, irrespective of the fact that it was the English who
took the lead in the movement to coerce Venezuela. ^1 The Board
probably shared President Roosevelt's conviction that German actions
were aimed at converting a Venezuelan harbor into a Caribbean
Kiauchau for the purpose of "exercising some degree of control over
38. Taylor to Dewey, January 31, 1902, Dewey Papers.
39. Howard C. Hill, Roosevelt And The Caribbean, (New York:
Russell and Russell, 1965), p. 113; Rear Admiral Robley D.
Evans, An Admiral's Log, (New York: D. Appelton and Co.
,
1910), p. 77. Evans, while a member of the General Board,
was assigned by President Roosevelt as Prince Henry's
escort officer during the visit.
40. Taylor to Dewey, January 31, 1902, Dewey Papers.
41. Hill, Roosevelt And The Caribbean, p. 110.

the future Isthmian Canal and over South American affairs
11 "42
enerally.
After the Venezuelan incident, reports and rumors continued to
flow into the Board detailing German efforts to establish bases through-
out the Caribbean. All, regardless of their basis in fact, were
accepted as proof of the Board's thesis as to the coming German-
American confrontation. In December, 1903 the Commandant of the
U. S. Naval Station at San Juan Puerto Rico reported that the German
government had purchased land for a coaling station in St. Thomas. ^
In the same month State Department sources forwarded an evaluation
from the American Consul at St. Thomas that Germany had leased
I
n
'ater Island just outside the port of Charlotte Amalie and had fleet
ammunition stored in the government arsenal on the main island. 44
So pathological was the suspicion of Germany that even casual
social conversations were reported as events of great significance.
., Commander Nathan Sargent was told by an American in Shanghai that
-
the Germans in Peking invariably "assured their British friends that
the German naval preparations were by no means directed against
42. Roosevelt to William R. Thayer, August 21, 1916, cited in
Hill, Roosevelt And The Caribbean, p. 123.
43. Commandant, U. S. Naval Station, Puerto Rico serial 647-03,
December 12, 1903, General Board File 429.
44. General Board Minutes, December 20, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 89.
Later a clarification was received from the American Consul
in Copenhagen to the effect that it was the German-owned
American-Hamburg Line which had leased Water Island; the
ammunition report had no basis in fact. Report from
American Consul at Copenhagen, October 4, 1905, General
Board File 429.

England but were meant for any eventuality with the United States and
tha "^e pretext would be the question of the Brazil Colonies. " The
^American added that the Germans, "when in their cups, " often
referred to the conflict with the United States and "apparently regarded
it as inevitable. " Sargent transmitted this information to Dewey with
I the comment that:
I know your opinions on the subject but I only hope that in some
manner this undoubted intention of theirs can be so imparted to
Congress that its members will be convinced that there should
be no let up in our appropriations. ^5
r
I
I Dewey agreed with Sargent's opinion relative to the Germans, and pro-
5
i mised to do all in his power to see that the United States was pre-
I pared. u
j
Even the routine decommissioning of the German battleship
k
Kaiser Friedrich III for damage repair prompted excited reaction in
) Board circles. The U. S. Naval Attache report that the loss of the
ship for a six month period generated considerable concern on the
if-
I part of the German naval officers, caused the Chief Intelligence
. Officer, Captain Charles D. Sigsbee to warn the General Board that
the reaction of these officers proved that Germany had war plans
which counted on the use of the Kaiser Friedrich III during the time
she would be undergoing repair. ^7
45. Sargent to Dewey, December 10, 1904, Dewey Papers,
46. Dewey to Sargent, February 1, 1905.
47. Sigsbee to Dewey, May 17, 1901, cited in Seward W.
Livermore, "American Naval Development 1898-1914 With
Special Reference to Foreign Affairs, " (Unpublished Ph. D.
Dissertation, Harvard University, 1942), p. 53.

To the General Board, German commercial penetration in the
y--tern Hemisphere was simply a cover for subsequent naval incur-
sions and it was watched with concern and suspicion. In April of
| 1906 Admiral Dewey received a report from the Comm^iding Officer
of U. S. S. Nashville, Commander Washington I. Chambers, in which
I
I he touched on the German "menace" in Santo Domingo. He told
I Dewey that Germans were very influential in the Macoris area and
investing in rather extensive land holdings. He also sent along a
copy of a letter from Mr. L. Pardo, agent of the Clyde Steamship
Company in Santo Domingo City and endorsed the latter' s views
relative to the German ambitions in the Caribbean. Pardo ranked
t
I
Germany as the number one enemy of the United States whose objec-
i
j
[ twe was to destroy the Monroe Doctrine. Pardo wrote:
What is to prevent Germany from buying up British, Spanish,
Belgian, and other claims and making a demand on the
Dominican Government for immediate payment? And as such
not be made, taking possession of Custom Houses, and Samana
Bay as a guarantee. Should this happen, our Government would
have to satisfy German claims by paying same, or by force
prevent Germany from taking possession ... in order to uphold
the Monroe Doctrine. This would mean war.^°
In June of 1910, in reaction to reports about German commercial
leases in Haiti, the General Board persuaded Secretary of the Navy-
George von L. Meyer to take the position that:
48. Chambers to Dewey, April 9, 1906, General Board File 413.

•any such lease carried out in the Western Hemisphere would,
in effect, be almost, if not quite, as prejudicial to the safety
and interests of this country, as though the lease were made
direct to a foreign government. Especially is this true in the
case of places located on or near the trade routes in either
ocean to or from the Panama Canal in any direction. 4 ^
In April of 1913, the American Charge' d'Affaires in Colombia,
L eland Harrison advised the Secretary of State that he learned in a
conversation with "one of the minor officials of the Imperial German
E
Legation" that the German banana concession operating on the eastern
shore of the Gulf of Uraba in Colombia was "ostensibly for the pur-
\
pose of furnishing cargo for . . . German steamers, but the real
[
reason of the undertaking is due to . . . [the] desire to possess a
coaling station ... in the Caribbean, where England, France, and the
p United States are already well supplied with naval bases,." Harrison
evaluated the report as tending "to confirm the suspicions previously
voiced by the Legation to the effect that the German interests in the
Gulf of Uraba
. . .
were rather political then commercial in
character. "^ Later the American Consul in Barranquilla, Colombia
seconded Harrison's contention by advising that the banana concession
was "a cloak to the efforts of the German Government to secure a fuel
station
. . . .
" He based his belief on the fact that the port construc-
tion was being done by German army engineers, that the banana
49. Meyer to Secretary of State, June 21, 1910, General Board
File 429.
50. Leland Harrison to Secretary of State, Number 158, April 30,
1913, General Board File 429.

industry in the area was not a paying proposition, and that the Ger-
n 's were using their presence to exploit for petroleum deposits. 51
The General Board's reaction was not one of surprise for in its
estimate it simply confirmed its long held analysis of German strate-
gic objectives. It was of the opinion that Germany wanted the coaling
station not to supply its cargo vessels but as a military base of
operations. The Board went on to state that:
the desire of Germany to have a coaling station in the
*
Caribbean is as natural as is the desire of the United States
not to have Germany so established in that region. France and
England had possessions in the Caribbean before the United
States came into being, and the enunciation of the Monroe
Doctrine did not contemplate turning them out. But the advent
now of Germany in that region, in any way giving her a posi-
tion of military advantage, is opposed to the principle of the
Monroe Doctrine and is' a potential menace to the security of
the United States, and especially to the Panama Canal and her




The Board also received frequent reports on the conspiratorial
colonization policy of Germany in Southern Brazil, describing the
German immigrants as 1, tightly knit, and willing and anxious to revolt
and accept the position of German colonies of the Empire. " D ^
51. Isaac Manning to Secretary of State, Number 234, May 31,
1913, General Board File 429.
52. Dewey to Secnav, June 14, 1913, General Board File 429;
General Board Minutes, June 13, 1913, Vol. 5, p. 113.
53. Sperry to son Charles, January 17, 1908, Sperry Papers.
Sperry was one of the Board members who shared this belief.
During the cruise of the "Great White Fleet" from 1907 to
1909, he stopped at Rio de Janeiro and said that he was "glad
to hear" that people there completely disavowed the plot, "for
in the G. B. [General Board] we always had in view German
attempts to acquire territory in those regions. "

It is clear that the General Board identified Germany as the most
li ly aggressor in the Atlantic area and found acceptable evidence to
confirm its findings. But this did not mean that Germany had the
capability to wage war against the United States, nor did it serve to
show whether or not or when it would be in Germany's best interests
i
* to do battle. In order to find the answer to these questions, the
Board members put themselves in the chairs of their German counter-
s'
parts, and analyzed the situation as they thought it appeared from
across the Atlantic. Among the possible German objectives were
the possession of territory in: the United States, Puerto Rico,
Panama Canal Zone, West Indes, the Caribbean littoral, and South
America. *"
The fear of a full scale effort against the Atlantic coast of the
United States was expressed in the early days of the General
Board, 55 but gradually eliminated as a feasible course of action,
principally because of the increased strength of U. S. coastal
defenses. °° By 1905, the Atlantic Coast retained interest only as a
site for a possible diversionary raid to excite panic among the
54. General Considerations and Data, p. l-b(5). Even before
the Panama Canal was completed in August of 1915, the Board
viewed it as a likely target.
55. Dewey to Secnav, March 22, 1901, General Board Letter-
press Vol. 1, p. 185.
56. In this connection, it is interesting to note that German naval
strategists had plans in April of 1901 calling for naval attacks
in Cape Cod followed by raiding operations on East Coast
cities. Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American- German
War 1870-1915," Part II, Political Science Quarterly , Vol.
55 (March, 1940), pp. 58-59.
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population and concomitant demands for concentration of the fleet in
^ome waters. ° '
South America, particularly the Brazilian coastal area, was high
on the German list of priorities, but it was here that the United States
was least able to project its seapower because of the great distances
involved and the lack of supporting bases. The Board felt that the only
hope for the United States in the event Germany chose South America
as a target was the prospect of an alliance with Brazil against
Germany which would give the United States the use of ports close to
the scene of action. 5° In any event the Board, at least in its early
days, gave considerable attention to this problem and concluded that
U. S. naval power could not guarantee the inviolability of the Monroe
jctrine in the face of an enemy attack anywhere in the vast stretches
of South American beyond the Amazon River. 59
57. ' German War Plan, p. 263; General Considerations and
.
Data," p. l-b(ll).
58. "General Considerations and Data, " p. l-d(27).
59. General Board Minutes, April 24, 1901, Vol. 1, p. 75. The
Board thinking bears a striking resemblance to a Mahan
proposal of early 1901 in which he suggested that the United
States draw a zone of interest around the countries adjacent
to the Caribbean and give Europe a free hand in the rest of
Latin America. Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt,
March 30, 1901, cited in George T. Davis, A Navy Second
to None, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940), p. 121, An
additional suggestion to this effect was made by Assistant
Secretary of State Francis B. Loomis in 1901 when he told
the officers at the Naval War College that the United States
should establish its "coast line" to include the Caribbean Sea
in the Atlantic and Ecuador in the Pacific, and allow the
European countries to "do as they chose" in the rest of South
America. Francis B. Loomis, "The Influence of an
Isthmian Canal upon Central and South America, " lecture
delivered at the Naval War College in 1901, Naval War College
Archives.

What remained as possibilities - the West Indes, the Caribbean
f littoral, and the Panama Canal Zone - became for the General Board
I the probable German strategic objectives in the Western Hemisphere
f
| against which the American Navy had to prepare. °°
The Board considered that for Germany to be successful in any
of these aims, she would have to seize and hold territory in the
Caribbean area. This could not be done with seapower alone; an over-
seas expedition of ships and troops would be needed. But to protect
[ and support the land forces, Germany needed control of the sea and
a protected base of operations near the objective area. Command of
the sea could only be obtained by defeat of the U. S. fleet; but before
t; encounter, the base would have to be secured both to provide a
safe refuge for the auxiliaries and to have a haven to which damaged
vessels could proceed after the battle. °1
i
Germany was assigned the capability co mourn; such an expedition
even Jhough it would require anywhere between 62 to 110 colliers to
[
supply coal alone. The General Board concluded that German mer-
chant shipping was so vast and well organized that it could really
i
support the navy in the Caribbean and also transport and supply an
\
f army of 200, 000 men. 62
But under what circumstances would Germany attempt such an
undertaking? In the view of the General Board, the German naval
~6Q~.
"Germany War Plan, " p. 8.
61. "General Considerations and Data, " p. l-b(6).
62. "Germany War Plan, " pp. 20-21.

strategists would not dare risk such a venture unless two conditions
wei c satisfied: the homeland must be protected, diplomatically or
I
militarily; and German forces must be at least on a parity with
,
American forces.
The most serious limitation on German ability to apply force in
the Caribbean was British seapower. The Board decided that it
would be unreasonable to assume that Germany would attack unless
she was either allied with Great Britain, or at the very least enjoyed
her sympathy and received some assurance that she would receive a
free hand in a campaign against the United States. To a lesser
extent this was also true of France, but in any event, the Board
tr 'ght it essential that the navy of any nation inimical to Germany
had first to be neutralized before she would undertake a Caribbean
campaign. °°
But even assuming this complete freedom from fear of attack on
the homeland while the navy was deployed overseas, there were other
limitations on German naval strategy. Germany would not, in the
opinion of the General Board, go on the offensive unless she could
muster a force superior to, or at the very least, equal to U. S.
strength. The General Board expressed it this way:
it would be suicidal for Black [Germany], with a fleet only
approximately equal to that of Blue [United States], and in
~6T. "Germany War Plan, " p. 28.

addition handicapped by the presence of the heavy train
[auxiliary vessels] necessary for such distant operations, to
attempt adescent upon . . . the Caribbean. ... It may there-
fore be seriously doubted if Black under the assumed condi-
tion of readiness of Blue, would resort to hostilities to gain
political ends when the chances of success are so minimized
by Blue preparedness. Thus will readiness for war serve to
prevent war.
The key expression in this statement is: "under the assumed
condition of readiness of Blue. " The General Board in comparing
relative strengths of the two powers applied qualitative as well as
quantitative standards and found that the United States, while close
to Germany in total tonnage, was in an unsatisfactory situation with
respect to quality. While Germany could be ready with maximum
d .oyable force in a period of seven days after the declaration of
war, it would take the United States Navy thirty days to prepare.
Thus, between the seventh and thirtieth day, the United States would
be in a position of marked inferiority to Germany and in serious
danger of defeat.
"
Comparative readiness was also seriously affected by the location
of the American fleet. The worst possible situation which could occur
would be a declaration of war by Germany when the American fleet
was either divided between the Atlantic and Pacific, or largely sta-
tioned in the Pacific. In either case, the length of time it would take
to fully mobilize and concentrate U. S. forces to meet Germany would




be greatly extended. While the completion of the Canal would reduce
th somewhat, it would still take longer than the thirty days thought
to be necessary with the fleet disposed in the Atlantic. 66
The Board therefore judged that, assuming security in home
waters, Germany would launch her offensive if her seapower were
quantitatively or qualitatively superior, or if the American forces
were divided between the Pacific and Atlantic. With the majority of
the fleet in the Pacific, or divided between the Pacific and Atlantic,
Germany would first make a raid on the Atlantic coast to garner
prestige, induce panic, and disrupt American commerce; then her
forces would descend on Culebra, Puerto Rico, Guantanamo, and
Co^n. The Board was not very sanguine about the outcome,
declaring that "these conditions are almost hopeless for Blue... . n &7
With the U. S. fleet concentrated in the Atlantic, German forces
would proceed via the Azores or Cape Verde Islands, occupy a base
on the southeastern edge of the Caribbean Sea in the vicinity of
Margarita Islands, then engage the U. S. Navy. 68
Under the above conditions the best course of action for the
i
United States would be to:
remain on the defensive, covering in the most efficient man-
ner Blue interests and possessions until
. . .
approximate
equality or superiority may be assured. It must be kept in
mind that an unsuccessful action by an inferior Blue fleet
inn "Germany War Plan, " p. 65.
67. Ibid




against the Black fleet will give Black freedom of action and
control of the sea for a considerable time, and probably pre-
vent Blue ever approaching an equality of force with
Black... f
69
If Germany were to launch an attack while the U. S. fleet was
concentrated in the Atlantic, in a high state of readiness, and about
on a par with the German Navy, the best option for the Americans
would be to mobilize forces at Culebra and be ready to meet the
enemy as it entered the Caribbean. This plan is diagrammatic ally
shown on the following page with the anticipated area of first engage-
ment shown in red as the "zone of control. "
The Board envisioned the possibility of concurrent operations in
th" Far East but concluded that they would be minor and would have
"little effect upon the war. " Besides Germany and the United States
did not have enought forces to spare for simultaneous large scale
actions in Asia.
™
The conclusions which were drawn by the General Board from
their study of the threat in the Atlantic were clear. If there was a
likelihood of a German attack, do not divide the fleet or concentrate
it in the Pacific. Take steps to ensure a more rapid mobilization of
the Atlantic Fleet. Ensure a force level which will give the United
States, at the very minimum, parity with the Germans from a






qualitative and quantitative standpoint. Fortify Guantanamo in order
je able to resist for a longer period of its surrender to German
71
lorces.
The facility and consistency with which the General Board was
able to define the foe in the Atlantic was noticeably absent in the
pacific. In the latter area, apart from the traditional requirements
to defend territory and citizens, there was no policy like the Monroe
Doctrine which would prompt the United States to lay down the
gauntlet. While it is true that the Open Door was an important plank
in the American Far East platform, it was not backed with the same
willingness to resort to force that marked the Closed Door of the
Monroe Doctrine. The threat therefore was somewhat more difficult
f to define.
The logistical and strategical considerations which confronted
the General Board planners were also vastly more complicated in the
Pacific; even with a Canal through the Isthmus of Panama, the dis-
tances to zones of combat were many times greater than in the West
Indes. An enemy could be engaged in the Caribbean from strong
points close to home bases, or even from the home bases themselves
as was demonstrated in the Spanish-American War. In 1900, when
the General Board began to study the naval strategy of the Pacific,
there was no base to speak of in the Far East where capital ships
W. "Germany War Plan, " pp. 63-65.

could be assured of the considerable technical support which their
complexities demanded. Reliance had to be placed on foreign facili-
ties which would of course be denied in the event of United States
belligerency. Then, extensive refit could only be accomplished by
P
the long trek to West Coast ports, a time consuming and power
draining process.
Further, the size of the American fleet and the spectre of a
German attack in the Atlantic meant only a small Asiatic squadron,
hardly sufficient as a basis for sensible war planning. So weak
were the American naval forces on the Asiatic station in 1900 that
I
one experienced naval o/ficer stationed there declared them, "most
•fficient" and easy prey to "any naval force
. .
. except Turkey,
Spain, Portugal, and China. "^ Ln short, the Caribbean was a good
place to have a war and therefore an enemy; neither was true in the
Pacific.
Prior to the establishment of the General Board, Japan had
received some attention as a possible aggressor in the Pacific. The
staff at the Naval War College had in 1897, at the request of the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, made studies of
the possibility of a conflict with Japan. The motivating cause was the
U. S. move to annex Hawaii. ?3 Soon after the General Board began
72. Captain Bowman II. McCalla to Lieutenant Commander
William S. Sims, May 9, 1904, Sims Papers.
73. William R. Braisted, The United Spates Navy in the Pacific,
1897-1909
,
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958),
pp. 11-12.

mooting, Lieutenant John M. LTlicott forwarded a paper identifying
Japan as a likely antagonist of the United States both because of the
friction which accompanied the annexation of Hawaii and the "natural"
propensity of Japan to expand southward and acquire the Philippine
Islands. 74 But the General Board wan too occupied with the German
threat to look westward. In fact, the Board was "so engrossed by the
Atlantic and West Indian situation" that it did not have time to even
concern itself with the Philippine Insurrection, 75
The events growing out of the Boxer uprising and the siege of
Peking were of sufficient gravity to induce the Board to divert some
of its energies to the Far East. What it saw was hardly encouraging:
Philippine Insurrection, the Boxer Uprising, Great Power conflicts
over China, Russian intrigue to capture the vast industrial wealth of
Manchuria, inadequate base facilities with which to support even an
undersized squadron of vessels.
As a planning body the General Board did not play a major role
in the naval operations in the Far East. However, the difficulties of
conducting operations in North China from Philippine pores led the
Board to urge upon Secretary Long the necessity of a naval base in
the area which would put the United States in a position akin to the
74. Lieutenant John M. Ellicott, "The Strategic Features of the
Philippine Islands, " May 12, 1900, General Board Letter-
press, Vol. 1, pp. 6-14.
75. Dewey to Long, May 23, 1900, General Board File 401.

other western naval powers in North China. 76
The easing of the Boxer crisis after the capture of Peking did not,
f
in the opinion of the Board, eliminate the need for the base for now
plans were being developed identifying Russia as the enemy and, in
order to be prepared for war, a salient was required close to the
anticipated combat zone in the Yellow Sea area. ' ' Unlike in the
Atlantic however, the Board envisioned a struggle between two
coalitions, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in one and
Russia, France, and Germany in the other. ?8 Although the likeli-
hood of such a development was remote, it was the only reasonable
foundation upon which to lay plans. U. S. policy towards China was
a his state based on the premise that there would be cooperation
a^nong the powers involved; U. S. naval forces were too weak to
undertake bi-lateral hostilities; and there was the feeling that the
Russian threat in Manchuria was an issue which tended to divide the
powers along the lines indicated above. Japan's membership in the
anticipated U. S. -British Alliance became further solidified by the
conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Pact of 1902. France was con-
sidered a natural ally of Russia because of their European friendship
and the innate antipathy towards Germany made it almost axiomatic
76. Dewey to Long, June 27, 1900 and June 29, 1900, General
Board Letterpress Vol. 1, pp. 42-43, 47.
77. Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowninshield, Senior Member Pre-
sent to Commander-in-chief Naval Force Asiatic Station,
October 18, 1901, General Board File 425-2.
78. Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers to General Board, May 13,
1901, General Board File 425-2.

ihat she should be placed in the Russian camp. 7 ^
respite constant pleadings and the support of Secretary of the
Navy John D. Long, the General Board was not able to convince the
State Department that the need for a China base was more important
than adherence to the expressed policy of support for Chinese terri-
torial integrity. The Board was not interested in a base in Korea
from which to operate against the Russians because it would be too
close to the Russian strongholds at Vladivostock and Port Arthur and
German activities at Kiauchiau, 80 Besides, if Japan were an ally it
would not be needed; and if an enemy, untenable. °1
The alliance on which the Board's early war planning for the
As ; 'ic theater was based, would have required a radical shift in the
direction of American foreign policy. The Board members surely
recognized this but were forced to the extreme by a realization that
American naval power would be hard pressed to undertake hostilities
on its own. It was overextended in the support of the most basic of
national responsibilities - protection of- citizens. Attempts to rein-
force the Asiatic fleet and to station a force of 1, 000 marines in the
Philippines failed because of the overriding fear of the German threat
in the Atlantic.
79. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909
,
pp. 115-116.
80. Crowninshield to Commander-in-chief Naval Force Asiatic
Station, October 18, 1901, General Board File 425-2.
81. General Board endorsement on letter from W. W. Rockhill to
John Hay, July 3, 1902, letter dated June 18, 1903. Cited in
Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909,
P. 134.

The signing of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance in January of 1902
was greeted by American naval strategists as a good omen. It
appeared to force Russia's hand in Manchuria for she agreed to with-
draw all of her troops by October of 1903. The Board's probable
enemy in the Far East seemed to be in retreat. 82 The optimism was
short-lived and vanished with the presentation of Russia's seven
demands to China which were prerequisites to further withdrawals. 83
The Board became alarmed and this development, together with a
dismal report from Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans on the escalation
of tensions in the area, prompted the Board to renew its recommen-
i
dation for an increase of Marine strength in the Philippines to assist
E is in carrying out his extensive responsibilities not only for the
)f pn tection of U. S. citizens but also to seize an advance base in
J North China in the event of war. $4
War did come in Febrauay of 1904 but not as the General Board
-
had*planned. The conflict remained a two nation struggle but its out-
come forced a dramatic shift in the General Board's identification of
the enemy. Now the members had little choice. Japan was the only
serious contender now that Russia was prostrate, France had
established an entente with Great Britain, and both Germany and
82. General Board endorsement on letter from W. W. Rockhill to
John Hay, July 3, 1902, letter dated June 18, 1903. Cited in




84. Evans to Secnav, May 2, 1903, General Board File 408-2;
Dewey to Secnav, June 15, 1903, General Board File 408-2.

Endand concentrated their power in home waters. And yet the Board
fou..- the Navy ill-equipped to meet Japanese power whose performance
I during the war proved it was not to be taken lightly. Support facilities
*. in the Pacific were still inadequate. The ships in the Asiatic fleet
were hardly sufficient to counter any Japanese moves toward the
? Philippines. The Atlantic was still predominant in American naval
thinking.
While the choice of Pacific foes had been narrowed, the Board
did not develop any specific war plans against Japan until late 1906.
Even the classes at the Naval War College continued the practice of
the past and devoted their attention to the study of the problem of
Ge-man aggression in the Atlantic. ^5 Undoubtedly the Taft-Katsura
understanding helped persuade the Board members that the Japanese
threat was more theoretical than real. While some reports of
Japanese intrigue in the Philippines came to the Board's attention^
they were neither as credible nor as frequent as those detailing
f
German activities in the Caribbean. The prospects for continued
calm in the Pacific in early 1906 appeared so bright that the General
Board dropped its oft-declared need for a base in China and the Navy
withdrew all battleships from the Asiatic station.
However the calm was soon broken and tensions began to build
anew, but this time with the Japanese over the issue of seal poaching
85. Naval War College Records, Boxes 45-54, Federal Records
Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa.
86. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909,
p. 188.

in the Aleutians. President Roosevelt told Secretary of the Navy
Ch— les J. Bonaparte to alert the General Board to be ready for advice
in the event the crisis developed into hostilities.^
7 The Board's re-
sponse was hardly encouraging for it suggested that the Navy did not
have the capability to wage war in the Pacific because there were
inadequate facilities in the Philippines with which to support the fleet.
It went on to state that it was also useless to keep the expeditionary
force of Marines stationed there since 1903, and it recommended
their withdrawal to the United States. A fortified base in the
Philippines had been and was still the sine qua non of the General
Board's Pacific strategy. ^8 Only eight months before this frank
• admission of debility had been stated to Congress by Captain William
Swift, a long time General Board member. He told the House Naval
Affairs Committee that if
war were to develop between the United States and some other
power having docking facilities on the coast of Asia, we
being in our present condition, the first step of our Govern-
ment would be to' anticipate needs and to supply the forces on
shore with a large amount of stores. Then it would devolve
upon the Navy to protect our communications with the
Philippines so long as our vessels could stay there without .
going into a dock, excluding the consequences of an engage-
ment with the enemy. After a while, in a few months, the
vessels would be forced to return home, to go to California
for docking. A reasonable estimate for going home and back
again, including the repairing which would be necessary,
would be from five to six months, and during that time the
87. Roosevelt to Bonaparte, August 10, 1906, Elting Morison,
ed. , The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, (8 vols., Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1951-1954), Vo) c 5, p r 53.
88. Dewey to Secnav, August 13, 1906, General Board File 408-2.

coast of the Philippine Islands would be open to an enemy, and
when they got back they would probably find the enemy's forces
in possession of many of the important ports on the coast, if
nothing worse; and this nation would suffer the consequent loss
of prestige before the rest of the world. 89
When relations with Japan worsened after the San Francisco
School Board decision to exclude Japanese school children from the
city's regular public schools, President Roosevelt asked if the
General Board was ready in the event hostilities came. 90 While the
Board reply indicated that plans were "complete, "91 the fact was that
the developing crisis caught the General Board completely unprepared
and it had to "hurriedly" sketch out a course of action should war
come. 92 The Board's estimate was that while things looked "ugly, "93
wi^_ would not result "over so trivial a question, " and at a time when
Japan was "in the present exhausted condition. "94 Besides, the
General Board did not want to go to war with Japan. Dewey did not
89. Testimony of Captain William Swift before the House Naval.
Affairs Committee, U. S. , Congress, House, House Naval
Affairs Committee, Hearings on Estimates Submitted by
Secretary of the Navy
,
59th Cong. , lstsess., House Doc.
No. 53, (Washington, 1906), p. 496.
90. William Loeb, Jr., to Bonaparte, October 27, 1906, General
Board File 425-2. Loeb was Roosevelt's private secretary.
91. Dewey to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Truman H.
Newberry, October 29, 1906, General Board File 425-2.
92. Memorandum by Commander Joseph L. Jayne, November 23,
1909, General Board File 425.
93. Remark by Dewey made to his wife and recorded in her diary
entry of October 27, 1906, Dewey Papers.
94. Captain Nathan Sargent's diary entry for November 30, 1906,
Sargent Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

think the Navy was ready;^
5 another member felt that the United
States would get a "dowsing" if war came. 96 The Board recognized
that the Navy needed time to prepare and it was believed that time
97
was on the American side.
While the Board's estimate discounted Japanese hostilities as a
probability, the events of 1906 served to transfer Japan from the
category of "sure friend" to "possible enemy. "98 ^ March of 1907
the Board took the position that "political conditions have so altered
that war is not improbable with an Asiatic power whose fleet is
superior to any which the United States can habitually keep in Asiatic
waters. . . . "99 The Naval War College, whose annual strategic
st- es prior to 1906 were never predicated on a war with Japan,
b-egan to emphasize this contingency and, between 1906 and 1914,
Germany and Japan received equal attention. 100
Although the Board considered a Japanese attack on the
Philippines "very improbable, " its strategy was based on that
95. Mrs. George Dewey's diary entry, October 27, 1906, Dewey
Papers.
96. Captain Nathan Sargent's diary entry, November 30, 1906,
Sargent Papers.
97. Dewey to Rear Admiral Willard H. Brownson, January 15,
1907, Dewey Papers.
98. Dewey to Secnav, March 5, 1908, cited in Braisted, The
United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909, p. 221.
99. Dewey to Secnav, March 4, 1907, General Board File 405.
100. Annual "Solutions to the Problem, " Naval War College
Records, Boxes 45-54, Federal Records Center,
Mechahicsburg, Pa.

assumption. The Board's plans called for the large vessels in the
Asiatic fleet to retreat and await rendezvous with the westward bound
Atlantic fleet. Shore defense of the Philippines would be concentrated
at Subic Bay where it was hoped that the Army and coastal defense
forces would be able to hold against the Japanese until the arrival of
: the concentrated American fleet, a period of about three months.
Prospects that this could be done were not bright; there was a
"strong probability that Subic and the Philippines would fall, leaving
the United States thereafter with no point of support for its fleet, and
giving to Japan the prestige of a decided initial success. "101
The hope of the Board planners was that the Congress would be
du^osed to provide for a two-ocean fleet which would present both
Germany and Japan with no rational basis for aggression. Lacking
this, the next best approach would be to fortify a base in the
Philippines to such an extent that the Japanese could not seize it
during '.^e period that Atlantic naval power was being transferred to
the Pacific. Neither of these goals were achieved during the period
under study, the German "threat" demanded continued priority over
the Pacific, and the only real foundation for the Board's Pacific
strategy was that the Japanese would not attack.
In the Spring of 1913, the actions of the California legislature,
c" ?cted at the passage of a law which would effectively deny to
Japanese aliens the right to own real property in California, and the
101. General Board Minutes, June 15, 1907, Vol. 3, p. 108.

Iconcomitant protestations by Japan, raised once more the question of
war. More than at any other time in the past, the General Board
seemed to think that conflict was a real possibility. It submitted a
I
memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy which listed a series of
I
steps to be taken "immediately" to prepare for war. Among these
were to dock all ships in the Atlantic fleet, concentrate all Asiatic
forces at Manila Bay, begin preparations to evacuate Guam on eight
hours notice, and to go on a twenty-four hour shift at the Washington
I
Naval Gun Factory. *^2 Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
listened attentively to the Board's urgent proposals but declined to
take any actions which would indicate to the public the alarm felt
"long the Board members. *0* A week later the Board urged the
Secretary to redeploy the fleet as a preventive measure in case war
were to break out, and as a deterrent to aggressive action on the part
of Japan. The principal movement the Board had in mind was to
mobilize the Atlantic Fleet at Guantanamo and prepare it tor imme-
diate dispatch to the Pacific. *^4 Acting Secretary of the Navy
Franklin D. Roosevelt approved of the General Board recommenda-
tion "in principle" but added that no action would be taken until the
President so directed. 105 Meanwhile President Woodrow Wilson
102. General Board Memorandum to Secnav, April 29, 1913,
General Board File 425.
103. Ibid.
104. General Board Minutes, May 7, 1913, Vol. 5, p. 89; Dewey
,
to Secnav, May 8, 1913, General Board File 425.
105. Memorandum to General Board from Commander N. L.
Jones, May 10, 1913, General Board File 425.
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too': stt;os to ease the tension and by June Dewey was able to express
relief that the "trouble with Japan" was over. 1Q 6
The "crisis" of 1913 found the General Board much better equipped
with specific war plans than in 1906. During the intervening seven
years, much effort was directed at developing and perfecting stra-
tegic schemes for guidance in the event of conflict with Japan. The
most advanced of these was the "Orange Plan" which was approved by
the General Board on April 29, 1913, -^ In this document the Board
set forth in great detail its estimate of Japanese strategy and the
plans which the United States should be prepared to execute to counter
that strategy. \
The Board's analysis indicated that war might break out as a
result of: trade rivalry in the Pacific between the United States and
Japan; racial antagonism; and population pressures within Japan
tending to a decision to acquire lebensraum in the Philippines. The
"apanese were characterized as a militaristic people who were con-
__
stantly ready for war and whose estimate of the United States' willing-
ness and readiness to fight was not much higher than their evaluation
of China. Ignorant of the capability of the American Navy, and
overly impressed with the invincibility of their own navy, the
Japanese could be easily led by ambitious leaders into the conclusion
10b. Dewey to son George, June 19, 1913, Dewey Collection,
Office of Naval History, Washington, D. C.
•07. General Board Minutes, April 29, X913, VoL 5, p c 76*

ihac war could be successfully undertaken again?: the United States.
Countering these tendencies was the realization that war would disrupt
their large trade with the United States, create demands on a national
treasury already drained by the war with Russia and sorely needed to
advencg internal well-being. However, the Board felt that if Japan
were eventually going to war with the United States, it would be in
their best interests to hasten its inception before the United States
increased its level of force and preparedness., fortified Guam, and
completed the Panama Canal, ™°
If the Japanese chose to initiate hostilities she would strike the
first blow, as she did in the Russo-Japanese War, without a formal
dc aration. *^ Further, because of the secrecy which surrounded
Japanese war preparations, her navy could be in the target urea,
fully ready on the day hostilities began. Japan was viewed as having
the capability to carry an effective campaign to the Philippines,
Gi>am, Kiska, Midway, and Tutuila, Samoa, although it would strain
her resources she also had the power to sealift four army corps to
Hawaii. While the United States was superior in the overall number
of large ships and guns, it was inferior in personnel, auxiliaries,
naval reserve, and general readiness for war, The most significant
103. War Portfolio No. 2, Reference No, 5-1, Orange War Plan,




initial advantage for Japan was her proximity to the area of expected
<_•(,. .oat. It would permit the Japanese Navy to command the seas of
the Western Pacific for an estimated 60 days v/'Uh a Panama Canal
and 104 days without it. 110
The Board felt that the Japanese would strike the* Philippines first,
destroy the ship support facilities at Subic Bay and Manila, and then
operate so as to deny the Islands to the transiting U. S. fleet by hold-
ing the principal strategic points,m As second priority, they would
occupy and fortify Guam so that the United States forces would not be
able to use it on their arrival in the Pacific without first expending a
substantial amount of effort to oust the Japanese. ***
Guam was considered by the Board one of the most strategic
positions in the Pacific. Properly fortified (this had not been done by
1914), and held by the United States, it could serve as an operating
base to harass Japanese lines of communications to the Philippines and
even .threaten the enemy's homeland. As a co 'inter-move, Japan would
have to divert a large proportion of strength from any attack on the
Philippines. Conversely, if Japan captured and fortified Guam, "it
would heavily handicap Blue [the United States] in any attempt to
establish and maintain a line of supply and communications across the
Pacific. "H3
110. War Portfolio No. 2, Reference No, 5-1, Orange War Plan,





113. Ibid., pp. 22-24.

It was also anticipated that Japan would attempt to seize Midway
Is_ .id and Kiska in order to advance her sea frontier across the
pacific in the direction of the likely American counter-thrust. *"
Keeping in mind that the primary objective of the Japanese was the
Philippines, the Board did not think that Japan v/ould undertake opera-
tions against Hawaii, the Panama Canal, Alaska mainland, or the
United States Pacific coast until the American fleet had been met and
decisively defeated. 115 -
The objective of the General Board counter- strategy was to
arrive in the "Western Pacific with a concentre :ed battle fleet clearly
superior to the Japanese Navy. H» Until this could be done, IT. S„
fc es present in the Far East on the outbreak of war.would have to
da their best to defend the Philippines against the Japanese attack.
Prospects for holding on were very aim, and it was thought that only
Correigidor would be able to survive until the fleet arrived from, the
Atlantic. *^ Guam, Midway, and Kiska would be defended only with
the light forces available to them. In the Board's estimate, "these
points must be primarily sacrificed by Blue, to be retaken later when
the forces are adequate. "118 Navy forces in the Eastern Pacific would
114. War Portfolio No. 2, Reference No. 5-1, Orange War Plan,







118. Ibid., p. 62.

iconcentrate at Hawaii to defend against the unlikelihood of a
.panese attack there, and to await the arrival of the Atlantic
Fleet.
119 '
The largest segment of U. S. naval power would sail from the
Atlantic when ready via the Panama Canal if completed, or via the
Magellan Straits if it were not. In either case this force would
proceed to San Francisco for repairs and provisioning, then steam
via Pearl Harbor and Midway to Guam. After capturing Midway and
Guam from the Japanese, the fleet would sail for the Philippines
-v.here it was expected the major and decisive engagement would take
place. The Board's diagrammatic presentation of the strategic
positions involved in its estimate is included on the following page.
The Board had the option of sending the fleet via the Cape of
Good Hope or the Suez Canal but rejected it because neutral ports
rlong either track would probably be denied to the ships. On the
other hand, the Magellan route offered the vast and friendly stretches
of coastliite along eastern and' western South America where it was
thought the Navy could find adequate coaling sites even without violating
the territorial waters of the Latin American countries. 120
In summary, the Board's war plan strategy against Japan was to
treat Hawaii as the defensive sea frontier, concentrate forces, then
gradually expand the frontier westward until the Japanese fleet was.
119. War Portfolio No. 2, Reference No. 5-1, Orange War Plan,










"1 < > ~
u — —» l—> £
" -> <— f-M *—
—t c z? T 2 P 3
1 Z M- M u C 3
— 2 c~ £ < *
~ £ 3" S3 O
— ?T ~ *-* c 3 O
O ""j ^" :> .^ o o QT il H» ~ 2* < 2 Zt
- - r> t— 3 C"
°*
E" =r 2. t— c* 3
*+
6
"> 3. 5 f - >! h
.— (J = c- t-
— o <— >-, a 'J c
'-: » o
_ i w «* ~»
•
"i S - j
X « u ~ < s
V V •J H- M •
"1 ^ • C. H- -'j
• — •
H 3 3 £
=r r- 5 c- h-
> 3 v< O
^*
a. t C* C-
» £L~ 3o p
a a a i £
Pen
a
<*• 3 ?. n £•















defeated and captured territory restored. The Board did not consider
in us Orange Plan the possibility of a two ocean war - Germany in the
Atlantic and Japan in the Pacific. The reason is clear: throughout
the period from 1900 to 1914 the Board was never confident that the
American Navy could handle one of the opponents, much less both at
the same time. But if the Board was given a choice of adversaries,




Captain Asa Walker, one of the charter members of the General
Board, wrote in 1900:
the modern man of war presents no canvas to the winds; with-
in her bowels is an insatiable monster whose demand is ever
for coal and still more coal . Every cubic inch of available
sp"ace is filled with fuel, and when this is consumed, the vast
machine becomes an inert mass. Coal then may be considered
as the lifeblood of the man of war, and upon its supply depends
her existence as a living factor in the battle equation* *
Wlaile Captain Walker emphasized the importance of coal, his
"insatiable monster" had other critical needs: ammunition; food,
supplies and repair facilities of many kinds to keep the complex
n.achinery and weaponry in operating condition; and drydocks to clean
the underwater hull of speed-retarding marine growth and to correct
deficiencies to normally inaccessible portions of the ship's structure.
The locations at which these requirements could be satisfied were
called bases and, needless to say, they have existed as long as
nations have had modern navies. They were a good deal more than
1. Captain Asa Walker, "The Battle of Manila Bay, " unpublished
mss". , Naval War College 1900, Naval War College Records,
Federal Record Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 24.
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j U st "coaling stations" for they had to provide much more than just
fuel. Further, they had to be strongly protected from an enemy attack;
otherwise the resources which they offered would invite their capture.
Their number, character, and location were matters of great strategic
- importance and largely determined the nature, scope and effectiveness
of the General Board's war plans prepared during the period from 1900
to 1914.
Prior to the territorial expansion of the 1890' s, all of the
American naval bases were located within the continental United
States. Ships cruising on distant stations relied mostly on foreign
facilities for their support - facilities which could be denied in the
mt the United States became engaged in a war. But the bases then
in existence seemed to many to satisfy the Navy's assumed mission
of commerce protection and coast defense. Any enemy would have to
chi <#»enge the U. S. Navy in its home waters where adequate shore-
based support was available.
This concept of local defense was questioned by the theories of
Captain Alfred T. Mahan. For him the real key to the defense of the
coast line was to confront the enemy on the high seas and destroy him
before his arrival in the home target area. Besides a navy existed
for much more than just coast defense. For him the great avenue of
progress was the sea for on it was carried the world's major com-
merce which, in turn, was the basis of a nation's wealth; however.

sea commerce depended on a strong merchant marine, access to
m^ .^ets abroad, and acquisition of colonies. These three elements
had to be protected by sea power and a system of far-flung bases.
Mahan's "colonies" were acquired as a result of the Spanish-
American War, and their protection by appropriate bases was no longer
a question of theory but of fact. Now the United States found its "coast-
line" extended many hundreds of miles in the Atlantic and many thousands
in the Pacific. The problem of where to locate seapower support facili-
ties at home and abroad to best advance U. S. interests was a large and
difficult one and it received a commensurate share of attention from the
Board members.
Secretary of the Navy John D. Long's initial letter of instructions
to the General Board had directed the members to study the Navy's
need for naval bases "at home, " in the newly acquired "dependencies, "
or --'herever hostilities might occur. * As was shown in Chapter II,
'his authorization eventually became the source for the first major
conflict between the bureaus and the Board since it brought the former
into competition with the Bureau of Equipment, the office which had
previously exercised almost exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of
base location. The Board's founders wanted to avoid conflict if pos-
sible because it might give cause to Secretary Long to cut short its
existence in the interests of internal harmony. ** It was for this
2. John D. Long to Admiral George Dewey, March 30, 1900,
General Board File 401.
3. Chapter II, p. 4 5ff.

reason that the Board's early naval base policy was marked by a high
do * ee of caution. While its members discussed the question of bases
repeatedly, there was a reluctance to offer any specific recommenda-
tions to Long. On April 17, 1900, the Board ranked Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba as the most important site for a naval base regardless of location,
however it was decided that the Secretary of the Navy should not be so
advised until he asked for an opinion. ^ By June of 1900 it had come to
a conclusion relative to a naval base in China but did not tell Long what
it was; instead he was advised that the information was available if he
desired it.
*
At the same time the Board made it clear to Long that the selec-
f-^n of naval bases was intimately connected with strategic considera-
tions, and he was requested to refer such questions to the Board prior
tj final decision. ° The Board's concern was that the recommendations
of the Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, Rear Admiral Royal B.
E adford, were not in keeping with the Navy's strategic necessities
and, if accepted, would be out of harmony with the war plans being
developed by the General Board.
Bradford's view of base requirements was significantly more
expansive and more attuned to the sensitivities of Congress than were
those of the General Board. For example, he wanted to protect Cuba
4. General Board Minutes, April 17, 1900, Vol. 1, p. 5.
5. General Board Minutes, June 29, 1900, Vol. 1, p. 20; Dewey
to Long, June 29, 1900, General Board Letterpress, Vol. 1,
p. 47.
6. Dewey to Long, June 27, 1900, General Board Letterpress,
Vol. 1, p. 44.

sand the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico with no less than three bases:
v West, Dry Tortugas, and Havana. His reasoning was based not
on strategy alone, but on the expectation that Florida Congressmen
would be more willing to lend their support to other projects if some-
thing were offered for their home districts. ? On the other hand the
Board, resting its case on strategic needs, thought Key West would
suffice.. ** Bradford thought it essential that first class naval bases be
established at such places as: Sitka, Liberia, the East and West
coast of South America, and the Galapagos Islands. ° The Board's
position was that the United States already had too many bases and
should not be encumbered with many more. It saw bases in terms of
their wartime function and were hesitant to go beyond what were con-
sidered to be realistic combat needs. Since the bases would be
useless if not defended, the members felt that an excess would over-
i
extend the Navy's resources; a preferable solution would be to rely on
commercial facilities in time of peace and a few bases and sea-going
colliers in time of war. *** *
Bradford's resistance to the Board's naval base policies con-
tinued until Secretary Long was succeeded by William H. Moody in
7. Captain Charles S. Sperry to wife, September 7, 1902, Sperry
Papers, Library of Congress.
8. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, General Board File
414-1.
9. General Board Minutes, June 19 to September 26, 1902, Vol.
1, pp. 187-209.
10. General Board Minutes, September 27, 1902, Vol. 1, p. 196;
Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, General Board File
414-1.

May of 1902. Moody, much more sympathetic to the Board's
Tuments than Long, settled the dispute by inviting the General Board
:o comment fully and freely on the question of naval bases. ^ This
action and Bradford's departure for sea duty a short time later re-
moved one of the principal obstacles which the Board encountered in
its expression of a naval base policy.
A greater source of difficulty remained and it came from Congress.
The Representatives quite naturally looked with favor on the presence
or prospect of a naval base within their district because, among other
things, it contributed to the economy. Conversely, they tended to view
with relative disinterest any expenditures in the overseas territories
l' v e Subic Bay in the Philippines or Guantanamo in Cuba. They were
concerned that the construction and use of expensive overseas dry-
docks - the sine qua non of a full-fledged naval base - would drain
away money which would otherwise be spent at home. This feeling
continued despite assurances from members of the General Board that
these docks would he used for only emergency repairs and would not
result in a diversion of funds normally flowing into the home yards. *^
The naval bases in existence in 1900 had been developed over a
period of more than a century in a naval environment of small ships.
11. Moody to Dewey, July 10, 1902, General Board File 414-1.
12. Testimony of Captain William Swift, U.S., Congress, House,
Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on Appropriation Bill
Subjects, 59th Cong. , lstsess., House Doc. No. 53,
(Washington, 1906), p. 468.

^ails, and a philosophy of coastal defense. The Board analyzed their
rowth as "largely governed by consideration of the moment and only
to a degree by those flowing from a reasoned policy of preparedness
and economy of national finances. "^ Their continued existence
seemed to be "as expediency, vested official interests and local
interests dictated, rather than on any comprehensive, well digested
plan following a policy looking to the best good of the whole nation. Ml^
The base at Kittery, Maine, (called "Portsmouth Navy Yard"
because of its location on Portsmouth Bay), was often cited with good
reason as an illustration of a strategical aberration produced by
purely political motives. Through the influence of Senator Eugene
Hale, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee and a Maine
jsident, and the acquiescence of many of the bureau chiefs, a tre-
mendous amount of money was poured into the Portsmouth activity
notwithstanding the General Board's consistent assertions that it was
not essential for the Atlaniic strategy. Despite the fact that there
was an adequate facility only 70 miles away at Boston, a drydock was
constructed at Kittery at a cost of over one million dollars; later a
channel had to be blasted at an expense of three-quarters of a million
dollars which, though permitting access to some ships, could still not
safely accommodate the large battleships then under construction. lo
13. Memorandum by Captain Harry S. Knapp, General Board
Member, September, 1913, General Board File 446.
14. Memorandum by Captain John Hood, General Board Member,
September, 1913, General Board File 446.
15. The Washington Post, February 5, 1915. This issue con-
tained an article written by George von L. Meyer, Secretary
of the Navy from 1909 to 1913.

The following dialogue between an economy-minded member of the
(.{«. e Naval Affairs Committee and the Chief of the Navy's Bureau of
Yards and Docks shows quite vividly the basis for the General Board's
frustration:
Mr. Lilley: What is the object of your spending any more
money on the Navy Yard at Portsmouth?
Admiral Hollyday: As long as we have a navy-yard there we
have to spend money on it.
Mr. Lilley: but how many battleships have ever been docked
there in the last ten years?
Admiral Hollyday: No battleship has ever been docked there,
Mr. Lilley: What is the object of a navy-yard there if you
cannot get to it with your ships?
Admiral Hollyday: The navy-yard is there. I don't know that
I can answer your question. 1°
Another powerful member of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee,
Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina used his influence to attract
large sums of government money to Port Royal, a place classified by '
the General Board as strategically valueless. Still, a drydock was
built there at a cost of three-quarters of a million dollars and barely
used. Finally, after a total of over two million dollars was expended
the site was abandoned. * * Tillman's comments with respect to these
appropriations were: "I am trying to get a little for Port Royal
because, if you are going to steal, I want my share. "18 After Port
16. U. S. , Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects , 60th Cong. , Istsess., House
Doc. No. 4, January 16, 1908, (Washington, 1908), pp. 214-
215.
17. The Washington Post, February 5, 1915.
18. North American Review, Philadelphia, April 20, 1909, copy
in General Board File 446.

Royal, another base was established to ensure a continuing source of
' ds to Tillman's constituency. A facility was built at Charleston
and, despite the Board's evaluation that this location was not essential
to Atlantic strategy, an expensive battleship drydock was constructed
which was, for all practical purposes, inaccessible to battleships
because of the difficult tidal conditions in the Charleston harbor. 19
The General Board had long urged that the bases at Pensacola
and New Orleans be closed and the money diverted to more critical
areas. It advised the Secretary of the Navy that those two areas
were "not strategically important" and the maintenance of bases there
was "a military extravagence. "^O In the last few weeks of his
incumbency. President Theodore Roosevelt authorized Secretary of
& trie Navy Truman H. Newberry to cut back on expenditures at
Pensacola and New Orleans. The resulting uproar prompted
Newberry's successor, George von L. Meyer to write that he was;
in full sympathy with the policy of only keeping up the Navy
Yards which are important and necessary, and of reducing
the expenditures to a minimum at the other yards; but this
order has raised a good deal of feeling in Louisiana and
Florida, and the commercial bodies, as well as citizens, are
on the backs of the Senators. ... It is very important to
have their good-will during the next four years in the support
of the Navy. 21
19. The Washington Post, February 5, 1915.
20. Dewey to Secnav, September 28, 1910, General Board File
404. For other statements to the same end see Dewey to
Secnav, October 2, 1906, February 24, 1909, both General
Board File 404.
21. Meyer to Theodore Roosevelt, March 8, 1909, cited in M. A,
DeWolfe Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer
,
(New York:
Dodd, Mead and Co. , 1920), pp. 462-464.

In the Board's opinion, the funds wasted in useless facilities could
ve been better spent on critically important projects to improve
conditions in the harbors which gave primary support to the battle
fleet. New York was one of these, but its channels, while allowing
battleships accessibility under normal tidal conditions, denied their
ingress (or departure) during periods of unusually low tides. Thus
the Texas was kept at her buoy for three full days awaiting favorable
water conditions. This situation was a source of serious concern for
the General Board, for in the event of war a sizable portion of the
Navy's assets could be kept from meeting the enemy or receiving
pre-battle repairs. While attempts were made to get Congressional
appropriations to correct the situation, Congress was slow to
respond and it took well over four years to rectify the problem. 22
The mis -aliocation of resources affected the U. S. West coast
as well. Since 1902 the Board had been consistent in its advocacy
of two first class bases: one at San Francisco and the other in Puget
Sound. 23 The increased attention focused on Japan after the Russo-
Japanese War made the Board even more sensitive to the strategic
importance of these two sites. Yet the Board found after nine years
of recommendations that neither base could adequately support the
H.eet for any prolonged period. 24 Docking capabilities were
22. Dewey to Secnav, December 13, 1915, General Board File
439.
23. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, Serial No. 284,
General Board File 414.
24. Dewey to Secnav, September 28, 1911, General Board File
404.

insufficient in both places, and the San Francisco base at Mare Island
d not have enough water to accept the larger ships. 25
The Board was able to draw some moral support for its outlook
of concentration of effort from members of the House Naval Affairs
Committee who declared in 1905:
too often in the past naval stations have been located at the
behest of local and political influence. The time has come
when naval stations should be located for the best interests
of the American Navy by men whose business it is to know
what the naval service demands. 2t>
The advice however went unheeded in practice and the Board continued
to see many of its recommendations fall prey to the conflict* between
strategy and politics, particularly those relating to overseas locations
where political leverage was at a minimum. The Board understood
the problem and declared that "it may not always be possible to
carry out the advisable military policy in regard to . . . shore naval •
establishments; but . . . such policy should be prepared and available
fc»r those concerned, as the ideal to be sought. "2
«
There were many opportunities for the General Board to depart
from its position that the number of bases be kept to a minimum. In
1904 a suggestion was made that the United States acquire the
Caribbean Islands of Curacao, Corn Island, St. Andrews, Old
25. Dewey to Secnav, January 29, 1908 and September 28, 1910,
General Board File 404.
26. House Naval Affairs Committee Report No. 905, February 11,
1904, published in Hearings on Appropriation Bill Subjects,
58th Cong. , 2nd sess. , (Washington, 1905), p. 13.
27. Dewey to Secnav, October 2, 1906, General Board File 414.

iOt
P-ovidence, Courtown, Alburqueque Key and Pearl Key to enhance
the defense of the Panama Canal. President Roosevelt asked for the
i
Board's opinion and it replied that the islands were of no use to the
I
United States either as bases or defense points for the canal. 2 ° In
I
the following year a proposal was made to develop sites for two
bases in Puerto Rico at Jobos Harbor and Rincon Bay. Again the
Board rejected the idea stating that it was undesirable to acquire any
more bases in the West Indes. Instead all "efforts and expenditures
in the region of the Caribbean should be concentrated toward the
a"
development of the Naval Station, Guantanamo. "29
Expansionists within and without the Navy had long cherished the
IL v_-.iapagos Islands as an element in the world-wide network of naval
bases. In 1899 both the U.S. minister to Ecuador and Rear Admiral
-
Bradford had strongly urged their acquisition. The Board announced
I
in 1903 that, while it could not look with favor on their transfer to
1
"any European power, lt 1t did not consider them desirable as the site
for a base. ^0 In 1908 a pair of excited dispatches were sent to the
I
State Department from the U. S. Ambassador in Ecuador reporting
on a German move to acquire the islands by commercial penetration. 31
One member of the General Board expressed the fear that the German
i
29. Dewey to Chief, Bureau of Navigation, May 27, 1905,
General Board File 404-3.
30. Memorandum concerning Galapagos, undated but circa 1908,
General Board File 429.
31. Secretary of State to Secnav, May 26, 1908, enclosing two
dispatches from the American Legation at Quito, copy in
General Board File 429.

actions bode ill for the security of the Isthmus and recommended that
the United States negotiate with Ecuador for the purchase of the
Galapagos to pre-empt German possession. 3 2 However, the majority
led by Rear Admiral John E. Pillsbury adopted the view that:
•
the use of the Galapagos Islands as a German naval base would
hardly be attempted while [the United States] holds the Isthmus
and if they [the Germans] should gain control
.
.'. they would
not need the Galapagos Islands for a base any more than the
United States needs them now.
Pillsbury concluded that the "exploitation" by the German syndicate
did not "warrant any feeling of unrest, " and "little harm" would ensue
| if the United States did not possess the islands. 33
On the other hand there were some sites in the Caribbean which
\
v ere not wanted as U. S. bases, but had sufficient merit to warrant
I
possession by a potential enemy. The Board did not want these places
to fall into German hands by political means. Thus it persuaded the
:
Secretary of the Navy to take "such diplomatic steps as may be needed
a
to insure
... not being surprised when war threatens by the sudden
cession or leasing" of all or part of the island of Haiti/Santo Domingo
"to any European power. "34 The Board considered this island to be
Particularly susceptible to political pressure because of the "feeble
and chaotic conditions" which existed there. The Board told the
32
*
Memorandum by Commander Joseph L. Jayne, June 23 1908*
General Board File 429.
33. Memorandum regarding the Galapagos Islands by Rear AdmiralJohn E. Pillsbury, June 23, 1908, General Board File 429
c54. Dewey to Secnav, December 18, 1900, General Board File 413

Secretary of the Navy that:
so important is the possession of this Island or its military
control, that if a foreign country should by a sudden surprise
obtain a foothold, at or just before the outbreak of war . .
.
,
it might easily cause what would otherwise be a short
campaign to grow into a long and extensive war. 35
When, in June 1914, the question as to the sovereignity of Swan
Island in the Caribbean was raised, the Board strongly urged that
the United States claim it, not because the Navy wanted it, but to
forestall any claim by a European government. 3 ° Similarly, the
purchase of the Danish West Indes was favored not as a base for the
American fleet but to keep it out of German hands. *
'
In view of the restraint exercised by the Board in their naval
base policy, it is surprising that in 1913 one of its members seriously
proposed the acquisition by the United States of all of Lower
California. Captain Harry S. Knapp wanted to take advantage of the
revolutionary disturbances then convulsing Mexico and "by purchase
or otherwise" take the entire area. He reasoned that this would
"remove for all time the possibility of any such enterprises on our
immediate flank as the one that brought forth the Lodge Resolution
during the last session of Congress. ..." He also desired to
utilize Magdalena Bay, which was included within the area, as a
35. Dewey to Secnav, December 10, 1903, General Board
Letterpress, Vol. 1, p. 109.
36. Rear Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, Senior Board Member
Present, to Secnav, June 12, 1914, General Board File 433.
37. Dewey to Secnav, December 10, 1915, General Board File
427.

Iwreat naval base. ^8 Knapp's letter was considered by the Board's
executive Committee briefly but never acted upon.
The General Board's recommendations on the subject of naval
bases were designed to effectively protect, project, and maintain
American seapower in the Western North Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico,
the Caribbean, and the Northern Pacific. ^9 Several basic criteria
were used in the selection process. Obviously the area had to be
available. Its location had to ensure a "sufficiently wide entrance to
permit exit in strong force, a deep and protected anchorage of large
extent, a capacity for ready and complete defense, and above all, a
geographic location suited to strategic demands. " ° The choice of
°ach base was also dependent on the location of others for the primary
function of a base was to increase the radius of action of the fleet. A
properly designed network of bases would act to extend the range of
seapower over great distances. This did not necessarily mean that
there had to be a continuous chain. Prior to the digging of the
Panama Canal, the preferred route to the Pacific in the event of war
lay through the vast expanse of water surrounding the shores of South
America. Yet the Board had never seriously considered the acquisi-
tion of bases along this track for it felt that American relations with
38. Draft letter from President, General Board to Secnav,
February 24, 1913, prepared by Captain Harry S. Knapp,
General Board File 439.
39. Memorandum by Captain John Hood, September, 1913,
General Board File 446.
40. Captain Asa Walker, "Notes on Cuban Ports, " unpublished
mss. (Naval- War College, 1900), Naval War College Records,
Federal Records Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa., Box 24.

South America, and the distances from the anticipated battle areas
'forded sufficient security.
The General Board's suggestion as to specific locations of bases
understandably varied during the period under examination but they
all finally pointed to these needs: two to three bases along the U. S.
Atlantic coast; one base in the Central Caribbean; one base in close
proximity to the Isthmian Canal; two bases athwart the U.S. Pacific
coast; and two to three bases in the Central and Western Pacific.
The Board members felt that the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf
of Mexico could best be controlled with first class bases at New
York and Norfolk. * Boston and Narragansett Bay had been included
in the early Board estimates but they were eliminated with the trend
toward concentration of resources. ^2 Key West had also been
classified as a "key strategic area" in 1902*^ but gradually
de-emphasized because the Board believed that the base at Guantanamo
and the opening of the Canal with a base in its vicinity would obviate
the need for any bases in the Continental United States south of Cape
Hatteras "from which to operate a fleet in case of hostilities in the
Atlantic Ocean. l '44
To maintain control in the Eastern Pacific, the Board consis-
tently took the view that full development of the bases at Puget
41. Hood Memorandum of September 1913, General Board File
446.
42. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, General Board File
414-1.
43. Ibid.
44. Dewey to Secnav, September 28, 1910, General Board File
404.

Sound and San Francisco would be required. 45
The first recommendation made by the Board for bases in the
vicinity of the Isthmian Canal were offered prior to the final selection
of the route. On the Caribbean side, the Board proposed a site with-
in the Almirante Bay-Chiriqui Lagoon area of Colombia (now the
I
Republic of Panama), which would apply regardless of the route. On
the Pacific side, two locations were suggested: the Pearl Islands if
the Panama route were selected; otherwise Port Elena in Costa Rica,
I
I close to the terminus of the Nicaraguan route.^
•The problem of protecting the Canal and its approaches loomed
I
I
i large in the minds of the Board members. They feared that with the
|
\ c itruction of the "Big Ditch" would come a scramble by user
k
rations for suitable territory in Colombia. In their opinion, there
was a strong analogy between the Isthmian Canal and the Suez, and
they expressed it to the Secretary of the Navy in this way:
nations whose interests are largely benefited by transit through
the Suez Canal, have, since the opening of that canal, acquired
not only new territory to command the canal in greater or less
degree, but they have also enormously strengthened their
original strongholds in the Mediterranean. Germany has
attempted to secure from the Porte the island of Farsan, in
the Red Sea, and has undoubted aspirations in Syria, where
s.he has gradually acquired great influence, especially at
45. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, General Board File
414-1; Dewey to Secnav, April 25, 1907, General Board File
420-1; Memorandum by Captain John Hood, September 1913,
General Board File 446.
46. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, General Board File
414-1; Dewey to Secnav, October 7, 1902, Serial No. 284,
General Board File 414.

Haifa; at the opportune moment she will act aggressively, and
it may be expected that Syria will ultimately be portioned
among various interested nations. 4 '
\ This analysis also suggested to the Board that it might be prudent for
I
[ the United States and Colombia to agree that the latter's "coast
I
r
territories and water be forever sequestered, as against all nations
I
except the United States. ..." The Board saw a parallel for this
action in the arrangements made between China and other foreign
i
l 48
nations establishing spheres of influence on Chinese territory. ° The
I
Secretary of the Navy endorsed these views and asked the Secretary
I






With^the decision favoring the Panama route and the acquisition
if' of defensible territory on either side of the waterway, the Board
decided that no bases in the area outside of U. S. sovereignty would
i
be needed. ™ Dewey and his officers thought it would be sufficient to
have a minor base at the Atlantic end and a first class naval base at
the Pacific terminus.
While the Board regarded all bases as essential to the support
I
of its strategy, the most critical were those on or close to the
!
expected battle frontier. As was shown in Chapter V, war plans were
47. Dewey to Secnav, October 7, 1902, Serial No. 284, General
Board File 414-1.
48. Ibid.
49. Moody to Secstate, November 21, 1902, General Board File
414.
50. Dewey to Secnav, April 12, 1906, General Board File 414-1.
51. Dewey to Secnav, September 28, 1910, General Board File
414.

I j al a against three enemies: Germany, Russia and Japan. The conflict
.a
I y, Lh Germany was anticipated in the Caribbean, and this factor, to-
I
aether with the many other American interest there, demanded a
I
strongly fortified naval base to ensure a viable United States naval
presence.
f
Before the Treaty of Peace with Spain, naval officers had
E
I
pondered the question as to bases in the Caribbean and decided that,
among other positions, a site would be needed in Cuba either at
| Santiago or Guantanamo to protect the strategically important
I
I
Windward Passage which lays astride the principal shipping lane
I between the North Atlantic and the Isthmus. ^2 Both areas were
I
r
- ^veyed by navy ships, and senior officers in the North Atlantic
w
Fleet were asked for their opinion. The overwhelming majority
I
I
favored Guantanamo, on the southeastern coast of Cuba, because it
[
was closer to the Windward Passage than Santiago, and had deeper
[
watc^, a better climate, was more readily defended, and permitted
easier egress in the event of a blockade. These officers felt that the
i
fate of the Spanish fleet, which had to sortie from Santiago through a
i
tortuous channel and a very narrow entrance, would never be
repeated at Guantanamo. °°
In the very first month the Board met, it decided that Guantanamo
52. Naval War Board Report, circa August, 1898, copy in
General Board File 414-1.
53. Dewey to Secnav, December 1, 1905, General Board File 406,

s the most important site for a naval base regardless of location, 54
but did not so advise Secretary Long until the following December
when he was asked to seek State Department approval of a scheme to
i
establish a base there "to defend Cuba, the Monroe Doctrine, and the
z
Isthmian Canal. " The Board also wanted "exclusive control" over an
J
* area of about 280 square miles of Cuban territory surrounding the
harbor. 55 Long concurred and so informed the State Department56
and the President. 57
The Board members realized that their desire for a base at
Guantanamo could not be immediately fulfilled because it depended
1
on negotiations with Cuba and congressional appropriations. Pressed
IL di by a fear of unreadiness to respond to a German attack in the
F
Caribbean, the Board urged Long to establish an interim stronghold
at Culebra, which lay within U. S. jurisdiction and was located
I




a naval base in the full sense but rather an "advance base, " relying
chiefly on mobile as opposed to permanently fixed defenses; further-
more, it would possess no significant repair facilities. In addition
to its function as a temporary base pending the development of
Guantanamo, it would also serve as a forward position for the fleet,
close to the edge of the Caribbean Sea through which the German
54. General Board Minutes, April 17, 1900, Vol. 1, p. 5.
55. Dewey to Long, December 17, 1900, General Board File 406.
56. Secnav to Secstate, December 21, 1900, General Board File
406.
57. Lone to McKinley, February 7. 1901. General Board File 406.

tlips would have to pass enroute to their target. 58 On the recom-
.^ndation of the Board, Secretary Long advised President Roosevelt
of Culebra's importance, and the latter issued an executive order in
December of 1901 assigning the island to Navy Department control. ^9
In November of 1901, Dewey again expressed the Board's
V.
£>
predilection for Guantanamo in these words:
I
a campaign based upon the Windward Passage, at a stronghold
such as Guantanamo, would be the most reasonable and logical
method of combatting a powerful enemy coming from continental
Europe and having as his objective [the] isthmian canal or the
occupation of South America. ^0
As the time for settlement of base rights in Cuba drew closer,
I
the Board continued to express a preference for Guantanamo but with
W the proviso that the area of control be large enought to encompass the
high hills surrounding the harbor, for it these strong points were
beyond the U. S. perimeter, they would invite enemy seizure and
I fil
challenge the security of the base. Di The tentative lease agreement
drawn up before the negotiations called for a total of approximately
280 square miles, about five times the amount finally agreed to.
The Cuban negotiator, President-elect Tomas Estrada Palma
resisted on the basis that the Cuban people would never consent to the
58. Dewey to Secnav, August 21, 1901, General Board File 411.
59. Executive Order issued December 17, 1901, copy in General
Board File 411; Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowninshield to
Secnav, September 26, 1901, General Board File 411.
60. Dewey to Secnav, November 12, 1901, General Board File
4-27.
61. Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, Senior Member Present of
the General Board to Secnav, March 24, 1902, General

cession of so great an amount of territory. The boundaries proposed
jy the General Board would have placed a Cuban fort and a small
town within the area of American jurisdiction. It would also have
assured the Navy a good source of fresh water. The Palma objections
were acceded to by the Secretary of State John Hay and the final base
limits excluded the high points surrounding the station and the fresh
water resources. 62 Nevertheless Guantanamo, even with these
restrictions, continued as the Board's overwhelming choice as the
principal naval base in the Caribbean.
The successful attack by the Japanese on Port Arthur in January
of 1905, brought about partially by the capture of high ground over-
looking the Russian base, created a stir within naval circles about
|R the defensibility of Guantanamo. It also had dominant hills surrounding
the harbor, they were in Cuban territory, and could, in the view of
some, be easily captured, thus turning Guantanamo into an American
Port Arthur. 63 There were SQme moyes ^.^ ^ ^^ ^ ^ ^
Port Arthur experience as an argument to abandon Guantanamo as the
|
locale of the principal Caribbean base and instead locate the main
[
bastion at Chiriqui Lagoon near the Atlantic terminus of the Canal. 64
|
The Board fought this movement; Dewey warned that "to withdraw the
62. Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor to Secnav, November 25 1902General Board File 406; Memorandum by Captain William
Swift March 1904, General Board File 406; Captain John EPUlsbury to Dewey, September 27, 1906, General Board File
63. Robley D. Evans, An Admirals Log
. (New York and London-D. Appelton and Co. , 1910).
64. Dewey to Secnav, February!, 1905, General Board File 406.

main defense and resources to Chiriqui, and abandon the broad
haven of Guantanamo to the invader, would be to invite and deserve
disaster. " 65 Although he asserted that the "time for discussion has
past, " he offered what was to the Board another cogent reason for
remaining in Guantanamo: the defense of Cuba as undertaken in the
Piatt Amendment. 66 These arguments were sufficient to reassure
Secretary of the Navy Paul Morton, and he fully endorsed them. 67
Morton's action preserved Guantanamo' s role in the General
Board's strategy, but there still remained the problems of expanding
the base perimeter and persuading Congress to appropriate large
enough sums to make the area an effective instrument of seapower.
T Board members still felt that somehow these deficiencies could
be overcome, and so convinced were they of Guantanamo' s strategic
worth that in the midst of the Japanese "crisis" of 1906, when all
eyes were turned eastward, they declared that Guantanamo was of
"first importance" to the "fleet and to the country, " for it was the
"only Naval Station in [the] most likely, and only probably theater of
war. Despite these expressions of optimism and faith in the
strategic significance of Guantanamo, neither of the two difficulties
were solved to the Board's satisfaction.




Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects, House Doc. No. 62, 58th
Cong., 3rdsess., (Washington, 1905), p. 504.
68. Dewey to Secnav, October 2, 1906, General Board File 404.

As Senior Member of the Joint Board, Admiral Dewey had asked
in -..arch of 1907 that the State Department undertake negotiations
with Cuba looking to the expansion of the Guantanamo perimeter so as
to embrace the high ground and an adequate fresh water supply. 69
However the diplomats were reluctant to begin talks because the
American occupation of Cuba at the time would have put the United
States in the "anomalous position" of negotiating with itself. 70 Later,
when this condition no longer obtained, the State Department directed
the American Minister at Havana to begin conversations with the
71
Cubans. However the Cuban representatives were reluctant to
agree to the proposals for it would "excite recrimination and hard
fep^ng" within the country. 72 The question was raised once again in
'1910 but sweetened insofar as the Cubans were concerned with the
concurrent offer to return the naval base concession granted in 1903
for Bahia Honda, about 40 miles west of Havana. The General Board
had never been impressed with the importance of this bay, and very
little had been done to develop it into a naval facility. 73 Although a
69. Memorandum by Dewey, March 25, 1907, General Board
File 406.
70. Elihu Root, Secstate to Secnav, April 6, 1907, cited in Secnav
to Secstate, July 13, 1909, copy in General Board File 406.
71. Alvey A. Adee, Acting Secstate to Secnav, July 17, 1909,
File 4631/11-12, General Board File 406.
72. Frederick Dearing, U.S. Charge d'affaires at Havana to
Secstate, No. 1093, September 16, 1909, attached to letter
from Adee, Acting Secstate to Secnav, September 27, 1909,
File No. 4631/13-14, General Board File 406.
73. John B. Jackson, American Minister to Cuba to Secstate,
August 27, 1910, No. 309, copy in General Board File 406.

draft treaty was made with this provision included which seemed to
t
sfy emissaries of both governments, the Cuban Senate failed to
give its approval and the agreement was never implemented. ^^
The usual reluctance with which Congress greeted proposals to
finance extra- territorial bases applied to Guantanamo. Funds were
provided but never with the rapidity, consistancy, or largesse which
was felt necessary by the General Board. A drydock, which was
considered an essential component of a first class naval base, was
begun in 1904, but owing to a shortage of money, its construction
was halted and never resumed prior to 1915. " The feeling in
Congress was that Guantanamo's significance was minor until the
Panama Canal was completed; so why finance projects which could
fyvell be delayed a few years. The Army which was responsible for
'•fixed fortifications at Guantanamo was not particularly eager to press
Congress for money since there was not much there in the way of
physical equipment to protect. • ' On the other hand, there were
those in the Navy Department who saw little sense in pumping
1 resources into Guantanamo unless the Army first installed fortifications
74. U. S. , Department of State, Diplomatic History of tiie United
States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, 1901-1904, "
- • Research Project No. 441, (Washington, 1906), p. 28.
75. Dewey to Secnav, October 8, 1908, General Board File 406;
Rear Admiral Marion Murphy, The History of Guantanamo
Bay, (U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: District
Publications and Printing Office, Tenth Naval District, 1953),
p. 10.
76. Secretary of War, Luke E. Wright to Secnav, October 31,







!- guarantee their security. <o In 1914, the Assistant Secretary of
\
|
£ ihe Navy sent a memorandum to all appropriate offices in the Navy
ft
Department asking them to reassess the problem with a view to
abandoning Guantanamo, limiting its role to providing refuge for the
I
fleet in the winter, or getting on with its full development. Nothing
came of this plea and, as late as 1916, with the General Board as
impressed as ever with its importance, a Navy Department ad hoc
board reported that Guantanamo was "totally inadequate to fill the
f
functions of an operating base of the Atlantic Fleet . . . and may,
I
therefore, be considered of negligible importance. . . . " 7 ^
The second of the three anticipated battle frontiers was in North
L ^.aina, and it remained a factor in the Board's strategic thinking until
after the change in the power equation produced by the Russo-
Japanese War. Prior to this conflict, the Board anticipated that the
most probable theatre of operations in which U. S. naval forces
might become engaged was in the area bounded by the Yellow Sea, the
Japan Sea, and the Gulf of Pechili. ^0 in addition to the responsibili-
ties connected with the protection of U. S. citizens and property in
that part of Asia, the Board felt that the Navy might be called on to
face Russia in a war precipitated by the divergent Great Power
78. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secnav memorandum of
June 9, 1911, General Board File 406.
79. Extract from Report of Board examining the future develop-
ment of Guantanamo Bay, attached to letter Dewey to Secnav,
December 2, 1916, General Board File 406.
80. Dewey to Secnav, November 25, 1903, General Board File
408-1.

interests and policies in China. The Philippines could not, in the
Board's view, adequately support operations that far north; therefore
-
la fortified base, close to the troubled area and under the complete





The decision as to a site was made in June of 1900, but not
I
* formally communicated to Secretary Long until the following October t
i
The members wanted the base located at Sam Sa, Fukien Province
i
Ivith the second and third choices Nam Kwa, Fukien and Bullock
I
82
: Harbor, Chekiang Province. The settlement with China over the
I Boxer rebellion seemed an opportune time to seek the concession
; an accordingly, the Board recommended that the State Department:
obtain for the United States the free and exclusive use of Sam
Sa Bay in Fo Kien [Fukien] province as a naval port with the
additional pledge that a circular zone 20 sea miles in radius
and wit.* the center at the eastern point of Crag Island shall
not, in the future, be alienated, controlled, or used in any
way by any other power and that the Chinese Government




The U. S. Minister at Peking advised Secretary of State John Hay that,
because of the Boxer negotiations, it would be inappropriate to raise
the base question, and he suggested that the matter be deferred until
81. Dewey to Secnav, June 27, 1900, General Board Letterpress
Vol. 1, p. 42.
82. General Board Minutes, June 29, 1900, Vol. .1, p. 20.
83. Dewey to Secnav, October 10, 1900, General Board Letter-
press Vol. 1, p. 81.

c rcumstances were more favorable.
84 Hay did however ask the
nerican representative in Tokyo to sound out the Japanese on Sam
Sa since it lay within their sphere of influence. Japan replied that
, ;i e could not agree with the U. S. proposal. 85
This eliminated Sam Sa but not the need, and, in November of
\
t
; .01 the Board asked that steps be taken to acquire the Chusan Island
I
| ^ o'a
£roup near the mouth*of the ir angtse River. 00 The State Department
E
declined to take any action, not only because it would have been incon-
I
.- .stent with the Open Door Policy, but more importantly since it
would have required the acquiescence of one or more of the other
I
i 07
Great Powers, a most improbable prospect.' Undaunted, the Board
newed its request in September of 1902 for a base in the Chusans
1
"in view of the probability that the theatre of operations" would be in
.: North. 00 It asked that "persistent efforts" be made in this direc-
tion even though the members knew that the Chusan area was situated
v.: thin « the British sphere of influence, and that an Anglo-Chinese
s
%
Treaty barred China from granting leases to third powers without
1
the concurrence of Great Britain. Dewey and his officers felt that
the general concurrence of U. S. -British policy in the Far East might
s —
84. Edwin H. Conger to John Hay, November 23, 1900, cited in
William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific,
1897-1909
,




86. Arent S. Crowninshield to Secnav, November 27, 1901,
General Board File 408-1.
87. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909,
p. 132.
88. Dpwpv tn f>Pr>nav .^onto-mKo-r* *3A 1QHO n«~«>.-.l "D~~~J T?l 1 ~

L . '"actor in convincing Great Britain to yield such permission. 03
WD'-'
'
j.*. , in the past, the Board's position was adopied by the Secretary of
U •> Xavy, but never executed because of overriding diplomatic
I
hi. faculties.
The final request of the Board for a base in China was made
!
iiust a lev/ short months before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
RVar.
J The onset of that conflict, the reluctance of the State Depart-
I
[xr.ent to accede to past requests, the aim of the United States to main-
lain an attitude of strict neutrality, all contributed to the Board's
j
I
ecision to drop its demands for a base in China. With the defeat of
>
Russia, the Board no longer saw the need for a protected position in
Noi China, and it felt that any operations incidental to the protection
S
jp
o:' U. S. citizens would be supportable from the foreign ports tradi-
tionally available to U. S. naval forces. On the remote chance that
[emergency conditions did arise which demanded a base, the Marines
t
Stationed in the Philippines could be used to seize and lightly fortify
i 91
lone. Thus in April of 1906, Admiral Dewey advised Secretary of
1
i
the Xavy Charles J. Bonaparte that a base on the China coast was no
I
longer required. ^ 2
89. Dewey to Secnav, October 7, 1902, General Board File 414.
90. Dewey to Secnav, November 25, 1903, General Board File
408-1.
!. Dewey to Secnav, August 13, 1906, General Board File
408-2.
92. Dewey to Bonaparte, April 12, 1906, Gener.?! Board File
". 414-1.

One of the most controversial questions which faced the General




I of the principal naval base in the Far East. The site in China was not
I
.supposed to meet all of the needs of the Asiatic Fleet; it was never
I
Or
anticipated that it would contain drydocks or major repair facilities,
but was to be much like Culebra in the Caribbean - an advanced
I
fortified position from which men-of-war could operate with a
reasonable degree of safety. A more critical requirement was for a
first class naval arsenal akin to Guantanamo in the Caribbean or
Gibraltar in the Mediterranean, and it was logical to assume that it
should be located on the rim of the American Pacific frontier in the
I
i ..ilippines. The point of contention was not that there should be a
I
| fully equipped and fortified base in these islands but rather the best
location for it.
Dewey was one of the first to offer an opinion: three months after
|
his victory at Manila Bay and eighteen months before he assumed the
presidency of the General Board he informed Secretary Long:
about sixty miles from Manila, and to the northward and west-
ward is Subic Bay, decidedly the best harbor in the Philippines,
having no equal as a coaling station or naval and military base.
The entrances are narrow, the shores bold, the water deep,
the bay land-locked, easily defended from attack by sea or land,
and the fresh water supply ample? 3
93. Dewey to Long, August 29, 1898, Dewey Papers. It is of
interest to note that the Spanish held Subic in the same high
regard for they had planned to erect a first class naval base
there. Dewey, to Secnav, June 15, 1903, General Board File
405.

Immediately after the Board was organized, it reviewed the






location on the island of Guimaras in the central Philippines
oirjosite the city of Ilo Ilo. ^4 This decision appears to have been based
• rimarily on a study made by Lieutenant John M. Ellicott of the Naval
I
Y, r College. Although he considered Subic Bay to be superior to
c
samaras from many viewpoints, the latter was deemed preferable
I because it had one more egress than Subic. »5 Also, and perhaps
i
w-aluenced by Ellicott' s arguments, the 1900 Summer Conference at
the Naval War College concluded that Guimaras was "the most
r important point strategically in the Philippine Islands, both as a
1 base and as best capable of defense. "96
Despite the fact "that in a later document the Board termed the
choice of Guimaras as "tentative, " it was convinced to such an extent
that it recommended the President issue executive orders assigning
i'* 1
. island to naval jurisdiction and authorizing an appropriation of
$i0, 000 for a survey of the area. * ' Secretary Long concurred^
and the President issued two orders implementing the Board's
recommendations. ^9
94. Dewey to Secnav, June 27, 1900, General Board File 404-1.
95. General Board Minutes, June 26, 1900, Vol. 1, p. 15;
General Board Letterpress Vol. 1, p. 14.
96. Naval War College, "Solution to the Problem of 1900, "
Appendix C, Naval War College Records, Federal Records
Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 45.
97. Dewey to Secnav, June 27, 1900, General Board File 404-1.
93. Secnav to President, July 12, 1900, General Board File 404-1,
99. Executive Orders signed by President McKinley, August 2,
1900. copies in General Board File 404-1.

}3ccause there was doubt in some circles as to the wisdom of the
uuimaras selection, Secretary Long appointed a board of officers in
-
i October of 1900 to re-examine the question and to make appropriate
u -f<*estions to him. 1UU This board, under the chairmanship of Rear00
A ;miral George C. Remey, reported a unanimous preference for
Subic Bay; ^l Guimaras was considered but rejected because of its
strong currents, poor anchorage ground, and a shortage of potable
| water.
iU ^
The report was referred to the General Board for comment and,
in a much more cautious and deliberate fashion than occasioned the
choice of Guimaras, the Board, after several months of study,
pressed concurrence with Remey's findings and stated that a
"strong naval base" should be established at Subic Bay. ^^
The Board's opinion did not agree with Admiral Bradford's con-
viction that Manila was a much better place for a base. He had also
expressed preference for Havana over Guantanamo because he thought
I
tae most important consideration in locating a naval facility was to
•ave it close to a commercial center and the many resources which
-
it offered. 104 On the other hand the Board was more impressed with
100. U.S., Congress, House, Report of a Commission on the
Establishment of a Naval Station in the Philippines, 57th





, p. 3, 6.
103. Dewey to Secnav, September 26, 1901, General Board File
405.
104. General Board Minutes, June 19, 1902 to September 26.

importance of strategic position and defensibility; it felt that
Manila could be more easily defended if the naval base were removed
•"rem its environs. With the two close together, "an attack on one
would be an attack on both; with the station at Subic, Manila could not
be attacked until Subic was reduced. "105 The desire of the Board to
separate bases from population centers may have been also predicated
on a fear that the fleet might thereby be forced into a coast defense
I
role (as had been the case with the Spanish in 1898), rather than
I
I
engaging the enemy armada at sea. Another factor in the decision to
i
keep out of Manila was revealed by Captain William Swift, a General
-
Board member, when he told the House Naval Affairs Committee:
if the United States should ever cede to the Philippine
Government the control of those islands we would find ourselves
(if we were at Cavite [Manila Bay]) in the same position that we
found ourselves in Habana when Cuba objected to our retaining
the naval station in that port. They were perfectly willing to
give us a naval station on the south coast of Cuba at a point
where there is no large town. ... If we were at Cavite and
such a change were to occur our position' would be untenable
and w"e would be obliged to give it up. If we were located at
Olongapo [Subic], at a place where there was no important
town or political interest in the islands, our position would be
one which we could maintain very much better. 106
The Secretary of the Navy agreed with the Board's reasoning, and
i
in ^.ovember of 1901 the navalization of Subic Bay became, in theory at
105. Dewey to Secnav, June 15, 1903, General Board File 405.
106. U. S. , Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects, 59th Cor?£
,,
1st sess. , House
Doc. No. 53, (Washington, 1906), p. 471.

n!,-jast, a firm, tenet of naval policy. *"' The efforts of the General
Board from then until 1907 were directed largely at accelerating what
to it was a painfully slow build-up in the area. In 1903 Admiral
Dewey reminded the Secretary that Subic was and should be the pri-
mary American base in the East* " and, reflecting on his experience
during the Spanish- American War, said that if the Spanish Fleet had
been at Subic, (as he had fully expected), instead of Manila, and had
it been properly defended, his victory "would have been much more
difficult. "109 That same year the Board offered the following
geopolitical formula: who holds Subic holds Manila; who holds Manila
iiolds Luzon; and who holds Luzon holds the Philippines. HO
resident Theodore Roosevelt was also a believer in Subic, and he
advised Congress in December of 1903 that "the national interests
require that the work of fortification and development of a naval
station at Subic Bay be begun at an early date. "HI
Up until December of 1903 the consideration of Subic as a base
was confined almost exclusively to naval officers, but with the
formation of the Joint Army and Navy Board and the Army General
Staff, Army officers began to address the problem. Their early
107. Long to President Roosevelt, November 9, 1901, General
Board File 405.
108. Dewey to Secnav, June 8, 1903, General Board File 405.
109. Dewey to Secnav, June 16, 1903, General Board File 405.
110. Dewey to Secnav, June 15, 1903, General Board File 405.
111. Message to Congress, December 7, 1903.

-^elusions confirmed the importance of Subic Bay, Brigadier
jeneral G. L. Gillespie rejected Manila because it would have re-
jired the expenditure of vast sums to construct an artificial harbor.
«-
le was instrumental in drafting the Joint Board position that any more
delay in the fortification of Subic and its development as a naval base
i would be "nothing less than a national disaster. "112
Another inter- service group called the National Coast Defense
ISoard or Taft Board, was studying the coast defense requirements of
United States territory, and it ranked Subic with Guantanamo as the
two foremost strategic areas under U. S. control, and the keys to the
•i I




Although up through 1904 the best military opinion seemed dis-
posed to Subic, Congress was reluctant to produce the money to give
i
effect to the plans. A majority of the members of the House Naval
Affairs Committee decried the indecision of their fellow Representa-
I
* •
tives and remarked that "it would seem almost criminal negligence
on the part of Congress not to provide a naval station where our
112. Brigadier General G. L. Gillespie to Chairman, Joint
Board, December 13, 1903, enclosure to Dewey to Secnav,
March 4, 1907, General Board File 405; Chairman Joint
Board (Dewey) to Secwar and Secnav, December 19, 1903,
General Board File 405.
113. U.S., Congress, Senate, Coast Defense of the United States
and the Insular Possessions
,
59th Cong,
, 1st sess. , Senate
Doc. No. 248, (Washington, 1906), p 8 26.

-•ps could be docked and repaired. "114 Secretary of the Navy
§
Moody hoped to ease the shortage of funds and to increase Subic's
X.
$
-eadiness by directing the transfer of naval assets from Manila to
i
1 : k- 115I Mjbic.
In mid- 1904 the inter-service and intra-service harmony which
prevailed as to the Subic site was interrupted by two dissonant
I
opinions: one by Major General Leonard Wood, a friend of Theodore
Roosevelt, and Governor of Moro Province in the Philippines; the
other by Rear Admiral William Folger, Commander of the
I
I
Philippine Squadron of the United States Asiatic Fleet. Wood told the
President that the development of Subic would be a "colossal mistake"
i v/ould become the "subject of serious regret in the future." He
I
viewed the function of the fleet in terms of coast defense, and he
wanted it to take "refuge behind the defenses of Manila 1^ so that it
could help prevent the capture of the city, its large population,
. .
.




Admiral Folger, after consulting with General Wood, wrote the
Secretary of the Navy the very same day that Wood wrote Roosevelt;
114. U.S. Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee,
Hearings on Appropriation Bill Subjects, House Report No.
905, February 11, 1904, 58th Cong. , 2nd sess. , (Washington,
1905), p. 11.
115. Secnav to All Bureaus and Offices, Serial No. 17628-1,
April 2, 1904, General Board File 401-1.
116. Wood to Roosevelt, June 1, 1904, General Board File 404-1.
117. Wood to Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, February 21, 1922,
Strauss Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection,
Library of Congress.

rie described Subic Bay as a "rat trap" and argued for a concentration
of effort in the Manila area.
**°
Beginning about the same time as Wood and Folger, Major
Charles Doyen of the Marine Corps, then stationed at Subic, used his
friendship with Representative Alston G. Dayton, a powerful membeV
of the House Naval Affairs Committee, to plant seeds of doubt within
Congress as to the best location for the base. On April 23, 1904 he
wrote Dayton that Subic seemed "beyond a doubt the most suitable
place for a Naval Station. ..." Just ten days later he reported a
change of mind and advised against spending money to develop Subic.
Instead he would do as Wood and Folger recommended: focus the
.nds at Manila. * In the following October he accused the General
Board of giving "misinformation" on Subic and of being "base crazy, "
He suggested that the General Board members did not really believe
in Subic but were afraid to alter their position because they were
attempting to get congressional recognition as an advisory board,
and to admit of a blunder" would have prejudiced their cause. Doyen's
real motives in advocating Manila over Subic may have been due to
the primitive conditions existing in the latter place. He wrote Dayton
118. Folger to Secnav, June 1, 1904, General Board File 404-1.
119. Major Charles Doyen to Alston G. Dayton, April 23 and
May 3, 1904, Dayton Papers, University of West Virginia
Library, Morgantown, West Va.

if they intend to keep this force out here something should be
done at once to improve their conditions; the climate, food
and lack of diversion are bad enough but when they have not
the ordinary comforts of life; when you see day after day 650
fine soldiers as can be found in the world cooped up in
shacks, 103 to each room of the size and suitable and appro-
priate for 50 animals, (i.e. 100 ft x 30), walking anywhere
from 1/8 to i/4 of a mile three times a day to their meals, in
a torrent of rain and mud for three months: it gives me a
heavy fit of disgust. I don't care so much about the officers
though we are none too well off but I do for the men, and I put
myself on record as saying right now that I am at odds with
this. 120
In response to requests from the President and the Secretary of
the Navy for comments on the discordant views regarding Subic Bay,
the Board reiterated its earlier position and concluded that:
the fundamental and conclusive reason in favor of Subic Bay
and against Manila Bay is the fallacy of concentrating the
means of the mobile naval defense at the center of attack, --
as if a boxer should try to defend himself by holding his fists
against his own breast. 121
Presided Roosevelt was impressed with the Board's reasoning and
| told Admiral Dewey he thought it "conclusive. nl 22
The almost universal faith in Subic 's importance continued to far
exceed its material development. The Board complained in 1905 that
the most basic naval resources - coal - was in critically short supply;
five years earlier it had recommended that 200, 000 tons be stored
120. Doyen to Dayton, October 11, 1904, Dayton Papers.
121. Dewey to President, August 4, 1904; Dewey to Secnav,
August 6, 1904; both General Board File 404-1.
122. Roosevelt to Dewey, August 5, 1904, General Board File
404-1.

rhore, yet only 13, 000 was on hand due to a shortage of funds.
| Docking facilities were non-existent until 1906 when the floating
dock Dewey was moored in the harbor. Its usefulness was demon-
I
strated by the fact that in less than two years it was used 57
times. 124 A dock such as the Dewey did not however make a naval
f
base: a floating dock is far less flexible than a land dock; fixed
fortifications were practically absent; and all of the many other
components essential to a naval base were still sorely lacking.
The General Board hoped that a visit to the Philippines in 1905
by Secretary of War William Howard Taft and Chairman of the House
Naval Affairs Committee George E. Foss would serve to remove
itever doubts remained over Subic and to speed its lagging
* development. Admiral Dewey warned Mr. Foss that he would
encounter prejudice against Subic, *^5 ancj ^e alerted officers in the
Far East who were of the Board's persuasion to do their best to
Counter it during the visit. 126 Dewey began to suspect that those
who opposed his views on Subic were motivated by a concern for
"society features"^" aj^ the "conveniences of comfortable barracks,
well filled supply houses, capacious offices, and the attractions of a
128
city. " Dewey's presumption was shared by others: Lieutenant
123. General Board Minutes, March 29, 1905, Vol. 2, p. 155.
124. Memorandum from Rear Admiral Washington L. Capps to
Dewey, March 23, 1908, General Board File 420-5.
125. Dewey to Foss, June 26, 1905, Dewey Papers.
125. Dewey to Sargent, June 27, 1905, Sargent Papers.
127. Dewey to Sargent, October 13, 1905, Dewey Papers.
128. Dewey to Rear Admiral Willard H. Brownson, February 1,

Commander Philip Andrews told Congress that the opponents of Subic
would never say so officially but their real desire to remain in Manila
was to savor "its comfortable feelings; "129 Rear Admiral Robley D.
Evans wrote that "the attractions of the Army and Navy Club at
Manila and the pleasures of social life in the city are in strong
contrast with the isolation of Olongapo [Subic], and they have
undoubtedly had their effect. " 130
The visit of Taft and Foss did not result in the advancement of
Subic Bay for they returned to the United States more inclined towards
131
Manila. The appropriation bill debated in the Spring of 1906
reflected this decision by providing that none of the money designated
- insular fortifications would be spent at Subic. Admiral Dewey
tried to muster enough opposition to defeat this exclusion by
appealing to President Roosevelt to exercise his influence among the
Senators. Ironically, Senator Eugene Hale was one who favored
Subic, and Dewey thought if Roosevelt worked with Hale, a sufficient
number of Senators could be brought into the Subic camp. According
to a diary' entry made immediately after the occurrence, Roosevelt
refused to go along because he did not want to be "on the same side
as Hale. "132
129. U.S., Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects , 59th Cong. , 1st sess.
,
House Doc. No. 53, (Washington, 1906), p. 500.
130. Evans, An Admirals Log, p. 301.
131. House Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings, House Doc. No.
53, (Washington, 1906), p. 472.
132. Mrs. George Dewey's Diary, March 17, 1906, Dewey Papers.

The Japanese-American "crisis" of 1906-1907 generated a flow
of correspondence between the Board and the Secretary of the Navy
and impelled the former to advise for the first time since the demise
of the Russian "menace" that war was "not improbable" with "an
Asiatic power" which possessed a fleet superior to that which the
United States could maintain in the Far East. The Board added that
Japan would, because of the absence of an "impregnable American
biise" in the Western Pacific, have the Philippines at its mercy
during the three months then estimated as the lengthof time needed
to transfer the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific. In the meantime the
enemy would have so reduced the support facilities for the fleet that
*e long voyage might just as well never have begun. 133 ^^q Board's
despondency was shared by President Roosevelt. He called the
Philippines the American "heel of Achilles" and gave some con-
sideration to announcing an intention to give the islands their




Again in June of 1907 the Secretary's attention was called to the
'present necessities" in the Pacific, and he was told that if war took
place it would be essential to have a protected base in the Philippines
for:
133. Dewey to Secnav, March 4, 1907, General Board File 405.
* Secnav endorsed this view in his letter to the Secretary of
War of same file and date.
.134. Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907, Elting E. Morison, ed.
,
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1952), Vol. 5, p. 762.

capability of defense is an essential, not only for the purpose of
allowing our fleet to seek that of the enemy in case our naval
force should be the predominating one, but it is even more im-
portant in the event that the outbreak of war finds us with an
inferior force which must be sheltered until the arrival of a
reinforcement. lc* 5
; The Board reminded the Secretary that the Subic Bay site had been
accepted by "weight of overwhelming authority, nl 36 and, as if to g^ve
emphasis to its weakness, requested that he dispatch four submarines
-
10 Olongapo to help defend the floating dock Dewey since there was
"no land defense worthy of the name at Subic Bay. "^
'
The Army interest in Subic Bay was based on its responsibility
r'or the defense of the area from enemy attack. Up through October
c .907, (when the "crisis" with Japan subsided), there had been
official unanimity in both services that Subic was defensible irom
both the land and sea. Differences over tha Manila and Subic sites
were, up to that time, confined to arguments involving personal
preference of one over the other. While the naval planners in the
General Board had taken the position that Manila was not physically
suitable as a base, their Army counterparts never offered such a
sweeping condemnation of Subic Bay. A serious breach between the
two services over the defensibility of Subic came when the Army
135. Dewey to Secnav, June 18, 1907, General Board File 405;
General Board Minutes, June 17, 1900, Vol. 3, p. 114.
136. Dewey to Secnav, March 4, 1907, General Board File 405.




General Staff concluded in the Fall of 1907 that Subic could not be
defended from, land attack. This reappraisal was based on "new
examinations of the country back of Subic Bay and new studies of the
subject based on the reduction of Port Arthur. "138
Secretary of War William Howard Taft concurred in the Army's
findings, forwarded them to the Secretary of the Navy, and indicated
that the entire matter should be referred to the Joint Army and Navy
1 39
Board for its opinion. Although the General Board admitted that
it was "impressed"with the Army studies, it still insisted that Subic
was the preferred site from the naval point of view, and doubted
whether the Army could provide Manila with any more security than
could give Subic Bay. 14 ° Indeed, Dewey estimated it would take
i
the Army five times as many men to defend Manila ^*
General Board remonstrances notwithstanding, and in the face of
: final Army disavowal of Subic, the Joint Board was given only one
realistic option: to recommend that the naval station be placed at
some point in Manila Bay behind Army defenses. President Roosevelt
approved this action142 but not before informing the Secretary of the
N'avy in a blistering letter that the dispute had done "grave harm" to
138. Memorandum by General Board Member Captain Sydney A.
Staunton, January 17, 1912, General Board File 405.
139. Secwar to Secnav, January 21, 1908, General Board File 405.
140. Dewey to Secnav, May 27, 1909, General Board File 405.
141. New York American
,
October 25, 1907, Dewey Scrapbook,
Dewey Papers.
142. Secnav to all Bureaus and Offices, Serial No. 17628.20 of
February 19, 1908, General Board File 405.

•n
services because it showed "vacillation and one sided considera-
:ion ... by the army and navy experts. " He went on to say that he
I had been:
informed by almost every naval officer and by many army
officers that Subic Bay was the one all- important post to
fortify and defend, and that it alone could be made impreg-
nable to attack. Of course when assertions like this are
made to a layman, whether he be President or a member of
Congress, the layman assumes and has a right to assume that
those making them are to be supposed to recommend what is
best under actual conditions. . . . Now, I have the very highest
regard for the officers of the army and navy. I think them on
the whole about the best citizens we have, and I want to back
them in every way; but they justify their most trenchant
critics when they act in such a manner. 1^3
The decision to move to Manila presented the General Board
planners with a serious difficulty. The Navy's most important asset
at Subic was the floating dock Dewey. It could not be moved to
Manila without extensive and expensive dredging which Congress
would be slow to provide. Accordingly 1?ne Board appealed to the
newly appointed Secretary of the Navy George von L. Meyer to leave
the Subic resources intact. The Board's argument rested on these
premises: that the development of a naval station at Manila would
probably not be completed until after the Panama Canal was ready
for service; with the Canal open, the Atlantic fleet could be rapidly
transferred to the Pacific thus deterring any enemy attack on the
143. Roosevelt to Secnav Truman H. Newberry, February 11, 1908,
General Board File 405.

:j h * i i
'
ppines and giving Subic a form of defense which did not have to
.
r elv on Army assistance. I
4" Secretary Meyer forwarded this
recommendation to President Taft, but the latter was still not con-
vinced and he told Meyer to get on with the move to Manila. * 4 5
Reluctantly the General Board drew up a plan for a base within
Manila Bay and it was forwarded to the Joint Board for review.
Prior to the Joint Board's reconsideration of the question the
Army had reassessed its defensive capabilities in the Manila Bay
region and decided that Corregidor Island was the only point in the
Philippines it could assuredly hold. This eliminated the basis on
which the General Board alternative of building the naval station at
the mouth of the Pasig River was offered. Thus the Joint Board was
facecl with these options: locate the naval station within the Array
shield at Corregidor; place it outside Army protection but at some
point in the Philippines; de- emphasize or rule out the importance of
a base in the Philippines. The Joint Board chose a combination of the
last two courses of action. Eliminating Corregidor entirely because
of its exposed conditions, poor natural advantages, and the great
expense it would take to overcome them, it concluded that the naval
base should remain at Subic Bay but with less extensive facilities
than had originally been intended. The Joint Board's decision was
144. Dewey to Secnav, May 27, 1909, General Board File 405.
145. Taft to Meyer, June 7, 1909, General Board File 405.

^iO
edicated on these factors: the probable development within a
reasonable period of a navy capable of keeping a force in the Far
East "equal to or greater than the tleet of a possible enemy, " thus
deterring an attack on the Philippines; the opening of the Canal, and
the increased speed and endurance of battleships would permit a
more rapid transfer of force from the Atlantic to the Pacific, thus
adding to the deterrence; the cruise of the "Great White Fleet"
demonstrated that the inter-ocean transit could be made more
swiftly than had been thought, and when the ships arrived in the
Pacific, they did not need the amount of material repairs previously
estimated; the creation of a large naval base at Pearl Harbor would
render less necessary a first class fortified base in the
Philippines. 14 "
The Joint Board solution, while adding nothing to the capability
of the islands to resist attack, did save Dewey and the General
Board considerable face and the Navy the embarrassment of \ *
abandoning Subic; and it also reflected the degree of influence pos-
sessed by the Joint Board Chairman, Admiral Dewey and the other
representatives of the General Board who were also members of
this inter- service group. At the same time it confirmed the Navy's
weakness in the Far East, withdrew the American sea frontier to
146. Report of the Joint Board, November 8, 1909, General
Board File 405.

Hawaii, and recognized that the real defense of the Philippines
_o ended on the maintenance of friendship with Japan. Captain
Bradley A. Fiske was one of the only members of the General Board
who saw any hope for the defense of Subic by the force of arms but
without resort to land fortifications; but his scheme involved the use
of airpower which had not yet been accepted as a reliable weapon of
w~r 147
In the view of the General Board there was one advantage which
accompanied the decision to de-accentuate Subic and that was it
accelerated the development of Pearl Harbor as the principal naval
arsenal of the Pacific. As early as 1902 the Board had rated it
among the most important strategic positions 148 and in 1903 had
suggested its fortification as an insurance against an attack on the
U.S. West coast. 14 ^ Little was done to implement these ideas until
the prospect of war with Japan appeared to many a real possibility. ***0
At the height of the Japanese- American "crisis" the Board proposed
that Pearl Harbor be transformed from a coaling station to an
advanced base in order to establish a protected line of communication
from the Eastern to Western Pacific. Several months later and
long before the decision to abandon the idea of making Subic the
147. Captain Bradley A. Fiske to Dewey, April 7, 1911,
General Board File 449.
148. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1902, General Board File
414-1.
149. Dewey to Secnav, July 25, 1903, General Board File 403.
150. Report of National Coast Defense Board, Committee No. 1,
January 29, 1907, General Board File 403.
.
151. Dewey to Secnav, June 18, 1907, General Board File 405.

^rilter of the Far East, the Board urged President Roosevelt to
\ -pur the growth of Pearl Harbor into a first class naval base in
order to:
prevent the occupation of the islands ... by an enemy that
might otherwise be in a position to operate therefrom against
our continental coast; and . . . [provide] a base for a force of
our own which, by placing itself upon the flank of any enemy
seeking to attack our Pacific coast from north, west, or
south, would afford far greater security to California,
Oregon, and Washington than could be obtained by a like ex-
penditure for fortifications within the limits of those states
themselves. *^2
Pearl Harbor was unique among the overseas bases. Board recom-
mendations for its development and fortification struck a responsive
^ cnord within Congress and, unlike Subic Bay to the West and
Guantanamo to the East, the funds flowed freely. In the period of
less than one year Congress appropriated almost two million dollars
for its improvement, *" ^3 by- 1913 the Secretary of the Navy could
confidently report that the largest part of its construction would be
completed by 1914. 154
During the first twelve years of the General Board's existence,
the island of Guam did not play a major role in the Board's Pacific
strategy. It was always considered a necessary link in the
152. Memorandum Regarding Pearl Harbor, January 17, 1908,
prepared by the General Board for the President, General
Board File 404.
153. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pac ific, 1897-1909,
p. 222.
154. Department of the Navy, Annual Report, (Washington, 1913),

trans-Pacific chain and, because of its coal supply and overseas
communications cable which touched its shores, there was a feeling
that it should be fortified. "5 But the Board was unwilling to assign
i
it a capability much greater than that. In 1907, the Board estimated
that "little is needed but a coaling plant with sufficient protection to
guard against surprise attacks upon it. "156 jn April of 1910 it held
to the opinion that Guam was "not of prime value to [the] battle fleet
in time of war. "
!
After the decision to abandon the concept of a fully protected
naval base in the Philippines, a movement began at the Naval War
College to expand Guam's role and extend the capability of U.S. sea-
p. /er westward. The Summer Conference of 1910 reported to the
Brard that Guam, "costly though it would be, " should be developed
into a "strongly fortified naval base of the first class;" that this
should be done to ensure the defense of the Philippines; that even if
a pfcace were found in the Philippines and adequately equipped as a
naval base Guam should be developed; and that Guam was essential
even without the Philippines. *^° Alfred T. Mahan endorsed these
views and recommended that the United States turn Guam into a
155. Secnav Charles J. Bonaparte to Governor of Guam,
September 29, 1905, General Board File 425-2. Letter
drafted by the General Board.
156. Dewey to Secnav, October 3, 1907, General Board File 405.
157. Dewey to Secnav, April 27, 1910, General Board File 414-1,
158. Naval War College, "Report of the Conference of 1910, "
Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 49.
I

"kind o: Gibraltar. " Mahan wrote:
i
I
no situation [locality] in our possession equals Guam to pro-
tect every interest in the Pacific; nor need it be feared that
Japan would attempt an invasion of the Pacific coast, or of
Hawaii, nor probably of the Philippines, with a superior or
equal American navy securely based upon a point only a
thousand miles from its coast, and flanking all its eastward
¥ 1 R 9* communications.^
I
1
In March of 1911, Rear Admiral Raymond P. Rodgers, the President
%
of the Naval War College attempted to stimulate interest in these ideas
among his colleagues on the General Board but without much
success. 160 While a majority of the Board appeared just as im-
i
pressed as Rodgers with Guam's significance, they were reluctant to
ise the issue at the time because they felt it might divert interest
from and possibly prejudice the development at Pearl Harbor. 161
Favorable progress at Pearl Harbor 162 ancj a report from the
Secretary of the Navy that many of the large construction and fortifi-
cation projects would be completed by the winter of 1912-1913, 163
undoubtedly prompted the Board to adopt a changed attitude towards
159. Mahan to Philip Andrews, September 24, 1910, original in
General Board File 404.
160. Rodgers to Dewey, March 4, 1911, General Board File 425-2;
General Board Minutes, January 24, 1912, Vol. 4, p. 275.
161. Dewey to Secnav, February 13, 1912, General Board File 404.
162. The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks remarked: "It is
believed that neither in this nor in any other country will a
naval station of the magnitude of Pearl Harbor have been laid
out and put in operation in so short a time after the construc-
tion was authorized. " Department of the Navy, Annual
Report For The Fiscal Year 1911, (Washington, 1912),
p. 181.
163. Department of the Navy, Annual Report For the Fiscal Year
1912. (Washington. 1913). d. 46.

Guam. In December of 1912 it advised Secretary Meyer that:
Guam occupies such a commanding strategic position in the
Pacific, and one of such vital importance to our national
interests in that ocean, that it is essential to hold it securely
against any form of attack. It is axiomatic that a campaign
involving the United States in the Far East rests primarily
upon the control of the sea. To maintain, or under many
circumstances, to attain that control, the fleet's line of
communication must be beyond the probability of successful
attack. The distance from Honolulu direct to the Philippines
or to any destination of our fleet in the Far East is too long
to traverse without an intermediate point of support, and
Guam furnishes that point geographically. If, however, it be
undefended, or insufficiently defended, it will be taken by our
enemy, who, resting upon Guam, will certainly be able to
dispute the control of the sea for a long time, and may be
able to prevent us from ever getting it in those waters. The
possession of Guam under naval control is a vital necessity
to our country in engaging in war in the Far East. The
General Board therefore believes that it should be given
defenses of a naval base of the first order. 164
This rather strongly worded opinion fell short of the War College
position of 1910, but it represented a considerable advance from
" previous Board statements on the importance of Guam.. However the
gap w!iich almost invariably separated the Board's naval base
desiderata from actual accomplishments applied to Guam In
February of 1913 the Board classified Guam as "defenseless. "165
In June of 1913 the Board suggested that surveys be made to
determine likely landing places for an enemy and corresponding
defensive fortifications; Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels
164. Dewey to Secnav, December 4, 1912, General Board File
403.
165. Dewey to Secnav, February 26, 1913, General Board File
408.

- proved of the idea but did nothing to order the surveys. 166 In
January of 1914 a board of Army and Navy officers recommended that
as part of Guam's fortifications there be installed the following
f
guns: 20 - 12" mortars; 4 - 14" guns; 6 - 6" guns; and 4 - 3" guns. 167
The General Board endorsed these recommendations 16 " but in May of
1915 Commander E. S. Kellogg of the Office of Naval Intelligence
reported that:
the fixed defenses [on Guam] consist of two 6" naval guns on.
the outer end of Orote Peninsula; two 6" guns near the
eastern end of Cabras Island, and a battery of four small
guns on the mainland between Piti and Atantano. 16 ^
j
The wide gap which separated Guam's actual defenses in 1914 and
the General Board's program for its urgent development as a first
class naval base should come as no surprise. With the exception of
Pearl Harbor, the General Board's naval base policy was largely
ijnored and unimplemented. While a good case could be made to
| show that its recommendations in this area of war planning were
i
characterized by reason and restraint, Congress obviously preferred
to exercise its power of the purse in different directions. As a
166. Dewey to Secnav, June 11, 1913, General Board File 403;
Secnav endorsement dated December 30, 1913; General
Board Summary of Correspondence on the Defense of Guam,
General Board File 422.
167. The Guam Board Report, January 26, 1914, General
Board File 422.
168. Dewey to Secnav, June 26, 1914, General Board File 403,
169. Extract from a paper on Guam by Commander E. S. Kellogg,
O.N.I. Register No. 5351, General Board Summary of
CorresDondence an thp. Dpfpnsp nf r,nam Hono-ml "Rnm-H
I'

ult the Board's plans for a supportable battleline in the Eastern
Caribbean and the Western Pacific were without effect and instead the
real frontier shrunk to Honolulu in the West and the American shore












As was noted in an earlier chapter, the General Board did not
at first address itself to the question of the Navy's shipbuilding
policy although it was authorized to do so by Secretary of the Navy
i
John D. Long's original letter of instructions. •* Board members
undoubtedly had some fixed ideas about the direction that the post-
war Navy should take; and they might have been able to influence the
appropriation for additional ships passed by Congress almost three
months after the Board was authorized. But they were probably
reluctant to take any action which might be interpreted as being
competitive with the bureau structure. Since 1889, the responsi-
bilities for developing the Navy's shipbuilding programs rested with
the Board on Construction. It was composed mainly of bureau chiefs
who, in Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor's estimate, would resent
any infringement on their functions and would defend themselves by
demanding the curtailment or suspension of General Board activities.
1. Chapter III, pp. 25-26. Secretary of the Navy (hereafter cited
as Secnav) John D. Long to Admiral George Dewey, March 30,
1900, General Board File 401.
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3v October of 1900, however, the General Board felt that the factors
;avoring entrance into the field outweighed these encumbrances, and
accordingly it made its first recommendations to Secretary Long.
From then until 1914 the building programs of the Navy were of major
concern to the Board, since the number and character of new ships
had a direct bearing on the problems of strategy and war prepara-
tions.
There were several consistently held convictions which perme-
ated „*:e shipbuilding philosophy of the General Board. In the first
place the Navy was considered to be a form of insurance policy or
deterrent, and it should therefore be increased to "such strength as
make it hazardous for any other nation to antagonize [the United
States] by force of arms. "* As the General Board observed:
No Navy is so expensive as war. The amount of money
necessary to build and maintain a Navy capable of securing
peace is only a small fraction of the amount which war with
a gr^at power would cost in its immediate and subsequent
obligations. 3
It also thought that the size of the Navy should be tailored to the
country's foreign policies and to the nations most likely to challenge
them, and while it recognized that domestic poUtics_and the state of
the economy did in fact affect the Navy's growth, it refused to let
2. Captain Asa Walker, Preparation for War, unpublished mss.
,
Naval War College, 1900, Naval War College Records,
Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 24.
3. Dewey to Secnav, April 21, 1909, General Board File 420-2.

I A
them influence its recommendations. 4 The Board wanted a con-
sistent national building policy for the Navy, not unlike Germany's,
devoid of party politics, and "not affected by changes of administra-
tion. " Board members despaired of the system which submitted
their proposals to the scrutiny of an unpredictable Congress and a
transitory secretaryship, and altered them in accordance with the
compromises inherent in the democratic process. * They also
resented the actions of the Secretaries who limited their proposals
to what Congress would probably pass. 6 The Board tried to adhere
to the idea of a long range goal, and, as a matter of fact, claimed in
1914 that many of its shipbuilding proposals of 1903 were still valid
oecause of this approach. •
Another belief was that the Navy's strength would remain
constant from the beginning of war until its end. Members were
disturbed by those who would rely on the "genius of the people to
meet and overcome emergencies of war" and'called this propensity
"unreasonable and delusive. "° The General Board asserted that:
little building can be accomplished after war has commenced.
The Navy as the outbreak of war finds it, ... is in all
essentials the Navy which must conduct the war, and by which
success or failure will be determined. 9
4. Dewey to Secnav, September 25, 1912, General Board File
420-2.
5. Dewey to Secnav, March 28, 1913, General Board File 446.
6. General Board Minutes, August 15, 1913, Vol. 5, p. 146.
7. Dewey to Secnav, November 17, 1914, General Board File 420,
8. Walker, "Preparation for War, " Naval War College, 1900.
9. Dewev to Secnav. Aoril 21. 1909. General Board File 420-2.

rT" °re was some contemporary evidence to support this contention:
I
it took three years from the date of authorization to place a battle-
ship in commission and four years until it was ready to take its
I
place in the line of battle; *" yet the Spanish- American War lasted
2,
only a few months, and the Russo-Japanese conflict only about 18
I
months. The Board members never anticipated the potential and
$
new technology of American industry to intensify its efforts and
I
f accelerate its production as it did during World War I.
The Board was also influenced by a desire to acquire for line
I
%
officers a larger share in the determination of the quantity and
s
r
1 quality of ships they might be called on to use in battle. Until the
Ea
Board entered the field, the bureau chiefs gave Congress their own
particular ideas as to the characteristics of ships and they were
i
not always in agreement with one another. One was interested in
t
I
ordnance, another in machinery, still another in the hull parameters.
WKit was lacking was a unifying force and the practical viewpoint of
those who had to use the ships. H
The universal standard of naval strength during the 1900 to 1914
—
*
10. General Board memorandum for Secnav, undated but circa
September, 1910, General Board File 420-2; Dewey to
Secnav, December 7, 1912, General Board File 420.
11. U.S., Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy, 1909
,
60th Cong. , 2nd sess. , House Doc. No. 3, (Washington,
1909), p. 69.

period was the battleship 12 and all of the General Board building
program recommendations reflected this. At the same time the
Board recognized the danger of placing too much emphasis on the
battleship and too little on other types of vessels. WTiile admitting
that the "measure of the material portions of a fleet's power is
expressed in the number of its first line battleships, " the Board
also maintained that "the life and continued power" of the battleship
depended on the existence of the cruisers, destroyers, submarines,
and auxiliaries. ^ The very first statement of General Board ship-
building policy related to the disproportionate relationships among
the various types of ships within the Navy and contained a plea for
he restoration of some equilibrium. * 4 So strongly did the Board
feel about this that in 1903 it actually listed battleships as last in the
"order of urgency. " At the time the members were particularly
impressed by the need for information seekers - the cruisers - for
without them the battleships would never meet the enemy. 15 This
attitude is significant for it rebuts the notion that the battleships
mesmerized the naval planner. Quite the opposite: he was well
aware that unless he had balance within the fleet structure, the
12. The battleship was the largest and heaviest of all types of
naval ships. It had great tonnage, long cruising range, highly
seaworthy construction, carried the heaviest armor, and the
largest naval guns afloat. In major fleet actions the battle-
ships were designed to take position in the main battle line.
13. Dewey to Secnav, March 28, 1913, General Board File 446.
14. Dewey to Secnav, October 12, 1900, General Board File
420-2.
15. Dewey to Secnav, October 17, 1903, General Board File

battleship would be of little or no use. As one member pointed out:
the Board insists that vessels of different types shall not be
built at random . . . but symmetrically constituted as a whole,
battleships, scouts, colliers, torpedo boats ... . Without
coal and information, for instance, the game may be lost
however strong the battlefleet may be. *°
In March of 1902, the General Board was stunned to learn that
the Chief of the Bureau of Construction proudly noted in his annual
report that the Navy had a total of 307 ships. The Board had been
measuring the Navy's effective war strength at 59 ships. It voiced
concern to the Secretary that the mathematics of the Chief of the
Bureau of Construction would confuse the public and the legislators
and lead them to think that the Navy was far stronger than it
actually was. *" The Board was pointing up the problem of statistics
which plagued all of those who had any responsibility for the United
States shipbuilding programs: how to estimate U.S. strength, and
the strength of the other maritime powers by developing a formula
for cost effectiveness which would not only guide the United States
in planning its own program, but also indicate its standing with
respect to the rest of the world. Similarly, the Board thought it
advisable to develop acceptable guidelines which would help determine
16. Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry to son Charles, January 30,
1904, Sperry Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress.
17. Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans to Secnav, March 27, 1902,
General Board File 420.

on ships were of no further service, and how much should be
expended on repairs prior to scrapping.
In 1910 there were no less than seven formulas which assigned
numerical values to a ship in accordance with its overall worth.
Most based their calculations on four qualities: offensive power,
defensive strength, speed, and radius of action. The General Board
and Naval War College made an evaluation of all of them and found
that "some betray a particular motive, such as to prove that the
English [British] fleet is or is not equal to the 'two power' standard, "
and none were suitable. It was then decided to develop a new and
effective formula. The quest, although long and studied, ended in
lure. The project officer, Commander Frank Marble wrote:
It appears then, from whatever point of view regarded that
the military value of a ship of war is not susceptible of com-
plete or definite mathematical expression. There are too
many unknown quantities and two many variables to deduce
an equation. Moreover, there is some danger of ascribing
to empirical formulas wider authority than they are entitled
to. A mathematical deduction has no more validity than the
premises upon which it is founded; and a series of approxi-
mations or guesses does not become true because it is
expressed in algebraic terms If it were possible to
agree upon a formula of military value, all navies would
build sister ships. *°
The Board decided to revert to the old system; that is to use as the
basis for comparison the numbers of ships having the same general
18. Memorandum by Commander Frank Marble, attached to
letter, President Naval War College, Rear Admiral
Raymond P. Rodgers, to Dewey, May 11, 1910, General
Board File 420'.

characteristics, emphasizing of course the pre-eminence of the
battleship.
-
Age was also an important consideration in assessing strength.
In the view of the Board, a ship was "born" not at launching, com-
missioning, or the laying of the keel but when the design was com-
-
pleted or when it was authorized by Congress. Because of the rapid
progress of technology in speed capability, endurance, and gunpower,
a ship would become obsolete, not because of its aging structure, but.
because of its aging design. Such was the case with the pre-
Dreadnought battleships when the Dreadnought types were brought
forth even though they were only a few years old. The Board
imated that, as a general rule, a battleship would have to be
relegated to the "second line" for coast defense operations after ten
years of commissioned service, and to the scrapheap after 20
years. ^° It presented the Secretary of the Navy with the following




Service, 1st Line 2nd Line




19. Confidential General Board Memorandum for Secnav, June 30,
1912, General Board File 420-2.
20. Dewey to Secnav, December 7, 1912, General Board File 420.

The Board system of applying fixed periods on the limits of ships'
useful lives was criticized by Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, Chief
of the Bureau of Ordnance, because it did not consider the fact that
some ships age faster than others owing to the type of service and
maintenance given to them. Therefore determination as to further
usefulness should be on an individual basis. 21 Naturally, the
Board resisted this policy, for it would complicate the Board's
replacement program based on a simple objective measurement,
age, and submit it to the vagaries of the decisions of the several
bureaus, each of which had an interest in a particular aspect of the
ships and would therefore probably differ on an estimate as to their
uture value. Apart from this however, the General Board formula
for determining the useful age of a battleship and of other type ships
must be viewed with suspicion. If advances in technology made old
designs obsolete why could not advances in technology permit the
replacement of old equipment with new using the same hull for both.
The Board assumed that the technological pace as demonstrated by
the advent of the Dreadnought would extend indefinitely whereas the
fact was that the Dreadnought was a quantum jump and not repre-
sentative of the average technological progress.
The Board's building programs were directed principally at
Germany, but from 1906 on also gave full consideration to the
21. Chief Bureau of Ordnance to Aide for Material, January 10,
1914, General Board File 420.

Japanese "threat. " The specific General Board proposals were
usually justified by reference to its estimate of the comparative
strength of the United States as opposed to the other leading maritime
powers and particularly the possible adversaries. The first evalua-
tion of this kind, forwarded in 1902, was not too optimistic for it
ranked the United States seventh among the world's naval powers.
This was based on the number of battleships and armored cruisers
possessed by each nation. Rear Admiral Robley D„ Evans, acting
for Admiral Dewey, reported that "the showing was ominous ... and
the gravity of the situation should be called to the attention of both
the President and Congress. Since 1900 Germany had consider-
ably widened its lead over the United States by completing six battle-
ships and two armored cruisers while the United States was adding
only one major ship to its fleet. ^3 a source of aggravation was the
apparent unwillingness of the Congress to respond, for it authorized
only two battleships and two armored cruisers in 1900 and none at
all in 1901. The growing gap between the American Navy and its
most probable foe was dramatized by the Anglo- German intervention
in Venezuela in late 1902 and early 1903. Most of the Board mem-
bers were in the Caribbean ,at the time participating in the fleet
22. Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans to Secnav, March 27, 1902,
General Board File 420-2.
23. U.S., Congress, Senate, Navy Yearbook, 85th Cong. , 3rd
sess., Senate Doc. No. 418, (Washington, 1919), pp. 802-
804.
24. Ibid.
, p. 160, 175.

Lneuvers which they had organized. While they sympathized with
. need for the application of some force against Venezuela, they
thought the Germans had gone too far, and to them it confirmed
their previous convictions as to German aggressiveness. 20 Both
Admiral Dewey and his Aide, Commander Nathan Sargent felt the
presence of American naval power prevented the Germans from
^oing even further than 'chey did. 26
The Board returned to Washington in January of 1903 and began
debating the size of the fleet which the Navy should have to counter
me German "menace. " Captain John E. Pillsbury and Commander
Nathan Sargent proposed that "there be a gradual increase in the
number of battleships until . . . [there was] one for each state of the
union. " 2 ^ At the time there were 45 states and three territories,
but it was generally assumed that the latter would become states in
the not too distant future. Other suggestions were made to fix the
ultimate strength at 36 and 42 but they were voted down. Finally all
members agreed that 48 should be the goal but they did not include
I a time limit nor associate the figure with the number of states. 2 °
The Board incorporated the opinion in a letter to Secretary of the
N'avy William H. Moody in which it was stated that "the defense of
2 5. Diary of Commander Nathan Sargent, Aide to Admiral
Dewey, December 18, 1902, Sargent Papers, Naval Histori-
cal Foundation Collection, Library of Congress.
26. Dewey to son George, January 4, 1903, Dewey Papers, Office
of Naval History, Washington, D. C. ; Diary of Nathan Sargent,
memorandum entry in back of 1903 diary book, Sargent
Papers.
27. General Board Minutes, January 31, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 237.
OQ Tk^

the coast, insular possessions, commerce and general maritime
interests of the United States" required a fleet of 48 first-class
battleships with a proportionate number of other vessels. 29 No
further justification was offered.
At the time of this discussion, the effective German Fleet Law,
enacted in 1900, called for a battleship strength of four squadrons
of eight ships each, two fleet flagships, and four reserve battle-
On
ships to be constructed by 1920. A Naval War College study done
prior to the General Board decision for 48 battleships, indicated
that the American Navy should possess a force which would give
"crushing superiority" over the Germans should the two nations
ce each other in the Atlantic. It was felt that this objective could
be .net if the United States maintained a strength one and one-half
times greater than Germany. ^1 Excluding the two German flag-
ships and four reserve battleships, this gave a total of 48 battle-
snips. J£'
29. Dewey to Secnav, February 9, 1903, General Board File 420-2.
30. Translation of German Fleet Law of 1900, attached to letter
Dewey to Secnav, May 24, 1910, General Board File 420-2.
31. Memorandum by Lieutenant Commander W. Irving Chambers,
undated but circa 1904, General Board File 420-2.
32. Although there is no indication in the General Board records
for 1903 that this was in fact the method of computation, in-
ternal correspondence dated 1915 and labeled "unofficial
memorandum as to the reasons which originally led the General
Board to determine on 48 battleships, " claims this to have been
the rationale. This memorandum was produced in response to
a charge by Congressman Finlay Gray in 1915 that the number
48 was derived not from an analysis of the threat, but as an
assurance that each of the states would eventually have a battle-
ship named for it. Gray was aware that there were only 45

The General Board's letter of February 1903, recommending a
balanced fleet with 48 battleships, did not set a specific time limit
by which the desired strength should be reached, but it did advocate
i
a battleship construction rate of four per year. This would give a
completed fleet of 48 in 1914, five years before the 1920 limit of the
German Fleet Law of 1900. 33 In October of 1903, the Board altered
its recommendation to two battleships per year with a target date of
completion in 1919. The Board justified this decrease, not on the
I
basis that four per year would be too much for Congress to digest,
but because it would require an unrealistic personnel recruiting
states in 1903, but stated that it was well known at the time
that the three territories would eventually acquire statehood,
Admiral Dewey attempted to refute Congressman Gray's
allegation, not by reference to the unofficial memorandum
and the German threat, but by quoting from a letter he had
written to the Secretary of the Navy in November 1914,
which reviewed the reasons for the 48 battleship policy.
In that document Dewey stated that the number was fixed
"by a calm and logical review of the policies and aims of
the nation and the known laws and prospective developments
and aims of other countries. ..." Why Dewey was not, in
contrast to the unofficial memorandum, more specific in
his explanation is not clear. Perhaps he was reluctant to
cite Germany as a presumed enemy in the November 1914
letter because it was scheduled to be published in the
widely read Annual Reports of the Navy Department, and
any reference to Germany would have been contrary to the
strict neutrality adopted by the Wilson Administration.
General Board Memorandum, January 26, 1915, General
Board File 420-2; U.S., Congress, House, Naval Affairs
Committee, Hearings on Appropriation Bill, 63rd Cong.,
3rd sess.
, House Doc. No. 13, (Washington, 1915),
p. 1049; Dewey to Secnav, November 17, 1914, General
Board File 420-2; Dewey to Congressman Lemuel Padgett,
January 21, 1915, General Board File 420-2.
33. Dewey to Secnav, February 9, 1903, General Board File
420-2.

and training rate. Nor did the Board's 1903 plans take into con-
sideration the problem of battleship replacement due to age, because
"experience had not yet . . . demonstrated the effective life of
battleships, nor had any exhaustive study been made of it. "35 It
was not until 1910 that the Board developed standards, patterned on
the practice of Germany, which would require the scrapping of all
battleships 20 years or older. 36 while this did not alter the ultimate
goal of 48 battleships, it did mean that Congress would have to
appropriate for more than two per year to achieve it by 1919.
Even two battleships per year was more than Congress was
willing to accept, and only a few months after the Board first pro-
\ ,ed its ambitious scheme, it found itself one battleship behind the
desired annual rate of construction. Undaunted, the Board added
the deficiency to its recommendation for the following year and sug-
gested the construction of three battleships; Congress appropriated
for only two. This still left a gap of one, which the Board tried to
bridge in 1905 by recommending three battleships, but Congress
would only authorize one, thus widening the difference to three.
34. Dewey to Secnav, October 17, 1903, General Board File
420-2.
35. Rear Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, Senior Member Present
General Board to Secnav, July 1, 1914, General Board File
420-2.
36. Dewey to Secnav, May 24, 1910, General Board File 420-2.
The 1908 revision to the German Fleet Law of 1900 provided
that "excepting cases of losses of ships, battleships
. .
. shall
be replaced after 20 years. " Translation of German Fleet
Law of 1900, as amended in 1906 and 1908, attached to above
letter.

By 1905 Great Britain began building a revolutionary new battle-
ship, the Dreadnought, which changed the standards by which naval
strength was judged. The Board, while still adhering to the goal of
48 battleships, hoped to use the new index of power as a lever to
convince the Navy Department and Congress to accelerate the lagging
building program. Admiral Dewey advised the Secretary of the Navy
that, on the basis of Dreadnought types authorized by the leading
maritime nations, the United States stood fifth after England, France,
Germany, and Japan. He warned that if Congress continued at the
pace of one battleship per year, Germany would have thirteen more
of the new class by 1915. ^ However, using the criterion of total
>nnage, a measurement seldom used by the Board, the United States
was at the time the third ranked naval power, ahead of Germany,
and would soon be second only to Great Britain. ^° in addition, the
cost- conscious Congress had to consider the greatly increased
expense of the new tvpe battleship; slightly more than three of the
old class could be purchased for the price of two of the Dreadnought
type. 39 ^he Congress was evidently more impressed with cost and
overall tonnage than with the argument of the General Board, and it
authorized only one battleship instead of the two recommended. ^0
37. Dewey to Secnav, October 2, 1906, General Board File 420-2.
38. Statistics of Relative Tonnages printed in George T. Davis,
A Navy Second to None, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Cougar, 1940), pp. 171-172.
39. The total cost of the USS Florida was $10, 3 59, 979.40. The
pre -Dreadnought Indiana cost $5, 799, 374. 26. Navy Year
Book, 1917 and 1918. p. 758.

Another opportunity to exert pressure on the Secretary and
Congress arose in 1906 with the "crisis" with Japan. The Eoard felt
that it now had to plan for a "threat" in each ocean and all of the old
arguments in support of the 48 battleship program were augmented
by an appeal for a "two-ocean standard" to protect both coasts. 1
The specific proposals called for four battleships and a proportionate
mixture of supporting vessels. ^2 it was the largest program in terms
of dollars ever brought forward by the Board; its total cost amounted
to- about $63, 000, 000, a figure greater than the total expenditures for
the entire Navy Department in 1901 and well over one-half of the
Navy's total outlay for 1906. "*^ Although Secretary of the Navy Victor
T
etcalf endorsed in large measure the Board suggestion, Congress
did not express the same sense of urgency, and it cut the program^by
44
about one- half.
The year 1908 marks the start of the German drive to overtake
the* United States in the naval arms race. In terms of tonnage built
and building it still lagged behind the United States, but would over-
take it in 1909 and maintain second position among the world's powers
through 1914. During the period from 1908 to 1914 the Germans
spent $100, 000, 000, more dollars for naval ship construction than
41. Dewey to Secnav, April 25, 1907, General Board File 420-1.
42. Dewey to Secnav, September 26, 1907, General Board File
420-2.
43. U. S. , Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Histori -
cal Statistics of the United States, 1789 -1945, (Washington,
1949), p. 299.
44. Navy Yearbook, 1917 and 1918
, pp. 281-283.

the United States. Even Japan, whose expenditures were admittedly
no match for those of the United States and Germany, quintupled their
new construction budget between 1906 and 1907. ^ 5 All of this dis-
turbed the members of the General Board deeply, particularly when
coupled with their image of an excessively parsimonious Congress.
In May of 1910 the Board reviewed for Secretary of the Navy
George Meyer the naval armaments race and reported that the
expansions of the Japanese and German fleets, representing "the
only maritime powers that the United States is likely to go to war
with, " was a source of "potential danger to the United States and
must be met with proportionate increases in U. S. Naval strength and
th astablishment of a two ocean fleet. " While the Board admitted
that the Navy had enough ships to confront Japan in the Pacific, it
stated unequivocally that they could not be properly supported
because of the inadequate logistic facilities. Until these were
developed, and until the Panama Canal with its well fortified base
facilities was available, the Board could not be very sanguine about
the outcome if war came with Japan.
The Board's estimate with respect to Germany was even less
optimistic. It had considered the U. S. Navy adequate to meet any
German aggression until 1908, but since then the Germans had made
greater strides than the United States in building Dreadnought type
45. Memorandum from the Office of Naval Intelligence, June 7,
1913, General .Board File 429.

i
• tleships and powerful battle cruisers, 'live Hoard predicted that
by 1920, unless the American programs were drastically accelerated,
; the United States would have to face a German fleet of 34 heavy ships,
I
a total far greater than the American fleet at its present state of
growth of one or two battleships per year. " The Board recommended
llit? construction of four battleships, sixteen destroyers (to narrow the
I
gap of ninety-eight thought needed for a balanced fleet), and twenty-
I
one other types of vessels. Congress cut the program by one-half
I
\ and authorized two battleships, eight destroyers and eleven rther
i 47
vessels. '
In 1912, actual German naval tonnage exceeded that of the United
I orates for the first time since 1905. In the same year the Board
made an eight year projection of the order of battle of the United
States, Germany and Japan based on the German and Japanese
: -building plans, and on the continuance of the Congressional appropri-
i




21 Dreadnought battleships to oppose
15 pre- Dreadnought battle-
ships *
64 destroyers
3 fast scout cruisers
















46. Dewey to Secnav, May 24, 1910, General Board File 420-2.
47. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420-2.
48. Statistics of Relative Tonnage printed in Davis, A Navy
Second to None. n. 172.

I ; n submitting this information to the Secretary, Admiral Dewey wrote:
the General Board does not believe that it is the national sense
that this condition of inferiority should be allowed to obtain.
It does not believe that it is the intent to put forth pretensions
in respect of policy that cannot be made good against challenge.
It does not believe that the United States, having attained at an
expenditure of almost two billions of dollars, a position as the
second naval power of the world, should refuse the expenditure
necessary to maintain that position, because other nations,
recognizing the advantages of naval strength have undertaken
to dispute it. ... It is not however, the province of the General
Board to enter into political and economic considerations; but
solely., as a military board, to advise^ clearly as to the
strength of Irtv naval force which it deems indispensable to
meet the poss/ole contingencies of the immediate future. ^9
The clear advice to which Admiral Dewey referred was for a
massive five year building program to make up for the neglects of the
t- past and to ensure that by 1920 the American Navy would have
I
"measurable equality to the German and Japanese fleets. " The pro-
i gram was defined as an "emergency" one and absolutely essential to
I
return the United States to second place among the world's powers.
I
I
The size of the "Board's program was immense and so was the cost:
I
an average yearly expenditure of $100, 000, 000 or almost 80 per cent
of the Navy's total budget for 1911. The Board secondly suggested
I
t
that one-half of this amount be financed by "an extension of the
jI
t Panama bond issue, " arguing that the Navy would guarantee the
safety of the American commerce which would use the Canal, and
49. Memorandum from General Board to Secnav on Building
Program, 1913-1917, September 25, 1912, General Board
File 420-2.

-~otect the Canal's security from any challenges from either Japan
50





George Meyer, but went largely unanswered in Congress where
funds were granted for only one battleship. ** a little over three
r
weeks after Congress acted, Admiral Dewey, on the General Board's
! behalf, addressed a long letter to the new Secretary of the Navy
I Josephus Daniels, criticising the Congress and past administrations
i
I for playing politics with the Navy, and for relegating the growth of
I
\ the fleet to "laws of expediency to meet temporary emergencies"
rather than the real needs of the nation. He appealed to Mr. Daniels
t support the long range goals which the Board had been advocating,
1
including the specific one of 48 battleships. He implied that unless
those objectives were met the government would have to "abandon or
modify" one or more of the following "well-established national
policies: no entangling alliances; the Monroe Doctrine; the Open
Door in the Far East; Asiatic Exclusion; exclusive military control
of the Panama Canal and its contiguous waters. " Admiral Dewey
went on to say that:
the forecast of the Board with regard to naval development
has proved remarkably accurate. The absence of any definite
50. Memorandum from General Board to Secnav on Building
Program 1913-1917, September 25, 1912, General Board
File 420-2.
51. U.S., Navy Department, Annual Reports, 1912, (Washington,
1912), p. 26.
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naval policy in our past, except in the General Board, and
the failure of the people, the Congress and the Executive
Government to recognize the necessity for such a policy, has
already placed us in a position of inferiority, which may lead
to war; and this inferiority is progressive and will continue
to increase until the necessity for a definite policy is
recognized, and that policy put into operation.
Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels could not concur with the
General Board's rather dismal outlook. His construction policy was
based on what he called the "golden mean. " 54 By this he meant that
he would present to Congress a program which would steer a course
between the Scylla of unilateral withdrawal from the naval arms race
and the Charybdis of unrestrained naval competition with its concomi-
tant burden on the American taxpayers. From the viewpoint of the
General Board however Daniels' course was hardly midway, for he
reduced the Board's battleship construction by one-half and, overall,
approved only 11 of 29 ships. ^5 Congress was slightly more
generous and authorized two of the four battleships and 17 of the
total 39 vessels. Board requests for 1914 followed a similar
pattern; of four battleships and forty-five other ships requested,
Daniels approved two battleships and 16 additional vessels; and
Congress appropriated for two battleships and 25 of other classes. ^
53. Dewey to Secnav, March 28, .1913, General Board File 446.
54. U. S. , Navy Department, Annual Reports for the Fiscal Year
1913
,
(Washington, 1914), p. 10.
55. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420-2.
56. Navy Yearbook, 1917 and 1918
, p.
57. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420-2.

The Congressional debates on the naval programs of 1913 and
i .4 were not untypical of those in the fourteen preceeding years.
Members decided along party and geographic lines. The
Republicans, the minority in both houses, generally stood on the
large-navy side of the aisle, while the Democrats were, nominally
at least, small-navy proponents. Proximity of the individual to the
sea appeared to be a determining factor; for example., many
Democrats from the eastern seaboard were advocates of a large
navy while many Republicans from the mid-western states voted
CO
with the small-navy faction. °° The non-navalists favored a policy of
retrechment whereby funds would be devoted primarily to the
i- nrovement of ship, personnel, and equipment quality rather thaj»
to purely quantitative increases. They thought that a smaller navy
would be entirely adequate for national security since expanding
foreign trade was reducing the likelihood of war; moreover the
impregnability of coastal defenses coupled with geographical isolation
of the United States made any attack on the country "inconceivable. ""
It was implied that the drive for more ships arose out of a selfish
profit motive on the part of the nation's shipbuilders and steel trust. "
The Democrats, in a minority report of the House Naval Affairs
58. Sprout, Harold and Magaret, The Rise of American Naval
Power, 1776-1918, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1946), p. 264.
59. U. S. , Congress, House, Report by House Naval Affairs Com-
mittee on Naval Appropriation Bill, monthly report (part 2),
62nd Cong. , 3rd sess. , House Report No. 1557, (Washington,
1913), p. 2.
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Committee, accused the Navy Department of statistical chicanery in
presenting figures designed to show a fleet inferior to Germany's. 61
The other extreme represented by a former naval officer and hero of
the Spanish- American War, Richmond B. Hobson, surpassed even
the General Board in defining the desired size of American naval
power. His formula for the growth of the fleet was as simple as it
was radical: the Navy's power should be equal to the combined
strength of the Japanese and German navies. 2 The General Board
had, ss late as 1910, rejected this two power formula, °3
The majority of the members of Congress took a position some-
where in between. One of these, Congressman William Williams,
'dressing his colleagues stated that:
we may well differ as to the extent of our Navy. . . and I confess
that when I reach the comparative stage, and undertake to
offset or counterbalance ship against ship, gun against gun,
and man against man, in the light of our isolation, unaccessi-
bility to attack, and numerous other conditions which only the
mind can conjecture, and which may or may not exist at the
time of actual hostilities, I become confused and frankly admit
that fhare is no rule by which the adequacy of any navy can be
determined with any precision, accuracy or certainty, and I
have reached the deliberate conclusion that the only safe
course to pursue is to maintain a navy of sufficient size to
deter the enemy from making war upon us, and of sufficient
strength to cope successfully with any fleet that may be sent
against us. °4
61. U.S., Congress, House, Report by House Naval Affairs Com-
mittee on Naval Appropriation Bill , 63rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
House Report No. 314, (Washington, 1914), p. 57, 65-67.
62. U.S., Congressional Record, 62nd Cong. , 3rd sess. , Vol. 49,
pt. 4, (February 22, 1913), p. 3705.
63. Confidential Memorandum from General Board to Secnav
attached to letter Dewey to Secnav, May 24, 1910, General
Board File 420-2.
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Mr. Williams theory of the "safe course" was no different than
» reasoning of the General Board; however when it came to a judg-
ment as to the number and kinds of ships to constitute the fleet it was
clear that for the 1900 to 1914 period the differences between the
Board and Congress were large indeed. By July of 1914, and nine
battleships short of its projections, the Board recognized the futility
of insisting on its 1919 target date and decided to change it to 1923.^5
A few months later, after war broke out in Europe, the Board dropped
all reference to the 48 battleship standard and instead called for a
Navy "strong enough to meet on equal terms the strongest possible
adversary. "°°
There is no evidence to indicate that any of the Secretaries of the
Navy approved of the General Board's long range program. Neither
Daniels nor John D. Long thought much of the idea. The latter pre-
ferred to "move along as the necessities require. "° ' Kis successor,
Wjlliam H. Moody felt that a long range program like the German
system would be desirable but difficult to implement because of the
Congressional practice of making appropriations on an annual
basis. ° George Meyer came closest in 1912 when he declared that
6"5. Rear Admiral W. H. H. Southerland, Senior Member Present
General Board to Secnav, July 1, 1914, General Board File
420-2.
66. Dewey to Secnav, November 17, 1914, General Board File
420-2.
67. U. S. , Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects
,
57th Cong., 1st sess. , House
Doc. No. 135, (Washington, 1902), p. 19.
68. U. S. , Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects, 57th Cong. , 2nd sess. , House
Doc. No. 11. (Washington. 1903). d. 80.

"a total of 41 battleships, with a proportional number of other fight-
,g auxiliary vessels is the least that will place [the United States] on
fi Q
a safe basis in its relations with other world powers.
" D Meyer's
selection of the number 41 was no accident. At the time this was
also the German goal. Meyer was therefore advocating an American
fleet equal in size to Germany's, and was anticipating the standard
proposed by the General Board in late 1914.
Adherence to the program of 48 battleships and a suitable
number of other ships through an 11 year period, marked by rather
dramatic changes which appeared to increase rather than lessen the
"threat" is indeed remarkable. Japan was not considered one of
the likely enemies in 1903, and the Board's long range building pro-
gram was not geared to the size of its naval establishment, A few
years later Japan joined the Board's list of probable foes and
remained on it through 1914 without precipitating a concomitant
adjustment in the original program. In 1903, Germany's projected
battle fleet was to consist of 32 battleships and 2 fleet flagships by
1920. 70 In 1908 this was revised to 37 battleships by 1915, and in
1912 revised still further so that by 1920 her fleet would have 41
battleships. '* In addition, since 1909, the German Navy began
69. U.S., Navy Department, Annual Reports, 1912, (Washington,
1913), p. 25.
70. Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow
,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 106.
71. Viscount Hythe, ed.
,
The Naval Annual 1914, (London:
William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1914), p. 34.

adding powerful battle cruisers to her forces and planned to have 11
n commission by 1920'- While these ships were not as potent as
a battleship, they were not to be taken lightly. The Office of Naval
Intelligence considered each of them to be the equivalent of one-half
a battleship. Thus, the revisions to the German Fleet Laws, from
the time when the Board first recommended a fleet of 48 battleships,
altered the German Navy's ultimate strength from 34 battleships to
the equivalent of 46. 5 battleships, an increase of over 35%. Yet
through all of this the Board remained convinced that its 1903
proposals were still valid.
The Board explained these apparent incongruities by stating that
it had in fact taken these changes into account but because
of the political relations which developed between Germany
and Japan, and of the unprobability of any concerted attack by
these two nations in the Atlantic and Pacific at the same time,
and also in view of the increased mobility of [the United
Sta'i^] fleet due to the approaching completion of the Panama
&% 5, . . . {the Board felt] that it was unnecessary to increase
its oridnal.estimate of 48 battleships. » . . ' *
During the period under study, the battleship - the key ship of
the fleet - underwent a revolutionary transformation; when the Board
was organized in 1900, the newest in commission was the Kentucky.
72. Viscount liythe, ed.
,
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73. Office of Naval Intelligence, Memorandum on Comparison of
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Defined by Congress as a "sea-going coast line battleship, " she was
376 feet long, displaced 11, 500 tons, had a top speed of 16 knots with
reciprocating coal-fired engines, a draft of 23 feet, carried a
multiple-caliber main battery of 13-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch weapons,
and cost 4.4 million dollars. '5 [n contrast, the New Mexico,
authorized by Congress in June of 1914, and described as a "first-
class" battleship, displaced three times as much water, was 250
feet longer, had a maximum speed of 21 knots on oil-fired turbines,
drew seven feet more water, mounted a single caliber main battery
consisting of twelve 14-inch guns, and cost 12.6 million dollars, °
The Office of Naval Intelligence, in assessing the offensive power of
both ships, assigned the New Mexico a strength eight times greater
77than that possessed by the Kentucky . ' '
These two ships were representative of two eras, dramatically
separated by the completion of the British battleship Dreadnought
in December, 1906. Although the differences between them
encompassed the entire range of ship characteristics, the most
important change which occurred was in offensive power and speci-
fically the main battery armament. In the pre- Dreadnought days, a
75. U. S. , Navy Department, Dictionary of American Naval
Fighting Ships, Vol. 1, (Washington, 1959), p. 190; Navy
Yearbook, 1917 and 1918
, p. 790.
76. Dictionary of American Naval Fitting Ships , Vol. 1, pp. 196'
197; Navy Yearbook, 1917 and 1918, p. 792.
77. Office of Naval Intelligence, Memorandum on Comparision of
Ship Values, December 4, 1914, General Board File 420.

battleship had a multiplicity of calibers in her main gun battery, each
.ih an assigned function. Not much thought had been given to the
concentration of power in a single large caliber because of the gen-
erally accepted rule that the larger the caliber, the less the hitting
capacity. ° Besides, the anticipated open-fire range in battle was
3, 000 yards or less, well within the capability of the smaller caliber
rapid-fire weapons. However, the hodgepodge of weaponry
brQught with it many disadvantages: not all of the guns could be
fired simultaneously because of mutual interference problems;
several types of weapons meant multiplication of fire control
systems, with all the problems that entailed; spotting of shell
F~lash.es was difficult; ammunition logistics became extremely com-
plicated; superstructures were cluttered and poorly designed; hulls
were so heavily laden with turrets that ships had hardly enough
freeboard to keep their weapons usable in heavy seas; and offensive
power was limited.
There were some stirrings in the world of naval architecture as
early as 1902 over the advantages of the purification of the main
batteries. In that year Rear Admiral Francis T. Bowles, Chief of
the Bureau of Construction and Repair had rough sketch designs
prepared for a battleship with 10-inch guns for a primary battery and
78. Commander William S. Sims to President Theodore
Roosevelt, September 24, 1904, William S, Sims Papers,
Office of Naval History, Washington, D. C.
79. Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940), p. 521.

no intermediate caliber guns. 80 In the same year, Commander
• mer C. Poundstone prepared a paper advocating the adoption of
the single caliber battery, * and in 1903 the Italian naval architect
Colonel Vittorio Cunniberti published an article in Jane's Fighting
Ships, advocating for the British Navy a battleship mounting an
all-big-gun armament of twelve 12-inch rifles. ^
The 1903 Summer Conference at the Naval War College had
considered a proposal by Lieutenant Commander \V\ Irving
Chambers for an all-big- gun ship carrying twelve 12 -inch or
11
-inch guns with a six salvo end fire and an eight salvo broadside.^
While Chambers' War College colleagues did not accept his ideas
without qualifications, they seemed to think his proposal well worth
investigating. It appeared to them that the intermediate battery was
useful only at close range, and even at these distances, it could not
penetrate the belt armor of a battleship. Furthermore torpedoes
were being developed with effective ranges exceeding those of the
intermediate guns. This meant that torpedo boats could fire at the
battleships and remain free from the hazard of the former's
intermediate batteries. In addition, gunnery and fire control
80. Board on Construction to Secnav, September 26, 1904,
General Board File 420-2.
81. Tracy B. Kittredge, "Biography of Admiral Sims, "
(unpublished mss. , Office of Naval History, Washington,
D. C), p. 610.
82. Janes Fighting Ships, 1903, pp. 310-318.
83. Battleship Plan by Lieutenant Commander W. Irving
Chambers, July 1903. Blueprint in General Board File
420-6, January 26, 1904.

practices in the American and foreign navies revealed an increasing
-curacy of the longer range weapons. Therefore it might be
advisable to remove the intermediate batteries and concentrate gun
power in the heavier caliber weapons. In fact, the War College staff
estimated that Chambers' ship, which would do precisely that, would
be up to three times more effective than the best-armed battleship
then in commission. ° 4 Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor and the other
members of the General Board were "favorably impressed" with
Chambers' proposals, but they decided that no mention of this "new
and untried type" be made in their building program recommendations
then being prepared for the Secretary of the Navy. One Board
member, Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, who was President of
the Naval War College when Chambers developed his concept, and
had' become converted to the all-big- gun idea, kept insisting on the
virtues of the new type ship and finally persuaded the General Board
to -adopt a resolution in January of 1904 asking the Secretary of the
Navy to direct the Bureau of Construction and Repair to prepare
feasibility designs. °° A letter to this effect was sent to Secretary
Moody, ° ' concurred in by him, and sent on to Chief Constructor
~84^ U. S. Naval War College, "Solution to the Problem of 1903, "
Part VIII, (unpublished mss. , Naval War College, 1903),
Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pa., Box 45, 71.
85. General Board Minutes, October 16, 1903, Vol. 1, pp. 349-
350.
86. General Board Minutes, January 26, 1904, Vol. 1, p. 394.
87. Dewey to Secnav, January 26, 1904, General Board File
420-6.

Washington L. Capps. ^8 Capps did nothing at all about the matter
and it rested in limbo until September of 1904 when Captain
Charles S. Sperry, a member of the Board, complained to the new-
Secretary of the Navy, Paul Morton that Capps had completely
ignored the Board's request; then "bells rang and things began to
move. Morton withdrew the matter from Capps purview and
passed it on to the Board on Construction. 91 However Capps was
also a member of that organization and, in fact, his thinking was
fairly representative of its membership. All resented the General
Board's interference in their design function, and they were bound
and determined to delay as long as they could. The Board on Con-
struction told Morton that the Bureau would work on the plans when
time permitted, and it suggested that the matter be referred back to
op
Capps. Meanwhile, Morton had apparently left Washington and
Charles H. Darling, his assistant was acting for him. As has been
indicated, so he too resented the expansionary tendencies of the
General Board, and it was probably this thinking which prompted
him to tell Capps to stand easy and not to work on the Dreadnought
88. Charles H. Darling, Acting Secnav to Capps, February 1,
1904, General Board File 420-6.
89. Harry S. Knapp to Commander William S. Sims, July 9,
1908, Sims Papers.
90. Ibid.
91. Morton to Board on Construction, September 21, 1904,
General Board File 420-6.
92. Board on Construction to Secnav, September 27, 1904,
General Board File 420-6.
93. Chapter II, p. 62.

design until the work load eased. 94 On September 29, 1904 Dewey
.sked Morton once again to determine the status of the designs,
since the General Board was anxious to make a judgment whether or
not it should include an all-big-gun battleship in its building recom-
mendations soon due in his office. ^° Capps explained to Morton that
his people were still overworked, that it would take six months of
continuous application to produce the plans, but that the work load
would not permit him to begin now. He did however indicate that
rough sketch plans were available, but not detailed enough to permit
a valid judgment as to the relative merit of the ship. 96
Meanwhile the General Board began evaluating the results
coming in on the sea engagements of the Russo-Japanese War. They
seemed to show that the large caliber weapons were much more
accurate than had been expected; in fact the damage to the Russian
ships came preponderantly from the large guns and at ranges far
exceeding the effective fire zones of the intermediate batteries. The
Board therefore recommended that no intermediate batteries be
installed on future battleships. ^ ' But it was unwilling to go along
94. Darling to Capps, September 28, 1904, General Board File
420-6.
95. Dewey to Morton, September 29, 1904, General Board File
420-6.
96. Capps to Morton, October 8, 1904, General Board File 420-5.
97. The Navy Department was slow to accept even this change for
as late as January, 190 5 Secretary of the Navy Paul Morton
advised Congress that he favored retention of the interme-
diate battery. U. S. , Congress, House, Naval Affairs
Committee, Hearings on Appropriation Bill Subjects, 58th
Cong., 3rd sess. , House Doc. No. 62, (Washington, 1905),
p. 540.

with the uniform large caliber system of Lieutenant Commander
^nambers for two reasons: it had not yet received the technical
information on which to base a decision; and it still saw a strong
advantage in preserving "homogeneity of squadrons" by keeping the
speed, displacement, steaming radius, and maneuvering qualities
the same as those possessed by the recently completed battleships
of the Connecticut class. In order to keep the design of the new ship
within these parameters, and maximize gun power, the Board thought
it necessary to install a main battery of 10-inch and 12-inch guns.
If a homogeneous 12-inch main battery were installed in a 16,000
ton ship, it would have to be limited to eight rifles, a number
bought by the members too small. The Board cautioned the
Secretary that its recommendations were tentative in nature, and
confirmation would have to await the recepit of the information which
had long ago been requested from the Bureau on Construction. 98
While this debate was going on in the U.S. Navy, the British
were moving ahead on the development of a ship conforming to the
ideas of Bowles, Poundstone, Cunniberti, and Chambers. Because
of the close political relations between Great Britain and Japan,
British naval officers were permitted front row seats at the naval
actions of the Russo-Japanese War. They saw evidence of the great
destructive power of the primary batteries of the Japanese ships;
98. Dewey to Secnav, October 28, 1904, General Board File
420-2.

they noted the almost complete ineffectiveness of the intermediate
capons; and they learned from viewing the remains of Admiral
Kojestvensky's once proud Baltic fleet what poor design could do to
ships in battle. This experience provided confirmation of earlier
British naval thinking that the all-big-gun ship had great merit and
should be built. Designs were drawn for a battleship displacing
17, 900 tons, (the largest up to that time), mounting ten 12-inch
guns, and with turbine engines which would propel it at speeds up
10 21 knots. It was christened Dreadnought and joined the Royal
Navy in December of 1906, completely altering the character of the
naval arms race. Here was a ship which made all that came before
weak by comparison. She could fire three times as much steel
forward and twice as much abeam as the most powerful battleship
ever built; she had a two knot margin over her fastest rivals; and
she was the first ship ever constructed with the economical and
flexible turbine'engine. ^ u
The very month and year that Dreadnought joined the fleet, the
keel was laid for the American battleships South Carolina and
Michigan. They were also all-big-gun ships but not of the class of
their English counterpart. They carried only eight 12-inch guns on
a 16, 000 ton hull, and had a conventional power plant which gave two
99. Commander William S. Sims to Chief Bureau of Navigation,
July 12, 1907, General Board File 428.
100. Marder, Anatomy of British Sea Power, pp. 530-534.

knots less speed than the Dreadnought. Before the details for these
two ships were developed, the General Board had taken a position
significantly different from the tentative one given to the Secretary
of the Navy in October of 1904. But it took a year to do it because
of the incredible dilatoriness of the bureau structure. In June of
1905 Admiral Dewey had once again complained to the Secretary
Morton that Capps had not yet forwarded the designs requested 18
months before. ^1 Capps assured the Secretary that they were on
the way. 102 When they had not come on July 7th, a member of the
General Board called Capps and asked what had happened. Capps
reassured him that they had been sent on June 26th and should have
irrived. Dewey reported the situation to Morton's successor,
Charles J. Bonaparte; he in turn asked Capps for an explanation.
Capps answered that the plans had been found; they had been "mis-
addressed" to the Judge Advocate General's office. *03 The Board
finally received the long sought sketch plans on July 8, 1«905, a
year and one half and three Secretaries of the Navy after the original
request. 104
Receipt of Capps' sketches, the additional battle lessons drawn
from the Russo-Japanese War, and the knowledge of the British
101. Dewey to Secnav, June 10, 1905, General Board File 420-6.
102. Capps to Secnav, June 26, 1905, General Board File 420-6.
103. Capps to Secnav, July 15, 1905, General Board File 420-6.
104. Capps to Dewey, July 8, 1905, General Board File 420-6.

Dreadnought prompted the General Board to modify its October 1904
recommendation and to opt completely and wholeheartedly for the
revolutionary new battleship. Dewey saw the war as proving the
worth of "big ships, more big guns, and good shooting. " He admitted
that he b*d not felt this way earlier but now realized that the "modern
battle is fought at a range of three or four miles, " and it would be the
large all-big-gun ships like the Dreadnought that "decide the battle c "105
So strongly did he and the Board feel about it that they did not want to
wait until the next battleships were authorized by Congress. Instead,
they recommended that the 16, 000 ton South Carolina and Michigan,
whose keels were not yet laid, be modified to carry twelve 12-inch
guns (vice eight) on a displacement of 18,000 tons. 1(^ inexplicably,
cretary of the Navy Charles D. Bonaparte waited six weeks to
forward this request to the Board on Construction for evaluation.
The members of this body flatly rejected the suggestions of the
Genial Board, citing as one of the main reasons "the structural
difficulties involved in suitably locating additional 12-inch turrets...."
The Board on Construction defended the design of the South Carolina
and Michigan' and claimed for it a superiority over the Dreadnought
in every particular but speed and end-on fire. ^7 This was more
105. New York Herald, September 22, 1905, Dewey Scrapbook,
Dewey Papers. Dewey confided to Rear Admiral Caspar F.
Goodrich that he thought 40, 000 ton battleships would be in
the fleet one day. Dewey to Goodrich, November 17, 1905,
Dewey Papers.
106. Dewey to Secnav, September 30, 1905, General Board File
420-2.
107. Board on Construction to Secnav, November 23, 1905,
General Board File 420-2.

than a slight exaggeration, for the two classes were equal in broad-
cle power, the Dreadnought had a better power plant, and its guns
were placed higher above the water thus making them usable in heavy
seas. More importantly, the English had tne Dreadnought as part of
its fleet in 1906; the Michigan and South Carolina did not join American
naval forces until four years later. 1(^
In October of 1905, the General Board again recommended a
Dreadnought type ship with ten 12-inch guns, a broadside of at least
nine salvos, a speed of not less than 19 knots, and a freeboard
E
significantly higher than that of the Michigan and South Carolina. *Q°
The resistance to the large battleship still ran high, not only within
the bureau hierarchy, but in Congress, the White House, and among
some "big navy" men like Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan. As early
as 1902 Mahan warned President Roosevelt that the trend within the
a
Xavy to increase the battleship in size was harmful, for with it would
come an increase in cost and a consequent reduction in the number of
battleships authorized by Congress. He emphasized the importance
of augmenting the Navy's offensive power by increasing numbers of
ships rather than purely through the improved design of fewer ships. *
He analyzed the sea battles of the Russo-Japanese War and argued that
108. William Hovgaard, Modern History of War Ships
,
(London:
E. &F. N. Spon, Ltd., 1920), pp. 140, 146-147.
109. Dewey to Secnav, October 28, 1905, General Board File
420-2.
. 110. Mahan to Roosevelt, October 16, 1902, General Board File
420-6.

Ithey proved the importance of homogeneity, the value of the intermedi
j
r battery, and the virtue of numbers over size. HI Mahan's
reputation was so great that his opposition threatened to postpone
further evolution of the large battleship. President Roosevelt, a long-
time disciple of the "Mahan School, " told Secretary of the Navy
Charles J. Bonaparte that he had never been "quite as rabid a big-
ship man as some of [the) experts. "H2 He expressed CQncern ovej.
the removal of the intermediate battery and asked the General Board
to reassure him that the United States was doing the right thing. 1 13 .
Members of Congress were disturbed, by not only the increased cost
of the new ships, but with their deeper draft. Those who still thought
of the battleship as primarily a protector of continental ports feared
mat the larger ships would not be able to protect the coasts as well
as their forerunners. 114 !
Much of the doubt began to disappear with the publication of a
-ebunaMo Mahan's arguments. It was written by Lieutenant Com-
nander William S. Sims, one of the Navy's foremost gunnery experts
iid an aide to President Roosevelt. Exposing a number of factual
nd deductive errors in Mahan's article, Sims made a very persuasive
Hi. Alfred T. Mahan, "Reflections, Historic and Other-
InEfpby th6/attle ° f the JaP"» Sea ' " United States Navalnstitute Proceeding Vol. 32 (June, 1906 ), pp. 447-471112. Roosevelt to Bonaparte, August 20, 1906, Charles JBonaparte Collection, Library of Congress.
113. Roosevelt to Rear Admiral George A. Converse.
September 10, 1906, General Board File 420-3
!i; YCon«refs - House - Naval Affairs Committee, Hearingson Estimates Submitted by th e Secretary of the Navy
, 59th
'
Cong 2ndsess., House Doc. No. 14, (Washington, 1907)

case for the all-big-gun ship. * * D President Roosevelt was won
o , and he endorsed the Dreadnought design in a letter to the
Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, George E. Foss. **•'
Congress was, by this time, also well aware that the United States
was the only one of the leading maritime powers which had not yet
made a decision to adopt in full the Dreadnought concept. Final and
firm acceptance of a new direction for American naval building policy
was represented by the keel laying of the Delaware in November of
1907. She was the first ship of the modern Navy on which Congress
placed no restriction as to displacement. When finally completed in
April of 1910, she was the most powerful ship in the world and marked
the beginning of a new era of remarkable growth in American battle-
ship power, size, and flexibility; a growth which generally satisfied
the General Board planners. ^°
The General Board held the lightly armed, high speed protected
or scout cruiser in very high regard and, during the period from
1900 to 1914, included some of mis type in almost every year's
115. William S. Sims, The Inherent Tactical Qualities of All-
Big-Gun, One- Caliber Battleships of High Speed, Large
Displacement, and Gun-Power, " United States Naval Institute
Proceedings
,
Vol. 32 (December, 1906), pp. 1337-1366.
116. Roosevelt to Sims, September 27, 1906, Sims Papers.
117. Roosevelt to Foss, published in U.S., Congress, House,
Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings on Estimates Submitted
by the Secretary of the Navy, 59th Cong., 2nd sess. , House
Doc. No. 39, (Washington, 1907), pp. 367-370.
18. Office of Naval Intelligence, Memorandum on Comparison
of Ship Values, December 4, 1914, General Board File 420.
Delaware's statistics: 20,380 tons displacement; ten 12-inch
guns; speed 21 knots. Dictionary of American Naval




building program. On the other hand, it did not warm to the idea of
|
j heavily armored cruiser or battle cruiser. The feeling among the
Board members was that Congress would only appropriate so much
B
I money for new construction ships, so why propose a type which would
i
compete with the battleship for the dollar and yet not be so effective.
I
The heavy cruiser, called by the General Board an "uncertain battle-
ship, " represented a sacrifice in armor and armament for speed,
v
I but at a cost which approached and sometimes surpassed the price of
the battleship. *1° In addition, the Board's analysis showed that
superiority in battleships over a prospective enemy was far more
I important than a plurality of armored cruisers because of the
neater power of the former as compared to the latter. In 1907,
i
r
Admiral Dewey advised President Roosevelt that "it can be only on
very rare occasions that a Commander-in-chief would not prefer to
add another battleship to his fleet in preference to an armored
cruise?; " and he went on to say that t*he Board believed "it would be
unwise to build any vessels of a type between battleships of large
displacement and fast unarmored scouts. "120
There were a few minor exceptions to this attitude: between
1800 and 1903 the Board recommended the construction of a few
119. Richard Wainwright, The General Board, " United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 48 (February, 1922)
p. 197; R. H. Robinson, "Battle Cruisers, " lecture delivered
at the Naval War College, July 12, 1912, Naval War College
Archives, Newport, R. I.
120. Dewey to Roosevelt, January 15, 1907, General Board File
420-8.

armored cruisers; and in 1911 and 1912 it suggested the "desirability"
v
. r ' building one or two battle cruisers, but only as supplements to the
-
regular battleship construction, and based on the shallow reasoning
that it might be wise to emulate the other naval powers who were
j
constructing some of this class vessel. However, faced with a con-
| tinuing shortage of battleships, and a reluctant Congress, the Board
evidently decided not to divert attention from the larger vessels, for
-".




The cruiser function which most attracted the attention of the





movements. They considered that the scout cruiser was the perfect
-IS.
I p^cfort for this mission and, from 1903 to 1914 the Board recom-
*
mended the construction of 38 of these ships in the proportion of one
I for each battleship. The results of the fleet maneuvers in 1902 and
1903 seemed to confirm the importance of of this class, *22 but m0re
-
I significant to the Board was the experience of the Russo-Japanese
War which showed that "the collection of information ... [was] of
prime importance to success, and only second to actual fighting
strength. "123 Despite the Board's consistent support for the scout
I
cruiser, the Secretary of the Navy approved only about one-half of
121. Dewey to Secnav, May 2 5, 191 1 and September 25, 1912,
General Board File 420-2.
122. Dewey to Secnav, September 21, 1903, General Board File
420-2.
123. Dewey to Secnav, October 2, 1906, General Board File 420-2.

the number thought to be requisite; Congress was even less generous
appropriating for only three in 1903 and none after that year. 124
The primary function of the destroyer in the early 1900's was
to protect the battleship from torpedo boat attacks. It was for this
reason that the ship was originally called "torpedo boat destroyer. "
From 1900 until 1907 the Board expressed the view that there should
be one destroyer for every battleship built. In 1907 this ratio was
increased to 4:1. The principal reason for the change was the rather
remarkable development of the automobile torpedo. By 1907 the
range of this weapon was increased to 4, 000 yards and the prospects
were for even greater improvement. This meant that during night.
t'Tie attacks a torpedo boat could fire at a battleship at a distance
twyond the capability of the latter's searchlight. During the daylight
hours gun defense could be used, but with the development of the
Dreadnought and the removal of the intermediate batteries, this was
no*t as affective as it formerly was. The Board therefore felt that it
would be prudent to' provide the protection via an advanced screen of
destroyers which would be able to ward off raids by the incoming
torpedo boats. The mathematics of this screening was such that one
destroyer per battleship would not be sufficient; the Board settled on
four per heavy ship as a more acceptable proportion. The Board's
reasoning also seemed to be confirmed by the building policies of the
i
124. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420,.

two nations who had most recently waged sea warfare: Russia and
an. Russia had added 33 destroyers to her fleet since the conflict
and Japan was building at a 5:1 ratio. 12 ^
The General Board was somewhat more successful with getting
jj
its destroyer program approved than it had been with the scout
f
cruisers. The Board had proposed the construction of 133, the
!
Secretary approved 67 of these, and the Congress appropriated for
{
52.126
The least glamorous and yet in some respects the most important
I
I
I classes of ships were the auxiliaries. They were designed to provide
sea-based logistic support to the men-of-war in the form of
1
ammunition, fuel, repair, general supply, medical care and, in the
I
i case of transports, to lift marine combat forces to the war zone. As
i
with the cruisers and destroyers, the Board determined that the
|
I
numbers of these ships should be a function of battleship strength.
.
Ther-e were some variations in the optimum ratios because of changes
i
in the capabilities of the combatant ships. For example, as the
distilling capacity of vessels increased, the need for water ships
i
I
diminished and gradually disappeared. 12 7
| The auxiliary which most occupied the Board's attention was the
collier or fuel oil vessel. After all, fuel was the only critical item
of supply which was consumed en route to the battle zone; if there
125. Dewey to Secnav, December 20, 1907, General Board File
420-2.
126. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420.
127. Dewey to Secnav, September 28, 1910, General Board File

Iwas no adequate system to replenish the bunkers, the fleet would not
oc able to engage the enemy in an advanced condition of readiness.
This was the situation in 1905 when Dewey told the Secretary of the
Navy that there were no colliers "suitable for accompanying the fleet
and keeping it supplied with coal. "128 The Navy's weakness in this
respect was underscored during the cruise of the battleship fleet
around the world from 1907 to 1909. To the everlasting embarrass-
ment of American naval officers, foreign ships had to be chartered
and pre-positioned in order to fuel the fleet. 129
Rear Admiral Charles S. Sperry, who commanded the fleet,
wrote;
not the least significant lesson of the cruise was that colliers,
chartered under foreign flags failed to deliver 27,000 tons of
coal as o'rdered in New Zealand and Australia and if we can-
not have a suitable commercial marine of our own, then the
government should own sufficient colliers. 130
The Congress recognized the problem for they authorized five colliers
in the, appropriation bill for fiscal year 1909. ^l To the General
Board this was nowhere near sufficient; in 1910 it estimated that to
take a fleet of 20 battleships, and an appropriate number of cruisers
128. Dewey to Secnav, September 11, 1905, General Board File
420.
129. Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, "Admiral Evans' Own Story
of the American Navy, " Hamptons Broadway Magazine,
Vol. 21 (October, 1908^ p. 46.
130. Sperry, unpublished mss. on the cruise of the battleship
fleet, Sperry Papers.
131. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420.

apd destroyers to the Philippines via the Cape of Good Hope, would
require 150, 000 tons of coal and 16 colliers. *32
Because it felt that Congress was non-responsive to the critical
need for auxiliaries, the Board looked elsewhere for solutions. Its
war plans for the Far East required the Asiatic Fleet Commander to
keep current lists of ships which might be available for purchase in
the event of hostilities. 133 In 1905 the Board endorsed a plan which
would have granted subsidies to the U. S. Merchant Marine in
exchange for advance agreements that certain of the ships would be
\ designated as naval auxiliaries in time of war. 134 jn 1914 the Board
I reported to Secretary Josephus Daniels that:
logistic studies in connection with the recent development of
the Orange [Japan] and Black [Germany] War plans show, con-
clusively that the question of auxiliaries is of paramount
importance, and that in view of the well known preparedness
of possible enemies through carefully systematized plans for
the employment of merchant auxiliaries, .the United States
will be heavily handicapped at the outset in the sailing of the
battle fleet unless similar measures ara inaugurated and
systematically prosecuted.
The Board went on to propose the following procedure: it would pre-
scribe the number, kind and characteristics of merchant ships needed
as auxiliaries; the Navy's Board of Inspection and Survey would,
based on its inspection, designate the ships which could meet the
.132. Dewey to Secnav, February 28, 1910, General Board File
420.
133. Dewey to Secnav, February 26, 1903, General Board File
420-5.
134. Dewey to Secnav, November 23, 1905, General Board File

General Board criteria, and list the repairs required to make them,
citable for service with the Navy; the Navy Department would select
the specific ships and make advance arrangements with the owners
for immediate acquisition in the event of an emergency. It would also
lay plans to program the work needed on the ships and even specify
the Navy Yards at which the work would be performed. The General
Board's objective was to have the ships "loaded and ready to sail . .
.
not later than 20 days after a declaration of war with Black; and
sooner, if anything, after a declaration of war with Orange. " The
Board further advised that "this limit cannot be exceeded without a
delay in the sailing of the fleet which may jeopardize a campaign. "135
? "retary Daniels approved of the Board's plan in June of 1915. *36
* The response of the Navy Department and Congress to the
General Board's construction program for auxiliaries was poor: of
the 50 ships requested, the Secretary approved of 26, and the Congress
authorized 17. i37 "
The newest weapons of war with which the General Board had to
deal were the submarine and the airplane. The Board's policy with
respect to these instruments was in marked contrast to its attitude
toward the more conventional tools. While it was very progressive
in the area relating to surface ships, it adopted a conservative
135. Dewey to Secnav, August 3, 1914, General Board File 442.
136. Bryon McCandless to General Board, June 9, 1915, General
Board File 442.
137. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420.

stance vis a vis the other two dimensions of naval warfare: subsurface
air. As late as 1914, one senior member of the General Board
remarked:
from the limitations imposed by natural laws submarines and
aircraft are and must ever remain weapons of limited
action
. . .
and their operations must be confined to compara-
tive narrow limits about their own coasts and bases. Within
those limits they are formidable; but beyond them compara-
tively useless.
It is understandable that the older members of the Board looked with
disdain on the submarine and aircraft; many of them had joined the
fleet when its primary motive power was the wind. In addition they
were concerned lest the newer vehicles attract too much money from
th construction of the very essence of the fleet, the battleship. *39
The younger officers within the Navy and the General Board attempted
to counter their elders with an aggressive and enlightened outlook on
the capabilities of the new vehicles, and whatever progress was made
in the years from 1900 to 1914 was due largely to their efforts.
As late as 1907, the General Board offered the view that the
"science of aeronautics has as yet [not] sufficient importance in its
relation to naval warfare to render advisable
. .
. the establishment of
an Aeronautical Division of the Navy nor the assignment of any
officers to duty in connection therewith. "140 gy i gio, with the
i
138. Rear Admiral W. H. H. Southerland to Secnav, June 17, 1914,
General Board File 420.
139. Report of General Board Third Committee, April 22, 1912,
General Board File 407.
140. Dewey to Secnav, September 26. 1907. General RnarH Fiip

advances in aircraft technology, the Board was willing to grant some
ential to the airplane, for it suggested that its value "for use in
naval warfare should be investigated without delay . . . . "141 it went
even further in 1912 when it recommended to the Secretary that the
tactics of the airplane be developed along with its mechanical improve-
ment. At the time the Board thought that the aircraft could be used
in coast defense or as a ship or shore based scout. ^^ A year later
the Board's Third Committee reported that aircraft had "progressed
beyond the experimental stage, " and should be recognized as a
proven instrument of war. The Committee which was representative
of the younger members of the Board, warned that the capability of
aircraft would develop to the point that they would challenge the fleet
at sea, and predicted that if Germany were to acquire the much-
coveted base in the Caribbean, it could transport aircraft there for
use against the continental United States. 14 ^ In August of 1913, the
full General Board endorsed these findings and advised at a "com-
plete and trained air fleet is necessary adjunct to the Navy for
successful operations against any strong Navy possessing such an
adjunct. " The Board envisioned that the air fleet's mission would
ir»clude: mining and scouting from ships and shore. The Board also,
for the first time, asked Secretary Daniels to ask Congress for the
i
141. Dewey to Secnav, October 14, 1910, General Board File 449.
142. Dewey to Secnav, June 26, 1912, General Board File 449.
143. Memorandum by General Board Third Committee, August 19,
1913, General Board File 449.

necessary appropriations to finance the development of naval
aviation. «4 Daniels approved the General hoard's recommendation
"in general" and he agreed to take steps to carry out the suggestions
i
"as far as practicable. "145 Congress however was unwilling to
authorize appropriations for naval aviation until March of 1915. 146
The submarine occupied a unique position among the other
components of the General Board's building programs. It was,
unlike the battleships, cruisers, destroyers, auxiliaries, and air-
craft, the object of considerable Congressional generosity. Indeed,
the legislators funded for a total of 67 while the General Board asked
I
for only 50. The reason for this munificence lay in the Congress-
i
?n's fear of an enemy's attack on the coastal harbors, and the faith
which they had in the submarine as a relatively cheap form of defense.
The early attitude of the General Board toward the submarine was
that it was a valuable coast defense weapon but severely limited in
capability; it did not want to move too quickly toward a large con-
struction program until the ship had been adeuqately tested and
I
evaluated. 14 ' The Board offered the opinion in 1902 that the eight
submarines then under construction were adequate, and until their
144. Dewey to Secnav, August 30, 1913, General Board File 449.
145. Z. H. Madison to General Board, September 20, 1913,
General Board File 449.
146. Navy Yearbook, 1917 and 1918, p. 384.
147. Dewey to Congressman Henry C. Loudenslager, May 19,
1902, Dewey Papers.

designs had been operationally tested, no more should be built. 14 ^
By early 1904, Admiral Dewey was willing to concede that the time
had come to accept the submarine as an accomplished, if limited
weapon, 14 ^ and in 1905 the General Board forwarded its first request
for new submarine construction. **0 jn 1906 and 1907 the Congres-
I
I
sional appropriations for submarines began to approach almost
*•
I one-half the cost of a new battleship and far exceeded the funds being
I
I granted for destroyers. ***• This prompted the Board to express to
I the Secretary, "with the greatest emphasis, " that
-
the submarine, even if developed to the highest degree of
which its most enthusiastic admirers believe it to be capable,
can never reduce the necessity for a strong line of fighting
ships nor take the place of such a line in the scheme of
national defense. *»*2
While Dewey and the Board held to this view some of the Navy's
younger officers like Lieutenant Commander Ridley McLean saw in
. the submarine the salvation of Subic Bay from the iapanese. In his
I
? view
the easiest, quickest and most practical means as well as the
most economical, of keeping the Japanese out of Subic Bay
148. U. S.
,
Congress, House, Naval Affairs Committee, Hearings
on Appropriation Bill Subjects, 57th Cong. , 2nd sess.
,
House Doc. No. 11, (Washington, 1903), p. 78.
149. Dewey to Congressman Ernest W. Roberts, February 18,
1904, Dewey Papers.
.150. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420.
151. Navy Yearbook, 1917 and 1918, p. 247, 261.
152. Dewey to Secnav, February 27, 1907, General Board File
403.

and Manila Bay would be to send a number of submarines out
there as soon as possible. I speak feelingly of this . . . and
although I know that there are [a] number of people who are
opposed to sub-marines it would be a good time to lay aside
our prejudice and utilize them for what they are worth. *^3
Lieutenant Commander McLean was assigned to the General
Board staff in ±009 to 1911 and began a campaign to persuade his
colleagues that their static view of the submarine mission was with-
out justification. He asked that they look at it not solely in the
context of short range harbor defense, but as a part of the fleet;
*
D^
and he recommended that the Board propose the construction of 82
of these vessels for distribution throughout areas of U.S. Naval
interest. **** McLean was able to convince the Board to sponsor the
building of a large number of submarines; in September of 1912 it
advised Secretary Meyer that the Navy should ultimately have 100 of
them distributed in the fashion that McLean had suggested. 156 3ut
while it was willing to go along with McLean's quantitative require-
ments, it did not accept the thesis that the submarine was capable of
153. Ridley McLean to Sims, December 19, 1907, Sims Papers.
McLean could have reinforced his case by referring to
Dewey's appeal in 1900 for the building of experimental sub-
marines. In what was undoubtedly an overstatement,
Dewey advised the Congressmen that he would not have been
able to take Manila Bay if the Spanish had had two sub-
marines there. Dewey's testimony to House Naval Affairs
Committee, April 23, 1900. Copy attached to letter Dewey
to Congressman Henry C. Loudenslager, May 19, 1902,
Dewey Papers.
154. Memorandum on Submarines, July 1, 1911, General Board
File 420-5.
155. Ibid.
156. Dewey to Secnav, September 25, 1912, General Board File
420-2.

operating with the fleet. The Board still looked on the submarines
^ coastal defense weapons, and resisted any trend toward the larger
more sophisticated, and expensive boats, because: the state of the art
of submarine construction was not capable of producing a "fleet-type
submarine;" it feared that the more costly ship would further erode
the position of the surface ships; and finally, in order to maximize the
large numbers needed for coastal defense, the price per unit would
have to be kept low. 157 The Board maintained this position until
mid- 1914 when it conceded that the submarine had advanced to the
stage where it could be considered a "sea- going" unit of the fleet, ^^
A survey of the period from 1900 to 1914 reveals that the Board
~~ked the Navy Department and Congress for a total of 340 fleet
vessels (battleships, cruisers, destroyers), auxiliaries (colliers,
ammunition ships, tankers, supply ships, hospital ships, transports,
repair ships), and submarines. The Navy Department approved and
forwarded to Congress requests for 186 ships, and Congress appro-
priated for 181. This last figure includes 75 submarines, the only
class ship which the coast-defense oriented Congress gave more of
than were requested. Excluding the submarine category, which was
not considered a component of the fleet, the Board found that the Navy
Department supported a little over one-half of its program while the
157. General Board Report, April 22, 1912, General Board File
407.
158. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420 c

Congress appropriated for a little over one-third. The spread
ween the Navy Department and Congress is rather narrow and is
explained by the fact that the Secretaries forwarded to Congress only
those building programs which they felt had a reasonable chance of
success. 159
The Board did not fare much better in its quest for fleet balance.
Based on the number of battleships in the fleet, or to be added as a
result of congressional appropriations, and counting ships built,
building or authorized, the Navy in 1914 was short 125 vessels of the
types needed to complement the battleship. This figure comprised:
19 scout cruisers, 80 destroyers, 5 colliers and oilers, 3 repair
ships, 4 supply ships, 4 traj.sports, 5 ammunition ships, and 5
hospital ships.
The plans which the General Board first laid in 1903 for a
massive, well-balanced fleet which would provide "crushing
i
superiority" over the "menacing" Germans failed in almost every
particular. In 1914, the American fleet was far from massive. In
fact, the authoritative Naval Annual ranked the United States fourth
j in modern battleships, fourth in cruisers, and fifth in destroyers. ^O
I
It was far from being well-balanced as the figures in the previous
| paragraph indicate, and it did not provide equality with the German
159. Badger to Secnav, April 2, 1920, General Board File 420;
General Board Minutes, October 26, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 54;
General Board Minutes, May 12, 1909, Vol. 3, pp. 331-332,
160. Viscount Hythe, ed. , The Naval Annual 1914, (London:
William Clowes and Sons, 1914), pp. 76-82.

naval forces, much less a "crushing superiority. " But what the
Gv-ueral Board failed to do in peace, Congress accomplished under the
threat of involvement in the war in Europe. By passing the Naval Act
of 1916, the legislators took a great leap forward, bridged the gaps
of the past, and embarked on a new course calling for a navy not just
second to England, but second to none.

CHAPTER VIII
THE DISPOSITION OF THE FLEET
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the General Board to
American naval policy during the period from 1900 to 1914 was to
foster and nurture the concept of the "fleet in being. " When the General
Board came into existence in 1900, the Navy had ships but no fleet; it
was hardly more than the sum of its parts. Its sea-going forces were
split up into five stations: Asiatic, Pacific, North Atlantic, Sc th
At" itic, and European. 1 This system unified the ships in the geo-
graphic sense, but not tactically for they seldom operated together.
Although the North Atlantic Station had, as part of its primary mission,
multi-ship training, its commander, Rear Admiral NormaJi H.
Farquhar, advised Secretary of the Navy John D. Long that he was
unable to conduct "squadron drills and evolutions, " during the year he
had been in command, "owing to the necessity for the presence of the
vessels on detached duty.
. . .
"2 Similarly, th Commander of the
Pacific Station found that he could exercise his ships in company for
1. U. S. , Navy Department, Annual Reports for the Year 1900,






only a few weeks of the year. * Of course the problem was not a new
,,e; as early as 1895, Assistant Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo
i
told the officers at the Naval War College that it was
t
I
painful to contemplate how many officers in command of ships
have finished the cruising time allotted to them under the
present rules and customs of the navy without even once having
sailed in company or manoeuvered for one day with the other
ships of our Navy. 4
Apart from the vessels on the Asiatic station, which were engaged
I
in suppressing the Philippine Insurrection and Boxer Rebellion, the
naval operations in 1900 were designed to "show the flag" at home and
-
wherever it was needed to be shown abroad. Training of groups of
I
I "'"ips was a subsidiary requirement. Secretary Long considered the
I '-
major function of the forces on the South Atlantic station to be the
promotion of commercial interests along the eastern coast of South
America. Even those vessels in home waters along the North Atlantic
coast were utilized in large part to $how the American people how
mr
modern a navy it possessed. " While this may have been an admirable
I
purpose, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, who had the respon-
a
sibility under Secretary Long for the movement of the ships,
I
1 3. U. S. , Navy Department, Annual Reports for the Year 1900,
(Washington, 1900), pp. 553-555.
4. Opening Address delivered by William McAdoo at the Naval
War College, June 4, 1895, Naval War College Archives,
Newport, R. I.





complained that the requirement to have them attend "local celebra-
.ons" was seriously interfering with their training. 6
The character of the naval operations was reflected in the capa-
bility of the ships. Captain Bowman McCalla who commanded the
protected cruiser Newark in the Far East called the forces on the
Asiatic Station in 1900 and 1901 "most inefficient" and "easy victim to
any Naval Force
. .
. except that of Turkey* Spain, Portugal and
China. " Gunnery efficiency, which had shown the need for great
improvement during the Spanish-American War& was very poor and
contrasted unfavorably with the British fleet, and more importantly
with the most probable foe, the German Navy. 9 There was no uni-
form system of battle tactics, and whenever the infrequent occasion
arose for multi-ship evolutions, the senior officer would have to
improvise with the result that the drills were of little or no benefit to
the ships. In fact, American naval forces were in such a low state of
readiness that Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor called a Naval War
6. Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowinshield to Secretary of the Navy
(hereafter cited as Secnav), October 1, 1900, published in Navy
Department, Annual Reports for the Year 1900
, p. 448.
7. Captain Bowman H. McCalla to Lieutenant Commander William
S. Sims, Sims Papers, Office of Naval History, Washington,
D. C.
8. Of the 9500 projectiles fired by U. S. ships during the Battle of
Santiago de Cuba, only 123 or 1. 3% hit Spanish vessels at an
average range of 2800 yards. Philip R. Alger, "Errors of
Gunfire at Sea, " United States Naval Institute Proceedings,
Vol. 24 (December, 1900), pp. 575-592.
9. Secnav in Commander-in-chief, U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic
Station, January 24, 1902, General Board File 434-5.

College estimate assigning them the capability to successfully defend
German attack in the Nantucket area, a "fairy tale. "^
Despite the evident inefficiency, many of the senior officers
charged with the training of the forces afloat took little corrective
action. For them, "maneuvers and target practice were things to get
over with as soon as possible. u11 Most of the sea-going Admirals had
little interest in prosecuting an aggressive program of training, and
limited experience in organizing and directing the operations of
several vessels as a unit. Besides, their short tenure of one year or
less, together with the fact that for the great majority of them a fleet
command would be their last tour of duty before retirement, didn't
contribute to an aggressive attitude toward preparedness. Rear
Admiral Taylor on the other hand was motivated by the principle that
"a fleet is a movable thing; and as action is its vital essence, so in-
action, continued too long, is its death. " He urged his fellow naval
officers to
abandon the shallow reasoning used to convince ourselves that
it is better to lie at anchor than to be underway; better to
save the boiler; not wear out the engines; nor overstrain the
guns and waste the ammunition. We must remember how
10. Notes by Henry C. Taylor on the Solution to the Problem of
1900, " Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pa., Box 45.
11. Yates Stirling, Sea Duty
,
(New York: G. P„ Putnam's Sons,
1939), p. 94.

much our love of ease influences our judgement in these
questions, and how easily we find reasons for doing what is
comfortable and pleasing. *2
•x
£
What Taylor and the other members of the General Board wanted
*
to do was to make the Navy a more credible force - one which hope-
.
I
fully would deter Germany from an attack, or at the very least make
it apparent to that nation that the American Navy was something not to
be taken lightly. They wanted to exorcise from their brother officers
and from the Navy as a whole, "the fallacy . . . that war is a very
remote contingency. " "An awakening must take place in the service, "
the Board declared, "and we must feel and act, as do England,
France, Germany and Russia, as if war might be declared tomorrow,
_ .ily thus can the Navy be kept ready to worthily sustain, both in peace
and war, the honorable traditions of the Republic. "13
The first action of the General Board toward the objective of
sculpting a fleet out of a conglomerate of individual vessels was to
persuade Secretary Long to direct the North Atlantic Squadron to con-
duct summer maneuvers in 1901. The Board explained to Long that
one of the most important aspects of its war planning function was to
take steps to ensure that the seagoing forces could execute the plans
:
j in the event war came. Since the war plans at that time envisioned a
12. Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor, "The Fleet, " United States
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 4 (December, 1903), p. 802.
13. Admiral George Dewey to Secnav, December IS, 1901,
General Board File 434-5.

German attack in the Nantucket area, it was only logical for the Board
• suggest that maneuvers take place there. 14 The results of the two
month exercises were a source of satisfaction to Admiral George
Dewey, and he expressed delight that the waters of Nantucket Sound,
which were of great strategic significance, were "navigated by a battle
| fleet for the first time. . . . "I 5 In similar fashion, the Board
sponsored maneuvers in the Asiatic Fleet in 1902, 1° and again in the
North Atlantic command in the winter and summer of 1902. 1 •
Although Dewey and Taylor were satisfied with the progress that
had been made, they wanted to go further. In January of 1902 the
Board began laying plans for extended exercises in the Caribbean
I which would bring together, not just the vessels of one station, but all
I*-, o* the naval forces in the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Europe. 18
I
The idea was a revolutionary one. Heretofore all of the naval vessels
I in the Atlantic were distributed into three fixed areas, each commanded
I by a flag officer who received his orders direct from Washington, The
only event which formerly would fuse them together was mobilization
14. Dewey to Secnav, March 22, 1901, General Board File 434-1.
15. Dewey to Secnav, August 22, 1901, General Board File 434-1.
16. Dewey to Secnav, December 19, 1901, General Board File
434-5.
17. Rear Admiral Arent S. Crowinshield, Senior Member of
General Board present, to Secnav, January 23, 1902, General
Board File 434-2,
18. Crowinshield to Secnav, January 23, 1902, General Board
File 434-2.

for war, and then because the ships had never trained together under
a c .mon commander, their efficiency as a unified force would be
f\ low. With the objective of increasing the Navy's preparedness for
\ war, Admiral Taylor thought it advisable to practice mobilization in
!
\
peace time and get naval officers to think of the Atlantic area as a
whole and not one divided into three isolated compartments. **
Interest in the exercises was widespread; Secretary of the Navy
i William Moody called them a test of the Navy's "ability to meet war
f
.
demands, " and he directed all offices of the Department to lend their
; unqualified support. 2 ^ President Theodore Roosevelt was enthusiastic,
j
! and in order to add to the event's prestige, persuaded Admiral Dewey
[
jj
to take personal command of the forces. 21
t.
The maneuvers took place between November 15, 1902 and
January 6, 1903 and were separated into two phases: phase one con-
\ sisted of a search problem, and phase two a mobilization of all forces
I
at Culebra, Puerto Rico for exercises in fleet tactics and gunnery.
( The search problem required the "friendly forces", represented by
3
* the ships of the North Atlantic Station, to detect and destroy the "enemy"
I
{ consisting of the vessels usually assigned to the South Atlantic and
s
! European Stations. The target for the presumed enemy was Culebra
19. Taylor, "The Fleet, " United States Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 29 (December, 1903), p. 805.
20. Secnav to All Bureaus and offices of the Navy Department,
and the Naval Stations Concerned, July 24, 1902, General
Board File 434-4.
21. Roosevelt to Dewey, June 14, 1902, Dewey Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

or any of several ports on the southern coast of Puerto Rico. The
objective of the North Atlantic Squadron was to prevent the seizure of
the ports, preferably by advance detection of the oncoming raiders. 22
ff'
The results proved to be not very encouraging. The assumed enemy,
which could have been, in accordance with the current thinking of the
General Board, Germany, achieved their objective with discomforting
I
I
ease and seized the port of Mayaguez without opposition. The lesson
?.
was clear: there was need for vast improvement in the areas of
I. scouting tactics, communications, and general strategic sense. 23
4
I
The operations during the second phase were somewhat more
satisfying to Dewey, Taylor and the other members of the General
p
->ard, not because the exercises - which were after all very rudi-
mentary in nature - were performed with commendable excellence,
but because the presence of 54 Navy ships seemed to infect all hands
with a great sense of purpose and enthusiasm. Commander Nathan
Sargent, a member of the General Board wrote:
the work of the Fleet off Culebra marks a new era in our naval
I progress. The mere fact of mobilisation alone upon so large
a scale would have been a good exercise; but to mobilise at an
advanced base 1500 miles from home, and to have there not
only the fleet but all of its adjuncts, including the torpedo
22. Secnav to Commander-in-chief U. S. Naval Forces North
Atlantic Station, July 22, 1902, General Board File 434-3;
Secnav to Commander-in-chief U. S. Forces South Atlantic
Station, July 22, 1902, General Board File 434-3. .
23. Captain William Swift, General Board First Committee,
Notes on Search Problems, February 25, 1903, General
Board File 434-3.

flotilla, colliers, coal lighters, tugs, supply vessels, tenders,
. .
. is something beyond any peace exercise ever attempted in
anv service. "
Admiral Taylor wrote Secretary of the Navy William H. Moody and
told him "how widespread and deep is the effect of this concentration of
squadrons upon the zeal of the officers and their whole tone of
thought. " 25 While the psychological benefits described above were of
value, the mobilization had more important significance. It illustrated
i
that the navy was far from ready. The philosophy which guided the
i
fleet's disposition and operation had to undergo a drastic change if it
was to become an effective instrument of war; the fleet had to be much
more than the sum of its parts; it had to be organized in peace as it
wr-'ld fight in war; the showing of the flag had to become secondary to
the training of the eet as a unit. As Admiral Taylor expressed it:
peace cruising must yield as well as the old tradition of
exhibiting our ships to foreign nations. The times have
changed. Instant readiness for war has become indispensable,
and all other questions must bow before it. 2 ^
As a direct result of the General Board maneuvers of 1902-1903,
American naval forces underwent a fundamental reorganization. The
24. Memoranda entry in Commander Nathan Sargent's Diary of
1903, Sargent Papers, Naval Historical Foundation Collection,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
25. Taylor to Moody, William H. Moody Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
26. Taylor to Dewey, January 15, 1903, General Board File 434-4.

past practice of scattering battleships throughout the world was changed
ar H instead they were concentrated into two fleets, the North Atlantic
^
and Asiatic, with 70 per cent of the strength in the former and 30 per
cent in the latter. The other stations - Pacific, European, and South
Atlantic - remained but at considerably reduced strength. *
«
Although a full discussion of the Venezuelan "crisis" of 1902-
1903 is beyond the scope of this study, it might be well to point out the. .
{ General Board view of the relationship between the Anglo- German
.• blockade of Venezuela and the American fleet mobilization. It does
J
not appear that the maneuvers were planned or executed as a counter-
move to the Anglo-German intervention; nor is there any evidence in
the General Board Files to indicate that Dewey was advised by
' Vvcishington that his forces might be called on to intervene as indicated
>•
by President Theodore Roosevelt's now famous letter to William R,
28Thayer of August 1916. If Dewey had received such a directive it
would have probably been issued sometime between December 8 to
25, 1902.29 Fleet drills were cancelled on December 18 "on
account of uncertainty regarding Venezuelan matters, " but this action
27. Navy Department, Annual Reports, 1903
, pp. 465-478, 649.
28. In this letter, Roosevelt told how he issued an ultimatum to
Germany and alerted Dewey1 s fleet for action. Roosevelt to
William R. Thayer, August 21, 1916, Roosevelt Papers,
Library of Congress. About the same time Dewey also
claimed that he had orders from Washington "to hold the fleet
in hand and be ready to move at a moments notice. " Dewey
to Henry A. Wise Wood, May 23, 1916, Dewey Papers.
29. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the R i se o f
.
America to World Power, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
• 1956), pp. 416, 419.

seemed to be prompted by Dewey's own sense of concern that things
m' ht get out of hand rather than any specific orders from Washington. 30
On December 10 Dewey did direct the ships anchored outside Great
Harbor, Culebra to be ready "to move ships at slow speed on short
notice, " however this was undoubtedly motivated solely by a desire to
protect the unexposed ships from the onset of sudden winds which might
cause them to drag anchor. 31 These two instances were the only
> occasions that the fleet departed from its standard, exercise-oriented
routine. Even the scheduled dispersal of ships to various ports for
holiday leave and liberty went as scheduled.
While it is apparent that there were no directives or plans to
intervene, there was widespread conviction among members of the
General Board that the presence of the American fleet in the Caribbean,
!
acted as a restraining force on the Germans, and that they would have
gone much further than they did had it not been for the numerically
superior U. S. fleet. In this connection, Admiral Taylor told Secretary
Moody that it was a "singular accident tnat all these things should come
about just as we achieve this very powerful concentration in this corner
of the 'American Mediterranean'.
. .
.
"32 Dewey told his son that he
had "no doubt the Venezuela question would have given considerable
30. Sargent's Diary, December 18, 1902, Sargent Papers.
31. Fleet General Order No. 6, December 10, 1902, General
Board File 434-4.
J2. Taylor to Moody, December 14, 1902, Moody Papers.

trouble had it not been for this splendid fleet on the spot. "33
immander Nathan Sargent recorded in his diary that it was
particularly fortuitous that just as the powers made their
demonstration upon Venezuela we should have so large and im-
posing a naval force in hand in the Caribbean. This did much
to strengthen our government in its attitude and its communi-
cations with the aggressive powers. Our establishment of a
battleship squadron . . . and our show of force has done much
to preserve peace and render our diplomacy effective. 34
Tayfcor also told Moody of a letter he had received from President
Roosevelt's brother-in-law, Captain William S. Cowles expressing the
view that the "presence of the fleet in these waters, concentrated and
organized for work, was probably a convenience to the administration
in discussing the Venezuelan situation. " Taylor commented that he
was "pleased that this was so, although the concentration was not
suggested with any reason but that of perfecting the fleet. ""
Up to this time the principal motivation of homogenizing the fleet
was training for war, but in the summer of 1903, the Naval War
College conducted a study which indicated that the concentration of
battleship forces was strategically necessary; in fact, the conclusion
was reached that even the division into two fleets was unwise and all
battleships should be concentrated in the Atlantic. The War College
argued that until the Panama Canal was completed, the only feasible
33. Dewey to son George, January 4, 1903, Dewey Papers,
Office of Naval History, Washington, D. C.
34. Memoranda entry in Sargent's Diary of 1903, Sargent Papers.
35. Taylor to Moody, December 25, 1902, Moody Papers.

wartime route for the U. S. fleet between the Atlantic and Pacific was
around Cape Horn. This meant that Germany, with U. S. forces split
between the two oceans, held "an inner line" permitting it to strike in
I either direction with a superior fleet. If, on the other hand, major
l
U. S. forces were concentrated in one ocean they would approximate in
size the German fleet and thus deter an attack, or be in a position to
repel one if it were launched. Since the threat was foremost in the
j
Atlantic it was there that the American naval forces should be con-
I
I
centrated. The War College concluded that:
habitual concentration is Blue's [United States'] only safeguard
unless the battle fleet is at least one and one-half times the
strength of Black's [Germany's]. It is particularly noticeable
that such concentration is the policy of Black and of all other
great powers except Great Britain, which maintains a small
battleship squadron in the East. Now, in the fall of 1903, the
actual state of things is as follows: Black's battleship fleet is
' concentrated in home waters; 30% of Blue's battleships in com-
mission are in Asiatic waters. The Blue concentrated battle
fleet should include all the battleships, all the armored cruisers,
exfcept one detailed as flagship of the Asiatic Station, cruisers
.
able to make not less than 17 knots, destroyers, colliers,
ammunition and supply ships. 36
Captain Charles S. Sperry was President of the Naval War College at
the time this opinion was offered, and he undoubtedly influenced it.
Actually, it was in keeping with a view Sperry expressed in July of
1901 to the effect that the major concern was a German attack in the
Atlantic area and the distribution of forces should be made accordingly.
IFen U.S. Naval War College, "Solution, Problem of 1903,""""
Part II, Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 45.

At the time he felt that the General Board was paying too much heed
to t. situation in the Far East and recommending the allocation of
I excessive forces to that area of the world. •>* Sperry's views differed
sharply from those held by the majority of his colleagues on the
General Board. They believed that concentration was essential for
strategic reasons and for tactical training, but were unwilling to go
as far as Sperry and the War College. They felt that to opt for total
concentration in the Atlantic would be tantamount to an abandonment
i
of U. S. responsibilities in the Far East, and with it would come an
abrupt decline in U. S. trade. In October of 1901, Dewey advised
Secretary Long that the "growing interest" of the United States "in
the "^ast will probably necessitate the keeping of a large naval force in
those waters. " Commander Nathan Sargent felt that the defense of
the Philippines, protection of American commerce, and support of the
Open Door all demanded a substantial fleet in the Far East. Blind
adherence to the doctrine of concentration would, in his opinion,
result in the loss of Oriental trade and "raise a hue and cry from San
Francisco to Boston. "39 Rear Admiral Henry C. Taylor was
37. Charles S. Sperry to wife, July 30, 1901, Sperry Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
38. Dewey to Secnav, September 26, 1901, General Board File
405.
39. Memorandum on The Disposition of Our Naval Forces, by
Commander Nathan Sargent, undated but circa 1902, Dewey
Papers.

convinced that total concentration in the Atlantic would be a grave
rru-^ake and would be in a effect a signal to the world that the United
States was retreating from the Philippines and its other interests in
the Far East. 40
The conflict of opinion together with the growing Russo-Japanese
tensions in the Far East prompted Secretary Moody to ask the General
Board for a reappraisal of the current distribution policy. 41 The
i
Board considered the question for a full two weeks, and Admiral
Dewey took the unprecedented step of participating in the discussions
An
with the Executive Committee. * Sperry presented the War College
view, and Rear Admiral Taylor emphasized the favorable impact
w'
%h the current battleship apportionment had on "trade, political,
and international relations. " He added that he was influenced in his
opinion by a recent conversation that he had had with Mr. Brooks
Adorns. 43
AT-thougJi Admiral Taylor didn't say so at this meeting there was
another incident of recent occurrence which had considerable impact.
As the debate over concentration was going on in the Board offices,
President Roosevelt ordered the Commander-in-chief of the Asiatic
40. Taylor to Stephen B. Luce, Luce Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress.
41. Moody to Dewey, November 20, 1903, General Board File
420-1.
42. General Board Minutes, November 20 - December 4, 1903,
Vol. 1, pp. 365-374.
43. General Board Minutes, December 4, 1903, Vol. 1, p. 374,

>Fleet to sail immediately with his three battleships and four cruisers
for ^onolulu. This action served to strip the Asiatic waters of all the
effective American sea power, but it did not apparently have any con-
nection with the situation in the Far East, or the discussions within
the Board. As Rear Admiral Taylor explained it:
when the Panama question was hot, there was reason to believe
that Chile might want to take a hand, and we figured our small
force on the Pacific side of the Isthmus as much inferior to
what Chile could send there. For this reason the President
a-ad Mr. Moody decided to send the Asiatic force as far as





Although the ships soon returned to their normal employment in the
Fa" East, the effect of their departure on the Japanese was pro-
nounced. Admiral Taylor received a visit from a representative of
the Japanese Legation in Washington which he described to Admiral
Dewey in the following words:
I had no sooner arrived in my office from the General Board
than a representative of the Japanese Legation, Mr. Stevens,
appeared showing me a cable (this is quite confidential) from
the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Japanese
Minister here asking that inquiry be made why, at this juncture,
our battleships should be ordered away from the coast of Asia*
Mr. Stevens said that the Japanese Minister was much dis-
turbed and that the presence of our battleships, although it was
known that we would take no part in any conflict, was of the
greatest weight in influencing negotiations between Japan and
Russia. 45
44. Taylor to Luce, December 9, 1903, Luce Papers, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress.
45. Taylor to Dewey, December 2, 1903, Dewey Papers.

To Taylor, the Japanese reaction proved the soundness of his views on
ti._ distribution of battleships, and indicated that their disposition
should not only take into consideration training and strategic concen-
tration, but political conditions as well.
The final Board decision represented a compromise; on the one
hand it declared that "the proper military policy, taken as a general
principle, ... is the concentration of all the battleships in the Atlantic";
on the other hand it recognized that
under present conditions, viz. , the imminence of war between
Russia and Japan, the presence of a battle squadron in the
East is necessary; and so long as the very unsettled condition
shall continue in the East, the detail of not less than three
battleships in the Pacific is advisable. 46
<-Two days later Admiral Taylor received a letter from Rear
Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, in response to a request by Taylor for his
opinion on the advisability of withdrawing the battleship fleet from the
Par East. Mahan wrote:
In considering possible wars with the great nations of the
world, it seems to me inconceivable that any one of them
should expect seriously to modify, or weaken, our position in
this hemisphere. Naval success of a moment there might be;
but our position, numbers, and wealth,
. .
. must forbid to any
European state the hope of permanent assertion against us on
this side of the Atlantic. Great Britain has abandoned the idea;
who better than she could maintain it?
46. Dewey to Secnav, December 5, 1903, General Board File
420-1.

In the East -- and that means all the Pacific -- the case is
very different. All of them, have there interests and aspirations
common to them a/id us; and are, some more, some less, in a
position to maintain them. Concerning that field,
. .
. much re-
mains to be determined. Further, and as a military consider-
ation more important, all of them have in the Pacific exposed
remote interests, against which we can take the offensive
,
always the desirable attitude. The danger of those positions
will constrain the action of each several country -- I forbear
names.
To remove our fleet -- battle fleet -- from the Pacific
would be a declaration of a policy and a confession of weakness.
It would mean a reversion to a policy narrowly American, and
essentially defensive, which is militarily vicious How
direct the fleet? Should not the answer be -- At some enemy's
interest? We cannot so do towards Europe; and, save Great
Britain or France, no European state can towards the
Carribbean, for want of coal stations; but both they and ws can
attack in the Far East.
In brief, the A_merican question, the Monroe principle,
though not formally accepted, is as nearly established as is
given to international questions to be. The Pacific and Eastern
is not in that case, and is the great coming question, as far as
one can easily foresee. '
While the General Board did not, in its estimate of the threat, go to
the extent which Mahan did in discounting the importance of the
Atlantic area, his strong views 6n the Far East were undoubtedly used
i
by the Board and Taylor as reserve ammunition to reinforce their
convictions. Secretary Moody endorsed the Board's recommendations
of December 5, 1903 and the 70-30 battleship distribution policy
remained in effect until August of 1906.
In the intervening period the Board had several discussions about
the possibility of expanding the Asiatic Fleet but they were not
,
.47. Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan to Taylor, December 7, 1903,
General Board File 420-1.

incorporated into any formal proposals to the Secretary. In
D**>ember of 1904, the Board's First Committee expressed the hope
I
that, when the Navy had 20 battleships in commission, (this would
occur in mid-1907), 12 would be stationed in the Atlantic, and 8 in the w
Pacific. The squadron in the Pacific would be distributed into two
divisions of four ships each which would range throughout the Pacific c:
area and join together once each year for maneuvers. "*8 Their ' -
function would be "to impress foreign nations with the power of the
United States to protect its interests, and, at the same time, carry
on the exercises necessary for efficiency. "4 ^ In January of 1905 the
Board took up a request from the'Asiatic Fleet commander for one
ac ;ional battleship so that he would have a total of four. 50 Some
m^ibers thought that any such expansion was a political matter and
should be left up to the President and the Secretary of the Navy.
FiSaily,* the Board decided not to take any action on the request
to
pfooably because President Roosevelt had already rejected the notion
of augmenting the fleet in the Far East. *>1
By August of 1906 many of the conditions which indicated the
presence of battleships in Asian waters had changed: the menacing
48. General Board Minutes, December 20, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 81.
49. Ibid.
, p. 80.
50. Rear Admiral Yates Stirling to Secnav, August 10, 1904,
General Board File 420-1.
51. General Board Minutes, January 24, 1905, Vol. 2, pp. 114-
115; Roosevelt to Moody, February 13, 1904, Elting E.
Morison, ed. , The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol. 4,}
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 729;
hereafter cited as Roosevelt Letters.

Russians had been dealt a crushing defeat by the Japanese; Prime
inister Katsura Taro had assured Secretary of War Taft that Japan
harbored no aggressive designs on the Philippines; the upsurge of
Chinese nationalism over the exclusion of coolie immigrants had
subsided by the spring of 1906. With an atmosphere of detente in the
Pacific, naval war planners once again turned their full attention to
Germany. The war game played at the Naval War College in the
summer and fall of 1905 seemed to confirm the wisdom of concen-
trating the battle fleet in the Atlantic, particularly since Germany had
completed four battleships in 1904 and 1905 while the United States
was adding only two to its forces. 52 In any event, and without
apparent consultations with the General Board or President Roosevelt,
the Navy Department decided in the summer of 1906 to withdraw ail
battleships from Asiatic waters, and by September they were on their
way. ^ The departure met with President Roosevelt's approval.
Indeed, without knowing of the Navy's plans, and concerned over the
incidents in the Pribilof Islands which led to the killing of Japanese
sea poachers, he suggested to Secretary of the Navy Charles J.
Bonaparte that it might be advisable to remove the battleships in case
trouble developed.
TT. Naval War College, "Solution to the Problem of 1905, "
Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center,
Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 46, Part 3, p. 29.
53. William R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific,
1897-1909, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), p. 188.
54. Roosevelt to Bonaparte, August 10, 1906, Morison, ed.
,
Roosevelt Letters, Vol. 5, p. 353.

By this time Roosevelt had thoroughly digested the lessons of the
ssQ-Japanese War. To him, one of the most significant was the
effect of the Russian Navy's strategic disposition on the outcome of the
war. When the conflict began, her naval forces were divided between
European waters and the Pacific. This permitted Admiral Togo of the
Japanese Navy to overwhelm first the Pacific detachment, then, when
Admiral Rodjestvensky sailed for the Pacific with his Baltic fleet,
Togo met and defeated him in the Battle of Tsushima in May of 1905,
The Russian experience made a profound impression on President
Roosevelt, and he was determined to profit from it. In January of
1907, Admiral Mahan, upset by a newspaper story that the President
was planning to send four battleships to the Pacific, warned him
against dividing the fleet. .Roosevelt replied with a denial of the
rumor, an assurance that he was not capable of such an "act of utter




were withdrawn from Asia. *** A few years later, on bis final day in
office, he left his successor, William Howard Taft, "one closing
legacy:
Under no circumstances divide the battleship fleet between the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans prior to the finishing of the Panama
Canal...
.
There were various factors which brought about
Russia's defeat; but most important by all odds was her having
divided her fleet between the Baltic and the Pacific... ,°°
55. Roosevelt to Mahan, January 12, 1907, Morison, ed.
,
Roosevelt Letters , Vol 5, pp. 550-551.
56. Roosevelt to Taft, March 3, 1909, Morison, ed. , Roosevelt
Letters, Vol. 6, p. 1543.

While events in the far-off Pribilof Islands did not disturb the
an. able relations between the United States and Japan., the decision
I of the San Francisco School Board in October of 1906 to segregate
Japanese students created an air of tension and provoked a fundamental
re- examination of American strategic priorities, and particularly the
disposition of the fleet. Serious naval planning did not begin until
early 1907, principally because Board members were not possessed
with any sense of urgency in the early stages of the crisis. 57 in the
event of war, and recognizing that the U. S. naval forces then in the
Orient were completely outmatched by the Japanese, the Board
estimated that the Japanese naval strategists would divide their fleet
into three parts; the strongest would accack the Philippines, a raiding
k squadron would destroy base facilities in Guam and Hawaii, and a
small number of vessels would be left in the home waters to protect
the coast. Japan was permitted the luxury of dividing her fleet
because the United States had not done so with hers; and she would
have a completely free hand for about three months until a force
superior to hers could arrive from the Atlantic. To some within the
General Board the policy of concentration in the Atlantic meant the
abandonment of the Philippines and other interests in the Far East,
and condemned the United States to a policy of inaction until the cum-
bersome move could be made from the Atlantic to the Pacific, To
57. Chapter V, p. 160.
<
avoid this they proposed an immediate increase in the Asiatic Fleet*
i
eluding the dispatch of enough battleships to defend Subic Bay until
the remainder of the Atlantic Fleet could arrive. This action would
also defend Hawaii and Guam since the Japanese would be reluctant to
| divide their force in the face of increased American strength. Of
I
course it might also deter the Japanese from attacking at all. 58
i
Dew'ey could hardly go on record as advocating this prqposal m the
1
face of Roosevelt's intransigeance with respect to concentration.
Instead, he strongly recommended that the fleet remain in the Atlantic
|
i
and, if necessity so dictated, that it proceed en masse to the Pacific.
1
In Dewey's view, a splitting of the fleet would be heresy not only in
l the light of the Russian experience, but also because any attempt to
i
i^jrin a divided fleet when war threatened would be interpreted by the
potential enemy as tantamount to a declaration of war, and would
therefore hamper diplomatic efforts aimed at forestalling the fighting.
i Je rejected the notion that retention of the battleships in the Atlantic
meant surrender in the Pacific; on the contrary, with the ships to-
gether, command of the sea would be assured and, if the Japanese had
I
control before their arrival, they would soon be able to wrest It from
her. Concentration in the Pacific was specifically rejected because
58. Unofficial General Board memorandum, January 28, 1907,
Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center, Case
No. 47, FRC locator 303472. This was a working paper used
at war planning conference at the Army War College and was
probably prepared in the General Board's First Committee,.
(
there was no fortified base in the Far East from which to operate, and
the Pacific coast navy yards were not capable of rendering adequate
*
I support to so large a force. It was also pointed out that if concentra-
t
i
tion in the Atlantic was the policy adopted by the major European
t
powers who also had interests in Asia, why should it not also apply to
I
the United States. Dewey hedged his recommendations in two particu-
I
lars: "political considerations" might dictate a "temporary departure,
"
II but when the conditions ceased to exist the fleet should be reassembled;
further, there would come a time before the completion of the Panama
Canal when the fleet could be safely divided. This point would be
reached when the Navy had 30 battleships, (at the current rate of
g: /th, this would be in 1911) and when the facilities on the West
Coast and at Subic had been "sufficiently developed and protected to
n^ake them real bases..
. .
" 59
The prospects for war appeared to diminish after President
Roosevelt extracted a promise from the San Francisco School Board to
rescind their offensive order, but the optimism soon faded. The San
Francisco riots in May 1907, and the vigorous reaction of the
Japanese press convinced many of the Navy's war planners that their
theories might be put to a test. The Naval War College, for the first
time, ranked Japan ahead of the perennial favorite, Germany, on its
list of probable enemies. The officers at the Summer Conference of
59. Dewey to Secnav, April 25, 1907, General Board File 420-1.
i
1907 did not think that the Japanese leaders really wanted war. Their
ultimate obj active was thought to be the conquest of China. Besides
Japan's financial condition was none too secure. On the other hand,
the recent agreements which Japan had made with Russia and France,
coupled with the long-standing Anglo-Japanese Alliance, gave her
considerable freedom of action in Asia. These factors together with
i
| the pressure of public opinion in the country could force them to use
\
war as a solution to the "serious race antagonism c "60 Admiral
-
Dewey and his colleagues on the General Board were also registering
a state of alarm. They advised the Secretary of the Navy of the
r<
importance of maintaining a degree of secrecy at Subic Bay to guard
ac .nst possible espionage. The Japanese in the island were singled
L out as likely infiltrators, and it was hypothecated that they might
attempt to disguise themselves as natives. In response, Secretary
Vic. dc H. Metcalf sent cablegrams of warning to the appropriate U. Sc
1
I naval authorities which communicated the Board's plea for watchful-
ness. °* Captain Sargent also felt a new sense of urgency. He told
his fellow Board members that
making all due allowance for exaggeration in current reports,
it cannot be doubted that the present attitude of the Japanese
agitators is such as to render possible international compli-
cations which may result in war. Our recollections need go
back but a very few years to recall the period precedent to our
•
~~TT
60. Naval War College, "Solution to the Problem of 1907, Naval
War College Records, Federal Records Center, Mechanics-
burg, Pa., Box 47, p. 101.
6.1. Dewey to Secnav, June 17. 1907. General Board File 405.

war with Spain, and to remind us to what extent a country
ordinarily as imperturbable and conservative as our own can
be aroused and provoked into a warlike spirit by the efforts of
a yellow press and its belligerent proselytes. If such was then
the case with us, how much more may it be now with a belli-
cose people whose heads are already turned by successful war
waged against an incapable enemy, and whose feelings are
being worked upon by adroit politicians with subtle arguments
on questions of race antipathy and alleged details of persecu-
tion of their compatriots. These may be but adroit measures
to annoy the existing government on the part of +he opposition
leaders, but should their provocations result in a change of
ministry the matter might suddenly assume grave proportions, 62
Sargent also challenged the theory of concentration, stating it was valid
when the number of capital ships was small but that now with 22 battle-
ships and 10 armored cruisers available or nearly completed
it would seem that not only is it unnecessary to maintain so
large a force in the Atlantic, but that our duty to the Pacific
Coast should not be neglected now that we are in a position to
satisfy its just demands. With a squadron of battleships and
aymored cruisers in those waters all danger of any raiding
attack upon Hawaii or upon the mainland would be averted, for
even such "enterprising enemies as the Japanese would not
venture so far from home unless they considered themselves
immune from attack upon their convoys of supplies and free to
coal without molestation. Without such a force an attack might
readily be anticipated, for the size of the Japanese fleet is
such that one portion of it could be sent to capture the Philip-
pines while another could make a demonstration upon our coast
in order to divert our movements and to prevent the despatch of
any force to relieve those islands. It may be urged by some
that a naval force of this size cannot be maintained upon the
Pacific coast owing to the lack of repair facilities, but with the
commercial resources of Seattle, Tacoma and San Francisco
added to those of our Yards at Bremerton and Mare Island and
the drydock and machine shops of Esquimau, which could be
used for the smaller vessels in time of peace, there should be
62. General Board Minutes, June 15, 1907, Vol. 3, pp. 107-108.

little difficulty in effecting such repairs as would be needed. ...
It is not suggested that a casus belli be given to Japan by the
immediate despatch of a large force to the Pacific, but ought
not the contingency of sending this force be considered, as
also the time and manner of so transferring it from one side of
our continent to the other that the susceptibilities of the
Japanese may not be injured.
Sa>*gent went on to say that he was well aware of the importance of
fleet concentration but suggested that it
i
may have become subject to some degree of modification and
that with our gain in naval strength and with our interests in
separate oceans so far apart as practically to require separate
forces for their protection, the concentration of the whole at
a distance of 11, 000 miles from a threatened point may not be
| a logical application of strategical principles. 63
F ~gent did not specify the exact number of ships he would send to the
s
i
{ " Pacific. He did refer to "a squadron of battleships and armored
1
cruisers" which, in accordance with the terminology then current,
I
could have been anywhere from eight to sixteen ships. The Board's
v.v.r pluns, developed in January of 1907, and predicated on war with
3
Japan, called for the dispatch of sixteen battleships to the Pacific,
if
£
i i. e. all then assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. °4
I
The Board did not act immediately on Sargent's request; but two
l.
.
days after it was offered it adopted the following resolution:
"Resolved: That it is the opinion of the General Board that, at as
early a date as practicable, not less than sixteen (16) battleships be
63. General Board Minutes, June 15, 1907, Vol. 3, pp. 107-111,
64. Ibid.

f assembled in the Pacific. " The Board then directed Rear Admiral
I
\Viilard H. Brownson "to communicate the foregoing resolution
| verbally to the Secretary of the Navy, in order that greater secrecy
I
might be preserved in relation thereto. "65 Metcalf so advised
f President Roosevelt, and on the following day the Joint Board con-
curred with the General Board proposal. 66 The resolution put
forward by the General Board fulfilled both the need for concentration
and the necessity to have some show of force in the troubled Pacific.
That it did not conform to Sargent's plan for a smaller force, is
i
probably due to the unfavorable reaction which such a proposal would
have on the concentration conscious Roosevelt; in addition, a voyage
o' lesser number of vessels would not provide the opportunity for a
full dress rehearsal of the Board's war plans.
The undertaking was a large one and there was some reason to
wonder about the outcome. The most recent precedent for a cruise
of such distance^ for so many ships, was the voyage of the Special
Service Squadron in September of 1893 consisting of two battleships,
five colliers and two supply ships. Although all of the vessels had
received overhauls just before their departure, the journey was
plagued by all manner of engineering breakdowns. 67 The anticipated
65. General Board Minutes, June 17, 1907, Vol. 3, p. 114.
66. Dewey to Taft, June 18, 1907, cited in Thomas A. Bailey,
Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises
,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1934), p. 216.
67. Reai* Admiral Albert S. Barker to Dewey, July 31, 1907,
General Board 'File 420-1. Dev/ey asked Barker for his
experiences on that cruise because of the upcoming voyage
r\f +Vio >\ o ++ 1 £» o 1-n T-> fleet
(
I>!
difficulty was one motivating factor in Roosevelt's decision to send
the ships. He told Senator Henry Cabot Lodge
it became evident to me, from talking with the naval authorities,
that in the event of war they would haVe a good deal to find out
in the way of sending the fleet to the Pacific. Now, the one
thing that I won't run the risk of is to experiment for the first
time in a matter of vital importance in time of war. Accord-
ingly I concluded that it was imperative that we should send
the fleet on what would .practically be a practice voyage. I do
not intend to keep it in the Pacific for any length of time; but
I want all failures, blunders, and shortcomings to be made
apparent in time of peace and not in time of war. ^8
:
Despite the claim of Roosevelt that it was he who authored the idea of
the world cruise, and notwithstanding the probability that he had been
thinking of it ever since the disastrous voyage of Admiral Rodjestvensky
.'rom the Baltic to the Pacific, it is clear that the Board resolution of "
—
69June 17. 1907 was the act which gave rise to his decision.
In July of 1907 Rear Admiral Henry N. Manney, on special duty
"" r
:th the Bureau of Equipment, wrote the President and advised him
that the dispatch of the battleship fleet to the Pacific would be a
"military mistake*. " Manney reasoned that the campaign which Japan
would wage against the United States would depend on her finances,
and these were very limited. In Manney 1 s fantastic scenario, Japan
would not undertake costly expeditions to capture the Philippines or
I
68. Roosevelt to Lodge, July 10, 1907, Morison, ed. , Roosevelt
Letters, Vol. 5, p. 709. The "naval authorities" to which
Roosevelt makes reference were member:, of the General
Board. Roosevelt to Root, July 13, 1907, Ibid. , p. 717.
69. Robert A. Hart, The Great White Flee t, (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1965); Brownson to Dewev. October fi

the Hawaiian Islands, but she would, with unarmored vessels, seize
uases in southern Alaska from which to harass the Pacific Coast. The
Japanese battle fleet would in turn be deployed to the Atlantic, and
there it would capture appropriate advance bases such as Nantucket
Island, and wreak havoc along the entire length of the coast. Mean-
while, the U. S. fleet would have concentrated in the Pacific and, on
hearing of the activities of the Japanese fleet, return to the Atlantic,
but in such wretched condition after the long cruise that it would be
no match for the Japanese. Manney concluded that "while our fleet
may protect only one coast, prudence would indicate that the more
valuable and vulnerable" should be protected and unquestionably this
' s the Atlantic. 70
Roosevelt did not really take Manney very seriously?! but
decided to solicit the General Board's views on his estimate, "* The
Board replied that the only common ground between it and Admiral
Manney was that "Japan shall shape her policy with a view to the
70. Rear Admiral Henry N. Manney to President Roosevelt,
July 19, 1907, General Board File 420-1.
71. He wrote his naval officer brother-in-law, Captain William S.
Cowles: "Is Admiral Manney a lunatic? He has sent me some
thoughts on the Japanese and our fleet going to the Pacific
which really would do discredit to an outpatient of Bedlam. "
Roosevelt to Cowles, July 24, 1907, Morison, ed. , Roosevelt
Letters, Vol. 5, p. 726.
72. Roosevelt to Acting Secnav Truman H. Newberry, July 24,
1907, Ibid., p. 725.

utmost economy of expenditure;" otherwise it was in total disagree-
ment with his estimate. The Board was convinced that the Philippines
would be Japan's first target, it ruled out any attempt at operations
along the Atlantic coast, and it strongly defended its decision to
deploy the battleships to the Pacific. The Board concluded with a.
plea destined to be misunderstood by Roosevelt:
our interests in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are each such
as to require protection by a battle fleet, and, the distance
between these oceans being so great as to preclude the possi-
bility of a single fleet giving adequate protection to both, the
military interests of the United States require that we should
possess two fleets, one in each ocean, each fleet capable of
caring for interests in the region which it is charged to
protect. •**
Roosevelt interpreted the. Board's statement, quoted above, as
favoring a departure from the sacred principle, "Concentration.
"
and while "heartily' approving of all else put forth by the Board he
was convinced:
if any one lesson is taught by the Russo-Japanese war, and
indeed by naval history generally, it is that in the effort to
protect even two important points a division of force may mean
the failure to protect either and the final loss of the war.
Before the war with Japan the Russian naval authorities took
precisely the view now taken by the General Board, namely:
that their interests in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans were
such as to require protection by two battle fleets, one in each
ocean, each capable of caring for the interests in the region
73. Rear Admiral John P. Merrell, Senior Member Present
General Board to Acting Secnav, August 2, 1907, General
Board File 420-1, July 19, 1907.

:which it was charged to protect. In consequence the Russians
were obliged to wait until the Japanese had destroyed their
Pacific battle fleet, and then to see them destroy the Atlantic
battle fleet when it got out there. I do not intend to run the
slightest risk of any such disaster. ... I want our fleet to be
a unit. If there is a war we must run the risk of raids on the
Atlantic coast and accept the inevitable howl that will come,
merely using such monitors and torpedo vessels as are
available, together with any unarmored cruisers, to try to
protect the Atlantic coast.
When our fleet goes to the Pacific I want every battleship
and armored cruiser that can be sent to go. So far from, its
I being a war measure to send our fleet there, I regard it as
reSily a peace measure. It will show other nations what we
can do and it will let us ourselves tell what we can do and
what the shortcomings that must be remedied are. My idea
is probably merely to send the fleet around the world. But
in any event, I will not leave in one ocean a considerable
fragment of the fleet, not enough to greatly weaken by its
absence the remainder of the fleet. This seems to me
elemental. ' 4
Roosevelt's sharp words obviously stung the Board members for
I
they felt, with considerable justification, that the President had mis-
construed the paragraph in question. It had been the Board's inten-
j
ti6n to
emphasize the inadequacy of the present fleet to meet the
demands upon it, and to indicate the direction towards which
our building program should tend. So far as the disposition of
the existing forces is concerned, the Eoard's views coincide
precisely with those expressed by the President. . . . The
General Board has no thought of departing from the principle
of fleet concentration, which it originally proposed and has
since consistently advocated --at times against weighty
opposition.
74. Roosevelt to Newberry quoted in Newberry to Rear Admiral
J. P. Merrell, August 8, 1907, General Board File 420-1,
July 19, 1907;-
75. Merrell to Secnav, August 15, 1907, General Board File
4-20-1
. .Tulv 19. 1907.

By late September and early October 1907, the fears that the
Ui-.ed States and Japan would go to war began to subside, and in
| December of the same year, the Atlantic fleet began the first leg of
a voyage which would eventually span the globe. Despite the de-
creasing tensions there were demands, notably from Army men, that
the fleet be retained in the Pacific until all danger was past. They
did not feel that they could defend American interests without a
powerful battle fleet. 76 These concerns apparently prompted the
General Board to take a somewhat more flexible stand on concentra-
tion. In February of 1908, it declared that the fleet should be
stationed in the "region where the greatest danger exists. " Just
whr i this would be was not, in the Board's view, a question which
|
naval officers should decide, but it depended on the "country's inter-
national relations" and the decision of the "Administration. " 77 The
Joint Board in its advice to President Roosevelt was a bit more
explicit. It suggested that the battle fleet should remain in the
Pacific until the "threatening complications" had ceased to exist.
The Joint Board counsel caused Roosevelt to wonder whether this
might not be a good idea, but on hearing that the Navy Department had
deep doubts that it could support the ships with the sparse facilities
76. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909,
p. 225.
.
General Board memorandum for the guidance of the naval
members of the Joint Board, February 18, 1908, General
Board File 420-1.
<
available on the West Coast, and elsewhere throughout the Pacific, he
cided that they should return to the Atlantic on the completion of
their tour. ^
There was at least one officer in the General Board who dis-
agreed with the President's decision. Captain Sydney Staunton of the
Board's First Committee, arguing that it was imprudent to make the
principle of concentration so "dogmatic, " suggested that the 16
battleships and 6 armored cruisers be kept in the Pacific and the
remaining 9 battleships and 4 armored cruisers be constituted as
part of the Atlantic fleet. He recognized the logistic limitations in
the Pacific, but thought that a decision to keep a large fleet there
would accelerate the build-up of the bases. The principle motivating
factor in Staunton's plan was
the strategic protection which it would afford to the Naval
Station at Olongapo [Subic Bay]. The army states that it can-
not defend Olongapo from a land attack during the period
necessary to bring a fleet from the Atlantic coast. But a
fleet in the Pacific, ready to move at once to the Philippines,
would probably prevent any attempt to transfer a Japanese
army over sea.
Staunton must have found some support for his proposal for he went
to the trouble of preparing a smooth copy of a memorandum embodying
his ideas for Admiral Dewey's signature. '* It was never sent and the
78. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909 ,
p. 226.
79. General Board Memorandum, June 23, 1908, General Board
File 420-1.
<
battle fleet began its return voyage on December 1, 1908. Dewey's
eluctance to forward Staunton's suggestions was probably due to the
awareness that they completely contradicted Roosevelt's ideas on
concentration and the Navy Department's statement that the fleet could
not be supported on the West Coast. Ironically, Roosevelt, like the
General Board, saw Japan as a greater menace to U. S. interests than
Germany but contrary to the thinking within the Board he did not want
to split-up the fighting ships. ^0
The General Board was not particularly impressed by the
.demarche in U. S. -Japanese relationships which occured in the last
half of 1908, and which was marked by the warm reception of the
American fleet and the exchange of notes between Messrs. Root and
TrJcahira. In February of 1909, less than two weeks before
Roosevelt left office, the Board forwarded a letter to Secretary of
.he Navy Truman H. Newberry recommending that the Staunton plan
•a
become naval policy. This was the two-ocean standard td which the
Board referred in its letter of April of 1907 with one significant
difference: the Navy had only 25 battleships completed, and not the
30 required by the earlier position. °* Roosevelt may have gotten
wind of the revolt, for just a few days earlier he told his Cabinet that
80. Roosevelt to Philander Knox, February 8, 1908, Morison, ed.
,
Roosevelt Letters, Vol. 6, pp. 1510-1514.
81. Dewey to Secnav, February 24, 1909, General Board File
420-1.
i
while there was any chance of difficulty with Japan he would resist
n es to divide the fleet and would insist on its retention in the
! Atlantic. 82
Any hope that Dewey and his officers had that a change of admin-
istration would prove more malleable in this regard proved illusory,
I
but the General Board would not yield easily on this issue. Through
. the forum of the Joint Board, President Taft was advised that
the time.
. .
is now approaching when because of the increased
size of the battle ship fleet it may be divided and a part of it
stationed in the Pacific. Such a fleet, more powerful than that
of any possible enemy in the Pacific, and based on the Pacific
yards and on the new naval station which is being developed at
Pearl Harbor, would control the Pacific and provide a
strategic defense against the invasion of the Philippines by
land.
It went on to imply that unless a more powerful force was stationed in
the Pacific, Japan would be tempted to invade the Philippines and it
would unquestionably fall into her hands. ^ This proved to be the last
formal attempt by the General Board to persuade its superiors on the
subject of the division of the fleet. There were later moves by
Captain Sydney Staunton and Commander Clarence S. Williams, both
Board members, looking to the division of the fleet, but they were
never officially adopted. The latter' s views were particularly strong.
82. M. A. DeWolfe Howe, George von Lengerke Meyer, (New York:
Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1920), p. 419, citing Mr. Meyer's
diary of February 19, 1909.
83. Report of the Joint Board, November 8, 1909, General Board
File 405.
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He maintained that the "present plan of keeping all of our battleships
in .e Atlantic is illogical and dangerous, " and would, in the event of
war with Japan, give "her a tremendous initial advantage. " Williams
observed that war with Japan was more likely than with Germany, for
even if the latter' s navy engaged in a successful war against the United
States, she would "in all probability emerge from the struggle in
such condition as to be helpless against Great Britain, "84
The final act in the long debate over the disposition of the fleet
came in November of 1910, All thirty-nine of the officers attending
the Summer Conference at the Naval War College voted unanimously
that the battle fleet should be concentrated in the Pacific Ocean, and
that portions of it return regularly to the Atlantic for major over-
haul. These officers did not expect trouble from Germany but as
they remarked:
^granting for the moment, what is not believed to be true., that
Germany is so inclined; could Germany afford to gratify
that inclination? The mere declaration of war would in large
measure cause a cessation of German trans -Atlantic trade
and would inflict grievous injury upon the German mercantile
marine; the German Navy, , . would be rendered for the time
powerless against that of Great Britain. Like two bar magnets
of equal strength placed side by side with poles reversed, each
with all its force clinging fast to the other and the two thus
joined together forming one single mass incapable of serious
disturbing influence exterior to that mass; so to-day, firmly
locked together, appear the British and German fleets. It is
'4. Memorandum by Commander C. S. Williams, March 16,
191G\, General Board File 420-1.
If
«
believed that neither country would do us harm if it could,
and it is also believed that neither country could do us vital
harm if it would.
. . .
But even if we should lose places of
such priceless value as Culebra, Porto Rico, Guantanamo,
the Isthmus, which as yet are without local defences, still,
they are not so far away from us and we could take them back
in time.
With respect to the Pacific area, these same officers observed:
if in that ocean we lose our undefended positions, which are
positions of such peculiar and extreme potential value, it
might prove impossible ever to get them back again, because
so far away from the center of power. The longer our action
should be deferred, the more hopeless it would or might
become. Moreover, conflicts of sentiment and interest,
race questions and trade rivalries, appear much more likely
arise in the Pacific than elsewhere. &5
The General Board was asked by Secretary of the Navy Meyer to
comment on the War College conclusions. The Board knew full well
that they contradicted completely his policy on the distribution of the
fleet and were also aware, from its own attempts, that his position
was less than flexible. The Board decided to reject the War College
suggestions and to support Meyer fully. It did not think that war was
probable and, while it agreed that Germany and Japan were the most
likely adversaries, it was not sure in what order they should be
ranked. However, based on the fact that Germany would be the
85. Naval War College, Committee reports on questions submitted
to the Conference, Naval War College Records, Federal
Records Center, Mechanicsburg, Pa. , Box 48.
<
"more formidable" foe, and recognizing that the East Coast could
.-ovide cheaper and higher quality logistic support to the fleet, it
recommended that the battle force be positioned in the Atlantic. The
Board did admit that this would make it "impossible to prevent Japan
from seizing Luzon, and Guam, and perhaps rading Pearl Harbor, "
but eventually the United States could acquire naval supremacy in
the Pacific, "overwhelm the Japanese fleet, isolate Japan from the
world, and bring her to terms. °° Meyer predictably approved the
Board's views and at the same time curtly told the President of the
Naval War College that in future conferences "involving important
policies of the Department, the different views be sought and sent to
the General Board. " Meyer added that he did "not desire a vote or
conclusion , . . on these important policies, or any publicity. "°^
.
This quieted the War College, and its later classes studiously
Tvoided discussing the subject of concentration. But it did not deter
the irrepressible Captain Staunton of the General Board. He raised
the question once again in April of 1912, arguing that there was not
"one chance in a thousand" that Germany would initiate hostilities
against the United States. Nor did he believe that war with Japan was
probable, although there was danger that the race issue in California
86. Dewey to Secnav, November 17, 1910.
87. Meyer to President Naval War College, November 17, 1910,
General Board File 420-1.
<
might precipitate a conflict. Staunton felt that the United States
uld, under the circumstances, safely send 12 of the older battle-
ships to the Pacific to act as a deterrent to the Japanese and ease the
fears of the residents living on the West Coast. ^^ Staunton's views
were challenged by another member of the General Board,
Commander William D. MacDougall. He was not as sanguine as his
colleague on Germany's intentions; on the contrary, he felt that any
dilution of the Atlantic fleet strength would tempt Germany to attack.
In addition, he raised the old issue concerning the inability of the
Pacific bases to adequately support a large number of battleships. 89
Dewey settled the matter by noting that Staunton's suggestions were
beyond all hope of implementation, and would not therefore, be
officially considered. 90
That the question was not raised again was not solely due to the
fact that Meyer remained Secretary through March of 1913, but also
because the naval planners began to shift their interests back to the
Atlantic area beginning in 1912. In that year the Naval War College
once again returned to the premise that Germany was the most
probable enemy and its war games for 1912 and 1913 were based on
88. Memorandum by Staunton, April 16, 1912, General Board
File 420-1.
89. Memorandum by Commander William D. MacDougall, May 7,
1912, General Board File 420-1.
90. Memorandum by Dewey, June 26, 1912, General Board File
420-1.
i
this assumption. 9 * In addition, the completion of the Panama Canal
" ras close at hand, and its availability seemed to the General Board,
not only to confirm the wisdom of keeping the fleet on the East Coast,
but also suggested the advisability of gathering in the Atlantic, "all
ships of military value, battleships, cruisers, scouts, destroyers,
submarines, and all military and other fleet auxiliaries into one
consolidated Home Fleet under one command. ..." The Board went
on to state that if there was "no particular danger of war threatening
in either ocean, " small detachments of the Home Fleet could be
assigned to "police and diplomatic duties" on the West Coast, and in
the event of trouble, they could be easily rejoined to the main fleet
through the Panama Canal. The Board thought that, in the absence
< j the threat of war in the Far East, U. S. interests there could be




War was declared in Europe four months after this recommendation
was made. Any doubts which still existed within the General Board or
at the Naval War College about the wisdom of concentration in the
Atlantic must have quickly vanished. There was no longer any need to
postulate any theories or play any war games to find out where the
greatest danger lay. Germany solved the problem, and answered for
the American naval planner the question which seemed to torture him
most: Where should the fleet be disposed. ?
TT. Naval War College, "Solutions to the Problems of 1912 and
1913, " Naval War College Records, Federal Records Center,
Mechanic sburg, Pa.




The irovement which began at the Naval War College in the late
1880's and early 1890's to formalize the process of war planning in
peacetime culminated in the establishment of the General Board of
the Navy in March of 1900. For the first time in its long history,
the Navy finally had an organization the primary function of which
was to consider with whom a war might occur, how it should be
fought, rnd how to best prepare for it. Until that time, the
Secretary of the Navy was not short of advisers; if anything, he
probably had too many. However - and in retrospect this seems
incongruous - he never had a system by which he could receive pro-
fessional advice on the overall needs of the Navy as they related to
the business of preparing for war. In effect, he received profuse
counsel on the trees but very little on the forest.
The person most responsible for the creation of the General
Board was Rear Admiral Henry Clay Taylor. His study of naval
administration, and his contacts with two fellow naval officers,
I
f ohen B. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan, convinced him that war
| planning, as an administrative process, had not received the
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attention it so critically deserved. It seemed to him that naval
officers, and their civilian superiors, generally assumed that the
onset and pace of future wars would give adequate time to prepare
for hostilities once they were close at hand. While this approach
had the virtue of simplicity, it was fraught with danger and ignored
Taylor's assumption that wars of the future would be marked by a
s-udden beginning, a rapid tempo, and great complexity.
Taylor based this estimate not only on the increasing sophisti-
cation of the instruments of naval warfare, but also on Mahan's
recently postulated thesis that the traditional roles of navies - coast
defense, blockade, and commerce destruction - were things of the past.
T
nstead, future conflicts would pit fleet against fleet, for the ultimate
prize, command of the sea. Taylor quickly embraced this theory and
'Concluded that there should be concomitant changes in the field of naval
.administration which would ensure that the American Navy would be
framed and ready to put it into practice should war come.
But even if Taylor had rejected the Mahanite view, and con-
tinued to believe that the nature of naval warfare would remain
essentially unchanged, he still had a strong case for his argument
that the Navy's organization was unsuited to its requirements. The
bureau system had already demonstrated in the crucible of war that
it was incapable of providing the Secretary with complete counsel
and, as a result, had to be supplemented with extemporized boards
to coordinate its specialized advice and to provide the Secretary with
I
.strategic plans of action. The fact that these temporary organs
proved very useful suggested strongly that they become permanent
components of naval administration to function in peacetime as well
as in war.
Taylor encountered resistance for his reorganization proposals
from three sources: the bureaus, the civilian administrators of the
Navy Department, and Congress. The opposition of the bureau
chiefs was purely of the self-serving variety. Ignoring the overall
needs of the service, they refused to acquiesce in any plan which
might erode their rather extensive power and elite status. Congress
was on the side of the bureau chiefs, not because it was sensitive
o their feelings, but because the pluralistic bureau structure
afforded the legislators a high degree of control over naval policy
and an influential voice in the proposal and disposal of funds bene-
ficial to their constituents. To them, the bureau-Congress
partnership was a useful one and should be maintained. They there-
fore had no desire to alter an organization which, in addition to
providing mutual advantage, had been in existence for over 50 years
and had apparently proved itself capable in three major wars.
Faced with this disinclination on the part of Congress and the bureau
chiefs, the Navy Department civilian administrators saw little
advantage in sponsoring Taylor's plans for a general staff. In
addition, Taylor's unfortunate selection of Germany's military
<
administration as a model conjured up the spectre that a general
staff would soon make the Secretary nothing more than a puppet and
lead to the de-Americanization of the Navy,
p
The odds were clearly against Taylor, but with remarkable
persistence he continued his campaign for seven long years.
i
Finally and quite unexpectedly Secretary Long decided in March of
1-300 to establish the General Board. It was a far cry from the
I
organization Taylor had strived for, but it was devoted to the pro-
blem of war planning nonetheless. Long's decision was quite out of
keeping with his previous expressions on the subject, and it is
difficult to assess the principal motivating factor in his action.
'ertainly one of the foremost was completely divorced from the
'c
issues; that was the selection of a position for Admiral Dewey which.
would be commensurate with his high rank, stature, and public
esteem. Indeed, there is some evidence to indicate that the Board
would never have been established if Long had not been confronted
with this problem. On the other hand, there is reason to conclude
that by 1900 he saw merit in Taylor's suggestion that he be given a
source of advice shorn of bureau parochialism. Whatever his scale
of priorities, he wanted above all else to keep peace in his conten-
tious official family. Accordingly, he assured the wary bureau
hiefs that the new organization would have no effect on them, and
he warned Taylor that the General Board would be little more than
^
in experiment, if it became a source of friction, he would not
hesitate to order its dissolution.
Although the General Board was supposed to deal with only those
enemies thought capable of challenging U. S, security, its history
reveals that it had other foes: bureau chiefs and line officer
extremists. Board members soon found that their work was being
f
seriously hindered by the intransigence of the first group. Any
1
I
movement to address problems germane to war planning, but
necessarily touching on areas of bureau interest, triggered strenuous
protests to the Secretary and raised the fear that the "experiment"
might end. Unfortunately, Secretary Long placed a higher premium
on familial peace than on unrestrained advice on naval policy, thus
'I encouraging the bureau chiefs to maintain their intractability.
I
Rear Admiral Taylor made the best of a most unsatisfactory
situation, and through his adept management demonstrated that the
General Board could perform valuable functions. It had, through its
members, staff, and association with the Naval War College, and
Office of Naval Intelligence, access to the best minds in the naval
service. Unlike the bureaus, it was not tied to any special interest,
but thought for the service as a whole. Nor was it burdened by the
details of routine administration which would consume the time
eeded to solve the large questions involved in planning for war.
However, without effective backing at the secretarial level, and
without a workable system to implement its recommendations, the
<
Board found that much of its intellectual energy was deflected and
absorbed by an unnecessarily opaque administration.
While the bureaus deserve a considerable share of the blame for
this situation, they could not have functioned as freely and disdain-
fully as they did had they not received encouragement and protection
from Congress, and so little real supervision from most of the
Secretaries of the Navy. Congressional thinking about the needs of
the Navy was unimaginative. It failed to appreciate the fact that, the
demands inherent in preparing a navy for war were growing in com-
plexity, and therefore required improved management techniques.
The actions of the legislators, and specifically their rejection of a
roposal in 1904 to "legalize" the General Board, seemed to ignore
the widened responsibilities thrust on the Navy as a result of the
acquisition of overseas territories. Curiously enough, this was the
same Congress which had approved a general staff measure for the
Army only the year before. The Army gained where the Navy failed
because it had a capable and influential spokesman in Elihu Root,
and unlike its sister service, gave a sad performance during the
Spanish-American War which vividly suggested the need for extensive
reorganization.
While the cooperation of Congress was essential to efficient war
planning, much could have been done at the secretarial level, if this
position had not been treated for the greater part of the period, as a
(
Iway station to other cabinet or governmental positions. Between
1902 and 1909, there were no less than seven Secretaries of the Navy,
and while they gave every indication that they were intelligent and
capable men, they could hardly make a significant contribution in so
short a tenure. More importantly, they were not able to tame the
bureaus and make them responsive to the overall requirements of the
service. It seems paradoxical that President Theodore Roosevelt,
admittedly very interested and expert in naval affairs, permitted this
situation to exist. Perhaps he felt so knowledgeable about the Navy
that he thought he could exercise the supervision which his cabinet
Qfficers were unable to do. Assuming this was so, he would still have
. und it impossible to maintain the day-to-day control needed to bring
together, in some sort of coherent fashion, all of the disparate
elements of the Navy Department. Neither could a short term
Secretary. As a result, the period was marked by less than effective
civilian control, the same circumstance which Long feared would
ensue if a general staff were authorized.
The second foe which the General Board encountered was com-
posed of a group of line officers who were dissatisfied with the pace
of organizational change within the Navy. While Rear Admiral
Taylor was alive, he was able to suppress their extremism. They
""^oked to him for leadership, and endorsed his conviction that until
a better organ was found, war planning could be best carried on in
the General Board. Taylor's death in 1904 left this line officer
<
faction almost leaderless. Dewey had great confidence in Taylor,
but was unable to relate in the same fashion to the rest of the group.
Besides, he did not favor the idea of a general staff and thought the
General Soard entirely adequate for war planning. Even if he felt
differently about the matter, he still would have been reluctant to
join in the fight, since it would have required him to associate his
i
illustrious name with a very controversial and unpopular movement.
Frustrated by Dewey's attitude, and lacking Taylor's enlightened
leadership, the proponents of a general staff abandoned their dis-
tinguished predecessor's proper and large methods, condemned
the General Board, and resorted to chicanery, muckraking, and
c.ner forms of extremist tactics. In so doing, they undermined
whatever good-will Taylor had cultivated over the years, hardened
congressional resistance to any organizational reform, and achieved
what the bureau advocates had hoped for - division among the line
officers.
The evidence indicates that these officers had little if any appre-
ciation for the problems of military planning in a democratic
environment. Indeed, they believed with Mahan that democratic
governments disabled efficient defense, and would have welcomed
a form of government which would have permitted a more direct and
sured link between their proposals and their implementation. As
one of them noted, they were looking for a system which would
<
'"automatically prepare" the United States for war. * In their eager-
ness to advance American naval power, they ignored the fact that
responsibility for war preparations is not concentrated in one place
or person, but is necessarily shared by the Executive, by Congress,
and ultimately by the citizens. They exaggerated the importance of
a general staff, and seemed to think that having one with wide
authority to propose as well as execute naval policy would solve all
of the Navy's problems. Even with their general staff they would
still have been subject to secretarial supervision and limited by the
strictures of congressional appropriations. Some of them even
advocated the appointment of a naval officer as Secretary of. the Navy.
~l fact, their entire philosophy suggested that they would not be
content with anything short of a militarist form of government.
From 1909 to 1913 Secretary of the Navy George Meyer
demonstrated that the Navy's war planning requirements did not
necessarily demand the radical solutions proposed by the extremists.
Unlike his predecessors, he remained in office sufficiently long to
become acquainted with the intricacies of his position and render
sound judgements on the merits of various courses of action. He
dared do what others would not and drastically curtailed the power of
the bureau chiefs without reference to their patrons in Congress,
1. Lieutenant Commander Ridley McLean to Commander
WilliamS. Sims, May 18, 1911, Sims Papers, Office of Naval.
History, Washington, D. C.
i
Contrary to the recommendations of the general staff advocates, he
also preserved the General Board, but at the same time complemented
its advice with a method to implement and monitor its approved pro-
grams. Because of Meyer's intelligent and capable leadership, the
1909 to 1913 period deserves recognition as one of the Navy's most
efficient eras from the viewpoint of general administration and war
planning.
Regrettably, Meyer failed to acquire congressional sanction for
his innovations, and his successor was able to restore the bureaus
to their former status. As a consequence, the rancor resurfaced
and with it came a renewal of the drive for a general staff. An
attempt by the reformers to eliminate the General Board a« a semi-
independent body and to effectively reduce the Secretary to a mere
figurehead fortunately failed. Finally, pressed on by the crisis in
Europe, Congress elevated war planning in the Navy to bureau status
and authorized the formation of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. While this removed the function of war planning from
the Board, it did not end its usefulness. Many succeeding secre-
taries recognized its value as an unbiased source of advice,
uncommitted to any of the many cliques within the Navy Department,
unburdened by the detail of day to day routine, and thinking for the
service as a whole. As a result, the General Board, established as
an "experiment" in 1900 continued in existence for a half a century.
i
In order to carry out its mission as the Navy Department's war
planning agency, the General Board had to develop an administrative
process which would produce the documents providing general and
specific guidance to fleet commanders in the event of war. This
system, while crude as measured by present day standards, was a
marked improvement over the disorganized and confused efforts of
the nineteenth century, and helped transform war planning from a
subsidiary endeavor to a major area of Navy Department activity.
The Board's war planning methods were designed to force naval
officers to think about future conflicts in concrete terms, to gather
the necessary intelligence information, analyze various courses of
action, select the most likely, and make the required logistic prep-
arations. Although there were no apparent weaknesses in the Board's
concept of war planning, there were several in its execution. Perhaps
the major deficiency, produced largely because of the chronic dis-
harmony between the Board and the bureaus, was the lack of adequate
logistic support. With the exception of Secretary Meyer's adminis-
tration, there was little or no real attempt to mesh materiel policy
with war plans. The quality of the plans also suffered because of a
serious shortage of personnel both within the Board and at the Naval
War College. Finally, although the Board wisely tried to get the
fleet commanders to share in the war planning process, it found all
too frequently that the latter group did not regard the plans with the
same degree of importance as did the planners.

The very nature of the war planning function demands that an
enemy be found. The Board's search was a brief one. Indeed, before
it met for the first time, Germany had been marked in the minds of
Board members as the most probable foe, and, with a few exceptions,
the prospect of war with her dominated their thinking throughout the
1900 to 1914 period. Among the many factors which prompted this
attitude were: the unfavorable impression created by German naval
activities in the Far East in the last decade of the nineteenth century;
Dewey's experience with Admiral Otto von Diederichs at Manila Bay
in 1898; Board members' endorsement of the mercantilist view that
olonies were essential to national wealth, and since Germany had not
shared to the same degree as other large powers in territorial gains,
it seemed natural that she would attempt to redress the balance,
probably at the expense of the Monroe Doctrine.
It would be difficult to accurately assess the Board's objectivity
with respect to Germany, but it is clear that many of the members
and particularly Admiral George Dewey and his close associate
Captain Nathan Sargent, possessed a definite anti-German bias which
probably colored their analysis of the German "threat. " This
prejudice undoubtedly prompted the Board to leap to unwarranted con-
clusions concerning German activities in the Caribbean. Any event,
however insignificant, was shaped to fit the a priori pattern of a
menacing Germany which would stop at nothing, including war, to
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ntention.i and capabilities was a distinctly inferior naval attache
system which provided the major portion of the Board's intelligence
information.
Although the Board insisted that the United States and Germany
were destined to go to war, it laid down one pre-condition which
made such a prospect very remote. It properly emphasized that
Germany would not attack in the Caribbean unless she were assured
of immunity from aggression in home waters. The Anglo- German
rivalry made this guarantee most unlikely. Still, the Board was
ndt willing to entrust American security to European antagonisms
and therefore wanted the deterrence provided by a fleet equal or
superior to Germany's.
In the period from 1900 to 1914, the United States had two-ocean
responsibilities and only a one-ocean fleet to protect them. This
fact plagued the Board planners and forced them to the conclusion
that the only rational war strategy for the Pacific was to avoid war
altogether. The Board never contemplated the possibility of unilateral
actio.i against the Russians over the Open Door policy, but felt that
the only feasible course of action, in view of American naval weak-
ness and the preoccupation with the Atlantic, was to /join Great
Britain and Japan in a mutual effort. This may have been feasible
om a military standpoint, but hardly from a political one consider-
ing American antipathy towards alliances. When Japan arose as the
most likely contender in Asia, it was evident to the Board that
I
moves on her part against the Philippines or other U. S. possessions
in the area. The Board strategy in this eventuality was simply to
abandon the Far East, regroup forces in Hawaii, and hopefully
recoup the losses.
Defense of territory would appear to be one of the most basic of
national responsibilities. Rightly or wrongly, the United States
acquired extensive holdings in the Caribbean and Far East in the
aftermath of the Spanish- American War. Because of a small,
standing army, and because these territories were insular in nature
and separated from the continent by large expanses of water, it
naturally devolved on the Navy to provide for their defense. This in
kurn required a network of bases to support the complex needs of
the modern warships. In addition, the bases had to be relatively
independent of the fleet for their protection, otherwise it would not
be free to seek and destroy its primary objective - the enemy fleet.
In addressing itself to these needs, the General Board exer-
cised reason and restraint although some within the Navy Depart-
ment were demanding a large and expansive naval base system. The
Board simply wanted to concentrate the effort in accordance with the
strategic needs, not only in the overseas territories, but at home as
well. Their program was essentially to have a fully developed base
the Caribbean, one in the mid-Pacific, one in the Western Pacific,
Ik two on the Atlantic Coast, and two on the Pacific Coast.
1<
The principal obstacle to the implementation of the Board's
recommendations came from Congress. The legislators were
reluctant to spend large sums of money on the overseas bases be-
cause they did not directly benefit the local economies. As a
consequence, the United States had too many bases within the con-
tinental limits and too few overseas, and those in the former
category were distributed in such a manner* as to restrict the capa-
bility of the Pacific Coast to support large numbers of ships for
long periods of time.
In retrospect it would have been more in keeping with the
national interest if Congress had rejected self-serving proposals to
inance relatively useless facilities at places like Port Royal,
Kittery, Pensacola, and New Orleans, followed the suggestions of
the General Board, and allocated the funds to more critical needs in
ihe paribbean, and the Pacific.
V&iile it is true that the division between the Army and the Navy
over a base in the Philippines resulted in eliminating that island as
a site for a large naval facility, it is probable that even if there had
been unanimity within the military, the necessary appropriations
would not have been granted by Congress. From 1901 to 1908 there
was concurrence with regard to Subic and yet its development lagged




The General Board shipbuilding proposals were designed to
achieve in a fixed period of time a specific battleship strength
supported by a balanced proportion of other type vessels. When its
long range program was first suggested in 1903, it was intended that
the 48 battleship fleet would give the United States "crushing
superiority" over the most likely foe at the time, Germany. It is
difficult to understand how the General Board could have logically
continued to insist that its goal of 48 had as much validity in 1903 as
it did in 1914, when in fact the eight year span had seen the addition
of Japan to the list of potential enemies and had been marked by
significant changes in the planned size of the German fleet. In fact
the Board, while priding itself on the consistency of its 48-battle-
ship plan, changed the criterion on which it was originally based
from "crushing superiority" to parity with Germany, without adding
Japanese strength to the equation. The Board's program may have
been consistent from a numerical standpoint, but far from it with
respect to relative power vis a vis Germany and Japan. Of course
it would have made little sense for the Board to expand its desired
end strength when congressional authorizations were not even coming
near the smaller figure.
Board members were understandably frustrated by the lack of
receptivity for the idea of a long range program. They believed that
naval policy in this respect should have "no relation to party or
I
parties, " and "should not be affected by changes of administration. "2
These views indicated a signal lack of appreciation for the democratic
system of government as it exists in the United States. The size of
the Navy was a legitimate subject of partisan politics, and like any
other aspect of the legislative process, was scrutinized and judged
on an annual basis by the Congress. Although three Presidents and
seven Secretaries of the Navy had the opportunity to endorse the
Board's 48-battleship objective, none did so probably because they
understood the futility and inutility of such an effort in the light of the
country's budgetary system.
The Board's shipbuilding program failed in other aspects as well.
Its annual proposals were generally halved by Congress and, perhaps
more significantly, altered to the extent that the desired balance
,' between battleships and other class vessels was never achieved.
•These behemoths of the sea were surely major indices of naval power,
but, as the Board correctly emphasized, it was folly to place too
great an emphasis on them to the detriment of other components of
the fleet.
Although the General Board found little success in its attempts
to acquire a balanced fleet of 48 battleships with an adequate naval
•base system to support it, it did make major strides toward
increasing the preparedness of the vessels whirh the Navy possessed.
2. Admiral George Dewey to Secretary of the Navy, March 28,
'913. General Board File 446.
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Through the efforts of the General Board, and particularly those of
Rear Admiral Taylor, the ships were forged together into fleets, and
the traditional practice of independent cruises gave way to the new
concept of multi-ship operations. The result was a more responsive
and professional Navy, far better equipped to deal with any enemy.
Soon after the fleet concept became accepted practice, a debate
began to ensue over the proper disposition of the Navy's warships.
Some within the Board, notably Rear Admiral Taylor, felt that the
doctrine of concentration espoused by the Naval War College was
important, but should not be rigidly applied, and should take into
consideration other factors such as U. S. diplomatic interests. To
them concentration was more of a tactical principle, applicable in
the event of imminent battle, and not always pertinent in a normal
peacetime environment. Their thinking was undouotedly based on
the expectation, that in the event war ame unexpectedly, a divided
fleet could avoid battle until it was brought together and its power
maximized.
Taylor's view.3 on the disposition of the fleet predominated until
after the Russo-Japanese War. That conflict convinced President
Roosevelt that the battleship fleet should never be divided until the
completion of the Panama Canal facilitated inter-oceanic communica-
tions. Some officers within the Board did not share his opinion but
found Admiral Dewey unwilling to challenge what he felt was an
(
irrevocable decision on the part of the President. These officers
thought that a small force of battleships n the Pacific would deter
Japanese planners from any adventure, and still not dilute the
Atlantic Fleet below a strength which would invite German aggres-
sion. Roosevelt's strong stand on fleet concentration not only
suppressed any moves toward a more flexible policy during his
administration, but during William Howard Taft's tenure as well.
In the absence of an actual conflict it would be hard to judge the
relative merits of the different views on the fleet's disposition, but
the debate from 1900 to 1914 indicated that the Navy's ship strength
.and naval base support facilities, were far from adequate in view of
the nation's far-flung responsibilities, and most inconsistent with
th£ Board's convictions that American security was endangered by
major powers in both the Atlantic and Pacific.
One final observation might be drawn from the history of the
General Board from 19C0 to 1914, and that relates to the problem
of war planning in a democratic environment like the United States.
As the Board's experiences illustrate, preparing for war in a peace-
time context is in itself a complex venture. Even totalitarian
governments with their concentrated system of decision-making must
find this so. The process is made tremendously more complicated
with the American form of government because it involves so many
stages: the large number of military specialists, the civilian
<
executives, the President, the Congress, and the citizens. It is
important that efficiency in this regard be sought not by any sacrifice
of the principles inherent in the society, nor in any organizational
gimmicks, but through an informed partnership which acts in accor-
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